Byzantine army

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The Byzantine Army was the primary military body of the Byzantine armed forces, serving alongside the Byzantine Navy. A direct descendant of the older Roman and Hellenistic Greek armies, the Byzantine Army maintained a similar level of discipline, strategic prowess and organization.

The Early Byzantine army received a mixed diet of victory and defeat - consequently the cavalry arm became more prominent as the legions were abandoned. Later reforms reflected some Germanic and Asian influences - with every encounter against a ferocious opponent the Byzantines would find a new source of excellent mercenaries with Huns, Cumans, Alans and (following the Battle of Manzikert) Turks sating the Empire's appetite for light cavalry mercenaries. Since much of the Byzantine military focused on the strategy and skill of generals utilizing militia troops, heavy infantry were recruited from Frankish and later Varangian mercenaries.

From the 7th century to the 11th century the Byzantine Army was among the most powerful and effective military forces - neither Dark Age Europe nor the fracturing Caliphate could match the strategies and the efficiency of the Byzantine army that allowed it to fight with fewer resources. With one of the most powerful economies in the world at the time the Empire had the resources to put to the field a powerful host when needed.

However the Theme system encouraged the growth of the aristocracy whose control over the military units decentralized the government. After the collapse of the Theme system in the 11th century, the Byzantines grew increasingly reliant on Tagmata troops which fought for pay rather than for duty as the Pronairs and the Thema troops did. Consequently the loss of the Anatolian land left the Empire with increasingly fewer resources to field such an expensive mercenary army and by the 13th century the Byzantine army was a mere shadow of its former self. To the end the Empire remained resourceful with ample weapons available for the inadequetly trained militia of Constantinople, yet lacking in technology.

Today the tactics utilized by the Byzantine army is studied by various militaries of the modern world.

Byzantine troop types

Kataphraktoi

The word cataphract (from the Greek κατάφρακτος, kataphraktos) was what Greek- and later Latin-speaking peoples used to describe heavy cavalry. Historically the cataphract was a heavily-armed and armoured cavalryman who saw action from the earliest days of Antiquity up through the High Middle Ages. Originally, the term cataphract referred to a type of armour worn to cover the whole body and that of the horse. Eventually the term described the trooper himself. The cataphracts were both fearsome and disciplined. Both man and horse were heavily armoured, the riders equipped with lances, bows and maces. These troops were slow compared to other cavalry, but their effect on the battlefield, particularly under the Emperor Nikephoros II, was devastating. More heavily armoured types of cataphract were called clibanarii (klibanaphoroi). These were eventually subsumed by the cataphract, and as such most Byzantine heavy cavalry became known as cataphracts.

Cavalry

The Byzantine cavalry were usually armed with bows, lances and swords, they were ideally suited to combat on the plains of Anatolia and northern Syria, which, from the seventh century onwards, constituted the principal battleground in the struggle against the forces of Islam. While not as heavily armed and armoured as western Knights, they were particularly effective against both the Arabs and Turks in the east, and the Hungarians and Pechenegs in the west.

Infantry

The Byzantine Empire's military tradition originated in the late Roman period, and its armies always included professional infantry soldiers. Though they varied in relative importance during the Byzantine army's history, under Basil II in particular heavy infantry were an important component of the Byzantine army. These troops generally had mail armour, large shields, and were armed with swords and spears. Under militarily competent emperors such as Basil II, they were among the best heavy infantry in the world.

Pronoiars

Pronoiar troops began to appear during the twelfth century, particularly during the reign of the emperor Manuel I Komnenos (1143-1180). These were soldiers paid in land instead of money, but they did not operate under the old theme system of the middle Byzantine period. Pronoiai developed into essentially a license to tax the citizens who lived within the boundaries of the grant (the paroikoi). Pronoiars (those who had been granted a pronoia) became something like tax collectors, who were allowed to keep some of the revenue they collected. These men are therefore generally considered to have been the Byzantine equivalent of western knights: part soldiers, part local rulers. However, it is important to note that the emperor was still the legal owner of the Pronoiars' land. Usually cavalry, pronoiars would have been equipped with mail armour, lances, and horse barding. Manuel re-equipped his heavy cavalry in western style at some point during his reign; it is likely that many of these troops would have been pronoiars. These troops became particularly common after 1204, in the service of the Empire of Nicaea in western Asia Minor.

