In the summary of the report the grievances of the Arabs were listed as follows:
1. The British in Palestine, now led by a Zionist, had adopted "a policy mainly directed towards the establishment of a National Home for the Jews, and not to the equal benefit of all Palestinians".
2. An official advisory body to the government in Palestine, the Zionist Commission, placed the interests of the Jews above all others.
3. There was an undue proportion of Jews in the government.
4. Part of the Zionist program was to flood the country with people who possessed "greater commercial and organizing ability" which would eventually lead to their gaining the upper hand over the rest of the population.
5. The immigrants were an "economic danger" to the country because of their competition, and because they were favored in this competition.
6. Immigrants offended the Arabs "by their arrogance and by their contempt of Arab social prejudices".
7 Owing to insufficient precautions, Bolshevik immigrants were allowed into the country leading to social and economic unrest in Palestine.
Some Jews claimed to the Commission that the cause of the trouble was propaganda from a small class of Ottoman supporting Arabs who regretted the departure of the old regime. The British "had put an end to privileges and opportunities of profit formerly enjoyed by them". However, the Commission was satisfied that this was not the case and that the feeling against the Jews was "too genuine, too widespread, and too intense to be accounted for in the above superficial level". Any anti-British feeling by Arabs had arisen because of their association with the furtherance of the policy of Zionism.
The report made clear that the "racial strife was begun by the Arabs" and that the "Arab majority, who were generally the aggressors, inflicted most of the casualties." "The [Arab] police were, with few exceptions, half-trained and inefficient, in many cases indifferent, and in some cases leaders or participators in violence" and, while a large part of the Moslem and Christian communities condoned the riots, "they did not encourage violence. While certain of the educated Arabs appear to have incited the mob, the notables on both sides, whatever their feelings may have been, aided the authorities to allay the trouble."
Five Jewish agricultural colonies had been attacked, but "in these raids there were few Jewish and many Arab casualties, chiefly on account of the intervention of the military."
The commission added that: "We have been assured, and we believe, that had there been no Jewish question, the Government would have had no political difficulty of any importance to deal with so far as its domestic affairs were concerned". There was "no evidence worth considering" that the Jaffa riots were planned; "had that been the case, we hesitate to conjecture what the consequences would have been". As long as the Jews remained an "unobtrusive minority" as they did under the Turks, they were not "molested or disliked"; it was only when the Arabs came to believe that they were exercising a "preponderating influence over the Government" that a state of feeling emerged which required "but a minor provocation on the part of a small number of undesirable Jews to ignite an explosion of popular anger against Jews in general".
The report noted that: "Moslems, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Maronites and other Uniates, Anglicans have been represented by witnesses, who included priests of the above Christian bodies: and it has been impossible to avoid the conclusions that practically the whole of the non-Jewish population was united in hostility to Jews".
Dr David Eder, head of the Zionist Commission, had addressed the committee and stated that only Jews should be allowed to bear arms, and that "there can only be one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish preponderance as soon as the numbers of the race are sufficiently increased.
On the King's Birthday, 3rd June 1921, Samuel made the first official interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, assuring the Arabs that immigration would be controlled according to the "economic absorptive capacity" of the country - and in fact suspended immigration, though only temporarily. He hastened the establishment of the Supreme Muslim Council, while restricting its powers exclusively to religious matters.
Perhaps most significantly, it was proposed that the anomalous position of the Zionist Organisation should be abolished and the country governed with the help of a body that represented all sections of the community. These proposals by Samuel caused significant unhappiness amongst the Zionists, such that Chaim Weizmann suggested to George MacDonogh, director of military intelligence (1916-18) and a pro-Zionist sympathizer, that Samuel be replaced as high commissioner. Meanwhile, the Arabs demanded the removal of Samuel and another Zionist, Mr Bentwich, his legal adviser. The Arabs felt that they were "the victims of Zionist coercion of the Government, which they most thoroughly distrust", and that "nothing short of a modification of the Jewish policy and the establishment of some form of proportional representation will ease the situation'.
In his 'Political Report' for June 1921, Samuel reported the details of his new scheme to the colonial secretary Winston Churchill. He wrote that, since his speech of 3 June, the Jewish population had been "very nervous and apprehensive" and considered the speech a "severe set-back" to their aspirations. He maintained, however, that this feeling had been "a good deal modified" since Jewish colonies had been "provided with arms (under conditions strictly limiting their use to self-defence)".
There was another outburst of violence on 2 November 1921, the fourth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. Private correspondence within the Colonial Office suggested that the Zionist Commission was making it appear that His Majesties Government "was bound hand and foot to the Zionists, that the statement of the 3rd June was mere dust thrown in their eyes, and all Legislation here was, and would continue to be inspired by Zionist interest"
Ultimately, the Haycraft Report did not affect British policy in Palestine.