Sherman Antitrust Act

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The Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act, July 2, 1890, ch. 647, , ), was the first United States government action to limit cartels and monopolies. It is the first and oldest of all U.S., federal, antitrust laws.

The Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal". The Act also provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony [. . . ] The Act put responsibility upon government attorneys and district courts to pursue and investigate trusts, companies and organizations suspected of violating the Act. The Clayton Act (1914) extended the right to sue under the antitrust laws to "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.. Under the Clayton Act, private parties may sue in U.S. district court and should they prevail, they may be awarded treble damages and the cost of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees.

History

The Sherman Act was signed by President Benjamin Harrison in 1890 and was named after its author, Senator John Sherman, an Ohio Republican, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, the Secretary of Treasury under President Rutherford Hayes, and Secretary of State under President William McKinley. After passing in the Senate on April 8, 1890 by a vote of 51-1, the legislation passed unanimously (242-0) in the House of Representatives on June 20, 1890.

The Purpose of the Act

Despite its name, the Act has fairly little to do with "trusts". Around the world, what U.S. lawmakers and attorneys call "Antitrust" is more commonly known as "competition law." The purpose of the act was opposition combinations of entities that could potentially harm competition, such as monopolies or cartels. Its reference to trusts today is anachronism. At the time of its passage, the trust was synonymous with monopolistic practice, because the trust was a popular way for monopolists to hold their businesses, and a way for cartel participants to create enforceable agreements. .

The Sherman Act was not specifically intended to prevent the dominance of an industry by a specific company, despite misconceptions to the contrary. According to Senator George Hoar, an author of the bill, any company that "got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he could" would not be in violation of the act. The law attempts to prevent the artificial raising of prices by restriction of trade or supply In other words, innocent monopoly, or monopoly achieved solely by merit, is perfectly legal, but acts by a monopolist to artificially preserve his status, or nefarious dealings to create a monopoly, are not.

The Legal Effects of the Act

The Act is brief and not highly specific. This meant that responsibility for the development of Antitrust law was entrusted to the U.S. courts, particularly the Supreme Court, which have the power to interpret federal statutes.

The Act was not used in court cases for several years after its passage. President Theodore Roosevelt used the Act extensively in his antitrust campaign, including to divide the Northern Securities Company. President William Howard Taft used the Act to split the American Tobacco Company.

(a) Cartels and Agreements "in restraint of trade"

(i) "Per se" Illegality versus the Rule of Reason

Section 1 of the Act prohibits "agreements, conspiracies or trusts in restraint of trade," making them a crime. Not every alleged agreement is treated alike. The Court has interpreted this section to prohibit arrangements that unreasonably manipulate trade, differentiating between two kinds of conduct: agreements which are very likely to raise costs to consumers, and those which might, but were not highly likely to be harmful.

The court gave this distinction legal meaning by characterizing conduct that is overwhelmingly likely to be harmful as illegal per se. Per se illegal conduct has always been limited, consisting chiefly of horizontal price-fixing or territorial division agreements. Other kinds of agreements that might be harmful to consumers but aren't necessarily, can only be won if the plaintiff satisfies the Rule of Reason. This requires the plaintiff to prove that the agreement caused economic harm, in addition to proving that the defendant acted as charged.

(ii) Was The Court once biased against big business? Is it biased towards big business today?

Most of the Section 1 cases coming before The Supreme Court between the turn of the century and the 1980s were dealt with under the per se rule. Later cases, including all of the Sherman Act cases before the court in the 21st century have been dealt with mainly under the rule of reason, if not dismissed outright. Thus it appears that courts before the Reagan years were biased against big business, and those since have been biased towards them. Whether or not this is true, it is not evident from the quantity of cases disposed of in the two rules. It must be noted first that it has remained well-settled that plain vanilla price fixing is per se illegal, as much now as ever. The modern cases have been appealed because they involve new kinds of conduct that were not settled in early appeals from Sherman Act suits. These cases tend to involve conduct in a grey area, where it is not literal price fixing or territorial division, but something allegedly tantamount.

What has changed since the Burger court transitioned to the Rehnquist court and with the Roberts court, is that courts are are unwilling to expand per se illegality to encompass new forms of conduct, even if they are allegedly tantamount to price fixing. Earlier cases were conflciting, but generally willing to treat as per se illegal, conduct that bore any resemblance to price fixing.

(iii) Actual Modern Trends

(A) The "Quick Look" Rule of Reason

A modern trend in Section 1 cases has been the "quick-look" rule of reason. Where conduct is not clearly per se illegal, but is arguably tantamount to price fixing, territorial division, or otherwise lacks the appearance of legitimacy, the court may apply a modified rule of reason. Taking a "quick look," economic harm is presumed from the questionable nature of the conduct, and the burden is shifted to the defendant to prove harmlessness or justification. The quick-look became a popular way of disposing of cases where the conduct was in a grey area between per se illegality, and demonstrable harmfulness under the rule of reason.