Akritoi

Akrites (plural Akritoi or Akritai) were defenders of the Anatolian borders of the Empire. They appeared after either the Arab conquests, or much later when Turkish tribes raided Anatolia from the east. The Akritoi units were formed from native Greeks living near the eastern borders. Whether such men were really soldier-farmers or lived on rents from smallholdings while concentrating on their military duties is still a matter of debate. The Akritoi were probably mostly light troops, armed with bows and javelins. They were most adept at defensive warfare, often against raiding Turkish light horsemen in the Anatolian mountains, but could also cover the advance of the regular Byzantine army. Their tactics probably consisted of skirmishing and ambushes in order to catch the fast-moving Turkish horsearchers.

Foreign and mercenary soldiers

The Byzantine army frequently employed foreign mercenary troops from many different regions. These troops often supplemented or assisted the empire's regular forces; at times, they even formed the bulk of the Byzantine army. But for most of the Byzantine army's long history, foreign and military soldiers reflected the wealth and might of the Byzantine empire, for the emperor who was able to gather together armies from all corners of the known world was formidable.

Foreign troops during the late Roman period were known as the foederati ("allies") in Latin, and during the Byzantine period were known as the Phoideratoi (Gr. Φοιδεράτοι) in Greek. From this point, foreign troops (mainly mercenaries) were known as the Hetairoi (Gr. Ἑταιρείαι, "Companionships") and most frequently employed in the Imperial Guard. This force was in turn divided into the Great Companionships (Μεγάλη Εταιρεία), the Middle Companionships (Μέση Εταιρεία), and the Minor Companionships (Μικρά Εταιρεία), commanded by their respective Hetaireiarches - "Companionship lords". These may have been divided upon a religious basis separating the Christian subjects, Christian foreigners, and non-Christians, respectively.

Additionally, during the Komnenian period, the mercenary units would simply be divided by ethnicity and called after their native lands: the Inglinoi (Englishmen), the Phragkoi (Franks), the Skythikoi (Scythians), the Latinikoi (Latins), and so on. Ethiopians even served during the reign of Theophilos. These mercenary units, especially the Skythikoi, were also often used as a police force in Constantinople.

The most famous of all Byzantine regiments was the legendary Varangian Guard. This unit traced its roots to the 6,000 Rus sent to Emperor Basil II by Vladimir of Kiev in 988. The tremendous fighting abilities of these axe-wielding, barbarian Northerners and their intense loyalty (bought with much gold) established them as an elite body, which soon rose to become the Emperors' personal bodyguard. This is further exemplified by the title of their commander, Akolouthos (Ακόλουθος, "Acolyte/follower" to the Emperor). Initially the Varangians were mostly of Scandinavian origin, but later the guard came to include many Anglo-Saxons (after the Norman Conquest) as well. The Varangian Guard fought at the Battle of Beroia in 1122 with great distinction, and were present at the Battle of Sirmium in 1167, in which the Byzantine army smashed the forces of the Kingdom of Hungary. The Varangian Guard is thought to have been disbanded after the sack of Constantinople by the forces of the Fourth Crusade in 1204; nearly all contemporary accounts agreed that they were the most important Byzantine unit present and were instrumental in driving off the first Crusader assaults.

Byzantine weapons

Late Roman weapons

Evidence for Weapons

Representational evidence, including propaganda monuments, gravestones, tombs, and the Exodus fresco, often shows Roman soldiers with one or two spears; one tombstone shows a soldier with five shorter javelins. Archaeological evidence, from Roman burials and Scandinavian bog-deposits, shows similar spearheads, though the shafts are rarely preserved.

Representational evidence sometimes still shows Roman swords. Archaeological evidence shows that the gladius has disappeared; various short semispathae supplement the older pugiones while medium-long spathae replace the medium-short gladii. These have the same straight double-edged blades as older Roman swords.

Representational evidence and recovered laths, as well as arrowheads and bracers, show Roman use of composite bows.

Evidence for Shields

Representational evidence, recovered bosses, and some complete shields from Dara, show that most Roman infantry and some Roman cavalry carried shields.

Evidence for Armor

Although the representational evidence, including gravestones and tombs, usually shows soldiers without armor, the archaeological evidence includes remains of scale armor, mail armor, and helmets.

