SCIENTIFIC IMPERIALISM AND BEHAVIORIST EPISTEMOLOGY

ABSTRACT: E.O. Wilson and B.F. Skinner have argued for an evolutionary ethics that allows what ought to be to be derived from what is-ethics from science. Evolution is inherently unpredictable, however, and some practices whose benefits cannot be proved might nevertheless turn out to be good for the survival of a culture or the race. Other practices that seem to be good might turn out to be bad. Consequently, the evolutionary argument implies that a successful culture will believe some things that cannot be proved, and it tells us that we cannot know in advance what those things will be.

Key words: evolutionary ethics, epistemology, E.O. Wilson, B.F. Skinner

It is widely believed in the academy, and not rarely beyond, that science provides, or will provide, a complete guide to action. Obviously science can and should guide action in many respects. It tells us how to build a bridge or a plane, how to cure many diseases (physical and, occasionally, mental), how to grow crops, and how to lay bets in games of chance. However, some questions, typically those termed "ethical" or to do with morality, have usually been regarded as beyond the limits of science. This separation of "ought" from "is" is less observed now than it was a few years ago. Even as general knowledge of science has declined in Western cultures (a substantial percentage of Harvard graduates apparently believe that the seasons are caused by changes in the Earth's distance from the sun, according to a recent survey, for example), and even as criticism of the objective basis for science has gained currency in humanities departments, faith in science as the ultimate arbiter of everything continues to increase. Scientific imperialism1-the idea that all decisions, in principle, can be made scientifically-has become, in effect, the religion of the intellectuals.

A particularly clear statement of this view was provided recently by the eminent biologist E.O. Wilson, the Aristotle of sociobiology, a lucid and persuasive writer and masterful chronicler of the behavior and taxonomy of ants. In a book that "proposes. . .a grand, coherent conception encompassing the sciences, the arts, ethics, and religion" that is breathlessly reviewed as "a work to be held in awe" and "a book of immense importance" (from the dustjacket), Wilson argues that science can indeed solve all problems, including ethical ones. He writes, "If the empiricist world view is correct, ought is just shorthand for one kind of factual statement..." (Wilson, 1998, p. 251).2

Wilson was preceded in this view by behaviorist B.F. Skinner. As I have pointed out elsewhere (Staddon, 2001), Skinner usually just assumed an ethical basis for his societal prescriptions without being very specific about what it was or where it came from (e.g., one of his many memorable phrases, "To confuse and delay the improvement of cultural practices by quibbling about the word improve is itself not a useful practice" [Skinner, 1955/1961, p. 6]), but at other times he discussed three bases for ethics. One was just conventional practice. Ethical behavior was behavior that was reinforced by the community; unethical behavior was punished by the community. Another was simple hedonism: "good" is what feels good (i.e., "is reinforcing") and "bad" is what feels bad. The third basis anticipated Wilson: "good" is what has been-and will be-selected for during genetic and, especially, cultural evolution.

Skinner's approach was through evolutionary epistemology, a position that first came to prominence during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when it contributed to social Darwinism and other controversial movements. Evolutionary epistemology has now returned to fashion along with evolutionary psychology. In this article I will look again at Skinner's and Wilson's approach to evolutionary epistemology to see how successful it is in converting "ought" to "is." I will argue that in difficult ethical cases it fails. Skinner and Wilson are both wrong, I believe, and for reasons that would have been obvious if both had not been so anxious to change the world in the direction they both knew to be right. I will argue that rational analysis alone shows that there will be areas forever and in principle closed to science. In these areas people may reasonably follow other systems of belief-religious, humanistic, philosophical-to aid them in making decisions that can never, even in principle, be based on scientific proof.

The Darwinian Metaphor

In a 1966 paper entitled "The Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Behavior" (Skinner, 1966; see also 1981) Skinner turned to a view of reinforcement that was quite different from the "strengthening" metaphor he had inherited from Thorndike. According to Darwin, nature acts to favor certain individuals for survival and reproduction-to select individuals. Nature does not, as was previously believed, actively strengthen their adaptive characteristics. Cuvier's "Law of the Conditions of Existence," which seemed to attribute adaptation to the direct action of the environment, was "fully embraced by the principle of natural selection" (Darwin, 1872/1951, p. 217). In the same way, argued Skinner, reinforcement does not directly strengthen behavior, as older views implied. Instead reinforcement selects behavior in a quasi-Darwinian fashion. Just as adaptation in nature can be traced to selection rather than direct environmental action, so (Skinner claimed) adaptation to contingencies of reinforcement reflects the selective action of reinforcement.