Double-aspect theory

Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia - Cite This Source

In the philosophy of mind, double-aspect theory is the view that the mental and the physical are two aspects of the same substance. The theory's relationship to neutral monism is ill-defined, but one proffered distinction says that whereas neutral monism allows the context of a given group of neutral elements to determine whether the group is mental, physical, both, or neither, double-aspect theory requires the mental and the physical to be inseparable and irreducible (though distinct). Notable double-aspect theorists include Baruch Spinoza, Gustav Fechner, Arthur Schopenhauer, George Henry Lewes, and Thomas Nagel. David Chalmers explores a double-aspect view of information.

The Scientist-theologian John Polkinghorne argues for "dual aspect monism" "there is only one stuff in the world (not two - the material and the mental) but it can occur in two contrasting states (material and mental phases, a physicist might say) which explain our perception of the difference between mind and matter

See also

• Property dualism

Notes

Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia © 2001-2006 Wikipedia contributors (Disclaimer)
This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License.
Last updated on Tuesday March 11, 2008 at 05:47:28 PDT (GMT -0700)
View this article at Wikipedia.org - Edit this article at Wikipedia.org - Donate to the Wikimedia Foundation