Armies of the early Byzantine Empire

Just as the Byzantine Empire (Gr. Βυζαντινή Αυτοκρατορία or, more properly, Βασιλεία Ρωμαίων) was a continuation of the Roman Empire, so the Byzantine army was an outgrowth of the earlier Roman structure. Provinces (provinciae) were originally under civilian jurisdiction, with governors appointed by the Roman Senate or by the emperor himself; the army consisted of thirty-odd legions quartered along the inhabited borders of the empire. The old Roman systems lasted until the early 7th century.

Byzantine Army strength:

Year	Strength
300¹	343,000
457	335,000
518	301,000
540	374,000
559	150,000
641	129,000
668	129,000
773	80,000
842	155,000
959	179,000
1025	250,000
1143	50,000
1261	10,000
1320	7,000

¹Figure for the Eastern Armies of the Roman Empire under Diocletian

Reforms of the army under Diocletian and Constantine

The Eastern Empire dates from the creation of the Tetrarchy ("Quadrumvirate") by the Emperor Diocletian in 293. His plans for succession did not outlive his lifetime, but his reorganization of the army did by centuries. Rather than maintain the traditional infantry-heavy legions, Diocletian reformed it into limitanei ("border") and comitatenses ("field") units. There was an expansion of the importance of the cavalry, though the infantry still remained the major component of the Roman armies, in contrast to common belief. For example, in 478, an Eastern field army consisted of 8,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry and it can be calculated that in 357 Emperor Julian had 10,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry at Strasbourg. But the importance of cavalry for the commanding officers, though not the numbers, did increase, and by the time of Justinian, the numbers had increased, too.

The limitanei and ripenses were to occupy the limes, the Roman border fortifications. The field units, by contrast, were to stay well behind the border and move quickly where they were needed, whether for offensive or defensive roles, as well as forming an army against usurpers. The field units were held to high standards and took precedence over Limitanei in pay and provisions.

Cavalry formed about 1/3 of the units, but as a result of smaller units, about 1/4 of the Roman armies consisted of cavalry. About half the cavalry consisted of heavy cavalry (including the stablesiani). They were armed with spear or lance and sword and armored in mail. Some had bows, but they were meant for supporting the charge instead of independent skirmishing. In the field armies there was a component of some 15% of cataphractarii or clibanarii, heavily armoured cavalry who used shock tactics. The light cavalry (including the scutarii and promoti) featured high amongst the limitanei, being very useful troops on patrol. They included horse archers (Equites Sagitarii)y. The infantry of the comitatenses was organized in regiments (variously named legiones, auxilia or just numeri) of about 500-1,200 men. They were still the heavy infantry of old, with a spear or sword, shield, body armour and a helmet. But now each regiment was supported by a detachment of archers and some skirmishers. If needed, the infantry could take off (some of) their armour to act in a more flexible way as Modares did (according to Zosimus) during the Gothic War of the 370s. The regiments were commanded by a tribunus ("tribune") and brigaded in pairs (cavalry units did, too) under a comes. These brigades probably were tactical and strategic units only, as no traces survive of brigade staff corps.

On the other hand, little is known of the limitanei. The old legions, cohorts and cavalry alae survived there, and newer units were created (the new legions, or auxilia and vexillationes, amongst the cavalry. The limitanei infantry may have been lighter-equipped than the comitatenses infantry, but there is no evidence whatsoever. They were paid less than the field troops and recruited locally. Consequently, they were of inferior quality. However, they were in the line of fire. They countered most incursions and raids. Thus, it can be assumed they did have superior field experience (except in periods of long campaigning for the comitatenses), though that experience did not extend to large battles and sieges.

Scholae units, which were more properly known as the Schola Protectores Domestici and the "Protective Association of the Royal Escort" (also called the Obsequium), were the personal guard of the Emperor, and were created to replace the Praetorian Guard disbanded by Constantine I. The legions in the third and fourth century were not the legions of the Republic or earlier Roman empire, that they consisted largely or solely of equites troops, and that they tended to be far short of the Augustinian legion component of 5,000 men.

Army of Justinian I and his successors

Armies of the middle Byzantine period

Themata

Main article: Thema

Usually attributed to Heraclius, the thema (Gr. θέματα) were administrative divisions of the empire in which a general (Gr. στρατηγός*) exercised both civilian and military jurisdiction. The name is peculiar; Treadgold's closest guess is that thema was being used to denote "emplacements".