(B) Inference of Conspiracy

Two modern trends have increased the difficulty for antitrust plaintiffs. First, courts have come to hold plaintiffs to increasing burdens of pleading. Under older Section 1 precedent, it was not settled how much evidence was required of the conspiracy. It could be inferred. Since the 1970s, courts have held plaintiffs to higher standards, giving antitrust defendants an opportunity to resolve cases in their favor, before much, if any discovery is done. This protects defendants from bearing the costs of an antitrust "fishing expeditions." However, it deprives plaintiffs of perhaps their only tool to acquire evidence.

Second, courts have employed more sophisticated and principled definitions of markets. Market definition is necessary in rule of reason cases, for the plaintiff to prove a conspiracy is harmful. It is also necessary for the plaintiff to establish the market relationship between conspirators to prove their conduct is within the per se rule.

In early cases, it was easier for plaintiffs to show market relationship, or dominance, by tailoring market definition, even if it ignored fundamental principles of economics.[E.g. in U.S. v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563 (1966), the trial judge, [Wyzanski] composed the market only of alarm companies with services in every state, tailoring out any local competitors; the defendant stood alone in this market, but had the court addded up the entire national market, it would have had a much smaller share of the national market for alarm services that the court purportedly used. The appellate courts affirmed this finding, however, today, an appellate court would likely find this definition to be flawed. Today's courts generally seem to use more sophisticated market definition that do not permit as manipulative a definition.

(b) Monopoly

Section 2 of the act forbade monopoly. In section 2 cases, the court has, again on its own initiative, drawn a distinction between coercive and innocent monopoly. The act is not meant to punish businesses that come to dominate their market passively or on their own merit, only those that intentionally dominate the market through misconduct, which generally consists of conspiratorial conduct of the kind forbidden by section 1 of the Sherman Act, or Section 3 of the Clayton Act.

The Act was aimed at regulating businesses. However, its application was not limited to the commerce side of business. Its prohibition of the cartel was also interpreted to make illegal many labor union activities. This is because unions were characterized as cartels as well (cartels of laborers). This persisted until 1914, when the Clayton Act created exceptions for certain union activities.

Criticism of the Sherman Antitrust Act

Critics question whether the Act improves competition and benefits consumers, or merely aids inefficient businesses at the expense of larger, more innovative ones. Alan Greenspan, in his essay entitled Antitrust

condemns the Sherman Act as stifling innovation and harming society. He says: "No one will ever know what new products, processes, machines, and cost-saving mergers failed to come into existence, killed by the Sherman Act before they were born. No one can ever compute the price that all of us have paid for that Act which, by inducing less effective use of capital, has kept our standard of living lower than would otherwise have been possible."

Others debate whether the goal of antitrust legislation should be increased competition or lower prices. For example, arguing in favor of the Act in 1890, Representative William Mason said "trusts have made products cheaper, have reduced prices; but if the price of oil, for instance, were reduced to one cent a barrel, it would not right the wrong done to people of this country by the trusts which have destroyed legitimate competition and driven honest men from legitimate business enterprise. On the other hand, some believe that as long as a monopoly is not a coercive monopoly where a firm is securely insulated from potential competition, it will keep prices low in order to discourage competition from arising. Hence, they believe legal action is uncalled for, and wrongly harms the firm and consumers.

Some believe that antitrust laws have a protectionist effect. Economist Thomas DiLorenzo notes that Senator Sherman sponsored the 1890 William McKinley tariff just three months after the Sherman Act, and agrees with The New York Times which wrote on October 1, 1890: "That so-called Anti-Trust law was passed to deceive the people and to clear the way for the enactment of this...law relating to the tariff" and said Sherman attacked trusts because they "subverted the tariff system; they undermined the policy of government to protect American industries by levying duties on imported goods." Dilorenzo says: "Protectionists did not want prices paid by consumers to fall. But they also understood that to gain political support for high tariffs they would have to assure the public that industries would not combine to increase prices to politically prohibitive levels. Support for both an antitrust law and tariff hikes would maintain high prices while avoiding the more obvious bilking of consumers.

Conservative legal scholar, judge, and failed Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork is also noted for his outspoken criticism of the antitrust regime.

Notes

External links

Official websites

Additional information

Antitrust Division's "Corporate Leniency Policy"
Antitrust by Alan Greenspan
Dr. Edward W. Younkins (February 19, 2000). "Antitrust Laws Should Be Abolished"
DiLorenzo, Thomas Cato Handbook for Congress, Antitrust
Sherman Anti-Trust Act Full text and commentary

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