CEILIDH is a
public key cryptosystem based on the
discrete logarithm problem in
algebraic torus. This idea was first introduced by
Alice Silverberg and
Karl Rubin in
2003. The main advantage of those schemes is the reduced size of the keys for the same security than the basic schemes.
The name CEILIDH comes from the Scots Gaelic word ceilidh which means a traditional Scottish Gathering.
Algorithms
Parameters
- Let be a prime power.
- An integer is chosen such that :
- The torus has an explicit rational parametrization.
- is divisible by a big prime where is the Cyclotomic polynomial.
- Let where is the Euler function.
- Let a birational map and its inverse .
- Choose of order and let .
Key agreement scheme
This Scheme is based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
- Alice choses a random number .
- She computes and sends it to Bob.
- Bob choses a random number .
- He computes and sends it to Alice.
- Alice computes
- Bob computes
is the identity, thus we have :
which is the shared secret of Alice and Bob.
Encryption scheme
This scheme is based on the ElGamal encryption.
- Key Generation
- Alice choses a random number as her private key.
- The resulting public key is .
- Encryption
- The message is an element of .
- Bob choses a random integer in the range .
- Bob computes and .
- Bob sends the ciphertext to Alice.
- Decryption
- Alice computes .
Security
CEILIDH scheme is base on ElGamal scheme and thus is based on the same security properties.
If the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds the underlying cyclic group , then the encryption function is one-way.
If the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH) holds in , then
CEILIDH achieves semantic security. Semantic security is not implied by the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption alone. See decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption for a discussion of groups where the assumption is believed to hold.
CEILIDH encryption is unconditionally malleable, and therefore is not secure under chosen ciphertext attack. For example, given an encryption of some (possibly unknown) message , one can easily construct a valid encryption of the message .
References
- Karl Rubin, Alice Silverberg: Torus-Based Cryptography. CRYPTO 2003: 349–365
External links