The five original themata were all in Asia Minor and designed to counter the Arab Muslim conquests that had already consumed the Egyptian and Syrian provinces during the Byzantine-Arab Wars. They were:

Thema Armeniakon (Αρμενιακόν), formed around the Army of Armenia established by Justinian I, comprising eastern Anatolia from Cappadocia to the Black Sea and the Euphrates;
Thema Anatolikon (Ανατολικόν), formed around the Army of the East, comprising the Byzantine holdings in central and southeastern Asia Minor;
Thema Opsikion (Οψίκιον), formed around the Obsequium ("Retinue"), a comitatensis force previously kept in the presence of the emperor, comprising Bithynia and Paphlagonia;
Thema Thrakesion (Θρακήσιον), formed around the Army of Thrace, comprising south-western Asia Minor around Ionia; and
Thema Karabisianon (Καραβησιάνων), the "Theme of Ships" in Pamphylia and Rhodos, which was a naval theme responsible for fending off the Arab navy.

Within each theme, eligible men were given grants of land to support their families and to equip themselves (πρόνοια). The population of the first four were directed into the army; Karabisianon supplied the men for the navy, although shipbuilding itself was subsidized (intermittently) by various departments of the Imperial treasury. The pattern was adopted in short order for the Empire's holdings in the West as well.

Following revolts strengthened by the large size of these divisions, Leo III the Isaurian, Theophilus, and Leo VI the Wise all responded by breaking the themes up into smaller areas and dividing control over the armies within each theme into various tourmai. Further, instead of expanding existing themes, the emperors of the resurgent Macedonian dynasty tended to create new ones in the areas they conquered. By the time of the writing of De Thematibus in the tenth century, Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus listed twenty-eight themata.

Sicily had been completely lost to the expanding Emirate of Sicily at the beginning of Constantine VII's reign in 905 and Cyprus was a condominium jointly administered with the Abbasid caliphate until its reconquest by Nicephorus II Phocas in 965. Constantinople itself was under an eparchos (earlier the praefectus urbi) and protected by the numerous tagmata and police forces.

Under the direction of the thematic strategoi, tourmarchai commanded from two up to four divisions of soldiers and territory, called tourmai. Under them, the droungarioi headed subdivisions called droungoi, each with a thousand soldiers. On the field, these units would be further divided into banda with a nominal strength of 300 men, although at times reduced to little more than 50. Again, the fear of empowering effective revolts was largely behind these subdivisions.

The following table illustrates the thematic structure as found in the Thracesian Theme, circa 902-936.

Name	No. of personnel	No. of subordinate units	Officer in command
Themata	9 600	4 Merẽ	Strategus
Turma, Meros	2 400	6 Drungi	Turmarch
Drungus	400	2 Banda	Drungary
Bandum	200	2 "Centuria"	Count
"Century"	100	10 "Contubernia"	Hecatontarch
	50	5 "Contubernia"	Pentecontarch
"Contubernium"	10	1 "Vanguard" + 1 "Rear Guard"	Decarch
"Vanguard*"	5	n/a	Pentrarch
"Rear Guard*"	4	n/a	Tetrarch

Note: The terms have been Latinized and terms in quotations are contignuations of the Roman Legion system or * direct translations.

Imperial tagmata

Main article: Tagma

The tagmata (τάγματα, "Battalions") were the standing army of the Empire, typically headquartered in or around Constantinople, although in later ages they sent detachments to the provinces. The remains of Diocletian' armies became the first tagmata, which were turned into the thematic forces under the Heraclian Dynasty. Around the same time, some tagmata were formed as social clubs for the well-connected nobles of the capital. Justinian, for instance, is said to have amused himself by including one of these units, the Scholae, in mock active deployment lists, thus causing a panic amongst their upper class gentlemen-soldiers, who had no desire to leave the safety of Constantinople for the discomfort and danger of an actual military campaign.

After the first set of thematic revolts reminded the emperors of the utility of a loyal standing force, however, the tagmata were reformed under a separate administration, improved in equipment and training, and continued to be used until the end of the empire.

The four most prestigious tagmata, in order, were:

the Scholae (Gr. Σχολαί, "the Schools"), the direct successor of the imperial guards established by Constantine;
the Excubiti or Excubitores (Gr. Εξκούβιτοι, "the Watchmen"), established by Leo I;
the Arithmos (Gr. Αριθμός, "the Numbers") or Vigla (Gr. Βίγλα, the "Watch"), established probably sometime in the late 5th to early 6th century; and
the Hikanatoi (Gr. Ικανάτοι, "the Able Ones"), established by Emperor Nicephorus I.

All of these were cavalry units consisting of 1,000-6,000 men each. A strength of 4,000 each appears to have been standard. The Numeroi (Gr. Νούμεροι, "Bathhouse boys" for their base of operations in the city), the Optimatoi (Gr. Οπτιμάτοι, "the Best"), and the tagma ton Teikhon (Gr. Τειχών, "of the Walls") were infantry tagmata. The Vigla and the Numeroi assisted in the policing of Constantinople; the tagma ton Teikheon, as the name suggests, manned the Theodosian walls and was generally responsible for the defense of the capital.

In addition to these more or less stable units, any number of shorter-lived tagmata were formed as pet units of various emperors. Michael II raised the Tessarakontarioi, a special marine unit, and John I Tzimisces created a corps called the Athanatoi (Gr. Αθάνατοι, the "Immortals") after the old Persian unit.

The tagmatic units were commanded by a domestikos, with a topoteretes as a lieutenant, except for the Vigla, which was commanded by a drungarios. The heads of the banda comprising the units, were headed by a komes. The Domestikos ton Scholon, the head of the Scholae regiment, became gradually more and more important, eventually coming to be the most senior officer by the end of the 10th century.

Komnenian army

Establishment and successes

At the beginning of the Komnenian period in 1081, the Byzantine Empire had been reduced to the smallest territorial extent in its history. Surrounded by enemies, and financially ruined by a long period of civil war, the empire's prospects had looked grim. Yet, through a combination of skill, determination and years of campaigning, Alexios I Komnenos, John II Komnenos and Manuel I Komnenos managed to restore the power of the Byzantine Empire by constructing a new army from the ground up. The new force is known as the Komnenian army. It was both professional and disciplined. It contained formidable guards units such as the Varangian Guard and the Immortals (a unit of heavy cavalry) stationed in Constantinople, and also levies from the provinces. These levies included Kataphraktoi cavalry from Macedonia, Thessaly and Thrace, and various other provincial forces from regions such as the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor.

Under John II, a Macedonian division was maintained, and new native Byzantine troops were recruited from the provinces. As Byzantine Asia Minor began to prosper under John and Manuel, more soldiers were raised from the Asiatic provinces of Neokastra, Paphlagonia and even Seleucia (in the south east). Soldiers were also drawn from defeated peoples, such as the Pechenegs (cavalry archers), and the Serbs, who were used as settlers stationed at Nicomedia. Native troops were organised into regular units and stationed in both the Asian and European provinces. Komnenian armies were also often reinforced by allied contingents from Antioch, Serbia and Hungary, yet even so they generally consisted of about two-thirds Byzantine troops to one-third foreigners. Units of archers, infantry and cavalry were grouped together so as to provide combined arms support to each other.

This Komnenian army was a highly effective, well-trained and well-equipped force, capable of campaigning in Egypt, Hungary, Italy and Palestine. However, like many aspects of the Byzantine state under the Komneni, its biggest weakness was that it relied on a powerful and competent ruler to direct and maintain its operations. While Alexios, John and Manuel ruled (c. 1081-c. 1180), the Komnenian army provided the empire with a period of security that enabled Byzantine civilization to flourish. Yet, as we shall see, at the end of the twelfth century the competent leadership upon which the effectiveness of the Komnenian army depended largely disappeared. The consequences of this breakdown in command were to prove disastrous for the Byzantine Empire.

Neglect under the Angeloi

In the year 1185, the emperor Andronikos I Komnenos died. With him died the Komnenos dynasty, which had provided a series of militarily competent emperors for over a century. They were replaced by the Angeloi, who have the reputation of being the most unsuccessful dynasty ever to occupy the Byzantine throne.

The army of the Byzantine empire at this point was highly centralised. It was dominated by a system in which the emperor gathered together his forces and personally led them against hostile armies and strongholds. Generals were closely controlled, and all arms of the state looked to Constantinople for instruction and reward.

However, the inaction and ineptitude of the Angeloi quickly lead to a collapse in Byzantine military power, both at sea and on land. Surrounded by a crowd of slaves, mistresses and flatterers, they permitted the empire to be administered by unworthy favourites, while they squandered the money wrung from the provinces on costly buildings and expensive gifts to the churches of the metropolis. They scatterred money so lavishly as to empty the treasury, and allowed such licence to the officers of the army as to leave the Empire practically defenceless. Together, they consummated the financial ruin of the state.

The empire's enemies lost no time in taking advantage of this new situation. In the east the Turks invaded the empire, gradually eroding Byzantine control in Asia Minor. Meanwhile in the west, the Serbs and Hungarians broke away from the empire for good, and in Bulgaria the oppressiveness of Angeloi taxation resulted in the Vlach-Bulgarian Rebellion late in 1185. The rebellion led to the establishment of the Second Bulgarian Empire on territory which had been vital to the empire's security in the Balkans. Kaloyan of Bulgaria annexed several important cities, while the Angeloi squandered the public treasure on palaces and gardens and attempted to deal with the crisis through diplomatic means. Byzantine authority was severely weakened, and the growing power vacuum at the centre of the empire encouraged fragmentation, as the provinces began to look to local strongmen rather than the government in Constantinople for protection. This further reduced the resources available to the empire and its military system, as large regions passed outside central control.

Analysis of the Byzantine military collapse

Structural weaknesses

It was in this situation that the disintegration of the military 'theme' system, which had been the foundation of the empire's remarkable success from the eighth to eleventh centuries, revealed itself as a real catastrophe for the Byzantine state.

The first advantage of the theme system had been its numerical strength. It is thought that the Byzantine field army under Manuel I Komnenos (r. 1143-1180) had numbered some 40,000 men. However, there is evidence that the thematic armies of earlier centuries had provided the empire with a numerically superior force. The army of the theme of Thrakesion alone had provided about 9,600 men in the period 902-936, for example. Furthermore, the thematic armies had been stationed in the provinces, and their greater independence from central command meant that they were able to deal with threats quickly at a local level. This, combined with their greater numbers, allowed them to provide greater defense in depth.

The other key advantage of the theme system was that it had offered the Byzantine state good value for money. It provided a means of cheaply mobilising large numbers of men. The demise of the system meant that armies became more expensive in the long run, which reduced the numbers of troops that the emperors could afford to employ. The considerable wealth and diplomatic skill of the Komnenian emperors, their constant attention to military matters, and their frequent energetic campaigning, had largely countered this change. But the luck of the empire in having the talented Komneni to provide capable leadership was not a long term solution to a structural problem in the Byzantine state itself. After the death of Manuel I Komnenos in 1180, the Angeloi had not lavished the same care on the military as the Komneni had done, and the result was that these structural weakness began to manifest themselves in military decline. From 1185 on, Byzantine emperors found it increasingly difficult to muster and pay for sufficient military forces, while their incompetence exposed the limitations of the entire Byzantine military system, dependent as it was on competent personal direction from the emperor. The culmination of the empire's military disintegration under the Angeloi was reached on 13 April 1204, when the armies of the Fourth Crusade sacked Constantinople and dismantled the Byzantine Empire. The old Byzantine empire was at an end.

Conclusion

Thus, the problem was not so much that the Komnenian army was any less effective in battle (the thematic army's success rate was just as varied as that of its Komnenian counterpart); it is more the case that, because it was a smaller, more centralised force, the twelfth century army required a greater degree of competent direction from the emperor in order to be effective. Although formidable under an energetic leader, the Komnenian army did not work so well under incompetent or uninterested emperors. The greater independence and resilience of the thematic army had provided the early empire with a structural advantage that was now lost.

For all of the reasons above, it is possible to argue that the demise of the theme system was a great loss to the Byzantine empire. Although it took centuries to become fully apparent, one of the main institutional strengths of the Byzantine state was now gone. Thus it was not the army itself that was to blame for the decline of the empire, but rather the system that supported it. Without strong underlying institutions that could endure beyond the reign of each emperor, the state was extremely vulnerable in times of crisis. Byzantium had come to rely too much on individual emperors, and its continued survival was now no longer certain.

Armies of the successor states and of the Palaeologi

After 1204 the emperors of Nicaea continued some aspects of the system established by the Komneni. However, despite the restoration of the empire in 1261, the Byzantines never again possessed the same levels of wealth, territory and manpower that had been available to the Komnenian emperors and their predecessors. As a result, the military was constantly short of funds. After the death of Michael VIII Palaiologos in 1282, unreliable mercenaries such as the grand Catalan Company came to form an ever larger proportion of the remaining forces.

At the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Byzantine army totalled about 7,000 men, 2,000 of whom were foreign mercenaries. Against the 80,000 Ottoman troops besieging the city, the odds were hopeless. The Byzantines resisted the third attack by the Sultan's elite Janissaries and according to some accounts on both sides were on the brink of repelling them, but a Genoan general in charge of a section of the defense, Giovanni Giustiniani, was grievously wounded during the attack, and his evacuation from the ramparts caused a panic in the ranks of the defenders. Many of the Italians, who were paid by Giustiniani himself, fled the battle. Some historians suggest that the Kerkoporta gate in the Blachernae section had been left unlocked, and the Ottomans soon discovered this mistake -although accounts indicate that this gain for the Ottomans was in fact contained by defenders and pushed back. The Ottomans rushed in. Emperor Constantine XI himself led the last defense of the city, and throwing aside his purple regalia, dove headfirst into the rushing Ottomans, dying in the ensuing battle in the streets, along with his soldiers. The fall of the capital meant the end of the Byzantine empire. The Byzantine army, the last surviving direct descendant of the Roman Legions, was finished.

Byzantine military philosophy

Despite the importance the Byzantine Empire attached to its position as the defender of true, orthodox Christianity against Muslim and Catholic alike, it is worth noting that the Empire never developed or understood the concept of a "holy war". Its neighbours' concepts of Jihad and Crusade seemed to it gross perversions of scripture or simple excuses for looting and destruction. Emperors, generals and military theorists alike found war to be a failing of governance and political relations, to be avoided whenever possible. Only wars waged defensively or to avenge a wrong could in any sense be considered just, and in such cases the Byzantines felt that God would protect them.

Major wars of the Byzantine Empire

Roman-Persian Wars

Byzantine-Arab Wars

Byzantine-Bulgarian Wars

Crusades

Byzantine-Ottoman Wars

Fall of Constantinople

Major battles of the Byzantine Empire

Early Byzantine period

Middle Byzantine period

Late Byzantine period

Battle of Pelagonia (1259)
Fall of Constantinople (1453)

Notes

References

Primary sources

Notitia Dignitatum, an early 5th century document, describing the disposition of the legions in both Western and Eastern Roman Empire
The Strategikon, a military handbook of the late 6th century, attributed to the Emperor Maurice
De Administrando Imperio, a government handbook of the 10th century, attributed to the Emperor Constantine VII Phorphyrogenitus
Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions, also attributed to Emperor Constantine VII Phorphyrogenitus and ed. by John Haldon and others

Secondary sources

Bartusis, Mark C., The Late Byzantine Army
Elton, Hugh, Warfare in Roman Europe
Haldon, John, Byzantium at War
Haldon, John, Warfare, state and society in the Byzantine World
Haldon, John, Byzantine Praetorians
Heath, Ian, Byzantine Armies 886-1118
Heath, Ian, Byzantine Armies AD 1118-1461
Kaegi, Walter, "Byzantine Military Unrest, 471-843: An Interpretation"
MacDowall, Simon, Late Roman Infantryman AD 236–565
MacDowall, Simon, Late Roman Cavalryman AD 236–565
Moroz, Irina, "The Idea of Holy War in the Orthodox World", Quaestiones medii aevi novae v. 4
Nicolle, David, Romano-Byzantine Armies 4th-9th Centuries
Nicolle, David, Yarmuk AD 636
Rance, Philip, 'The Fulcum, the Late Roman and Byzantine Testudo: the Germanization of Roman Infantry Tactics?' in Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 44.3 (2004) pp. 265-326, at: http://www.duke.edu/web/classics/grbs/FTexts/44/Rance2.pdf.
Simkins, Michael, The Roman Army from Hadrian to Constantine
Treadgold, Warren, A History of the Byzantine State and Society
Treadgold, Warren, Byzantium and Its Armies, 284-1081
Wise, Terence, Armies of the Crusades

External links

De re militari.org - The Society for Medieval Military History

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