The Dieppe Raid, also known as The Battle of Dieppe or Operation Jubilee, during the Second World War, was an Allied attack on the German-occupied port of Dieppe, Seine-Inférieure on the Northern coast of France on 19 August 1942. Over 6,000 infantrymen, predominantly Canadian, were supported by large British naval and Allied air force contingents. The objective was to seize and hold a major port for a short period, both to prove it was possible and to gather intelligence from prisoners and captured materials while assessing the German responses.
No major objectives of the raid were accomplished. 3,623 of the 6,086 men who made it ashore were either killed, wounded, or captured. The Allied air forces failed to lure the Luftwaffe into open battle, and lost 119 planes, while the Royal Navy suffered 555 casualties. The catastrophe at Dieppe later influenced Allied preparations for Operation Torch and Operation Overlord.
In the immediate aftermath of the evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk
the British started on the development of a substantial raiding forceunder the umbrella of Combined Operations
. This was accompanied by development of techniques and equipment for amphibious warfare
In late 1941 a scheme was put forward for the landing of 12 divisions around Le Havre
based on a withdrawal of German troops to counter Soviet success in the East. From this came a proposed test of the scheme in the form of Operation Rutter. Rutter was to test the feasibility of capturing a port in the face of opposition, the investigation of the problems of operating the invasion fleet and testing equipment and techniques of the assault.
The origins of the raid were unusual. Various raids had been planned, but the Dieppe raid was brought into reality only by the desires of the new Chief of Combined Operations
, Louis Mountbatten
. One of Mountbatten's principal assistants, Captain John Hughes-Hallett
, served as Naval Commander of the raid. The actual raid was undertaken without
the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and many elements in the planning suffered from the unofficial nature of the raid.
The previous Chief of Combined Operations, Roger Keyes, who had commanded the famous raid on Zeebrugge in 1918, had been ordered to organise raids on occupied Europe. He was replaced by Mountbatten in 1941, through the direct intervention of Winston Churchill, and a number of raids took place – notably Operation Archery (Vaagso, Norway), Operation Biting (Bruneval), and the larger attack at St Nazaire to put the drydock out of action. Detractors of Mountbatten have contended that all the raids prior to Dieppe were originated under the leadership of Keyes.
The 1942 raid on Dieppe was initially planned for July and code-named Operation Rutter
. The aims were straightforward: to seize and hold a major port for a short period, to test the possibility of gathering intelligence from prisoners and captured materials, and to examine the German reaction. The nature of combined operations would also allow the Royal Air Force to draw the Luftwaffe
into a large, planned encounter and the use of Canadian troops would, it was hoped, satisfy the Canadian commanders following the long inactivity of Canadian forces in England. Churchill grew more supportive as the defeats in northern Africa
incited a wave of press and parliamentary criticism.
Operation Rutter was approved in May 1942. It consisted of a main attack onto the Dieppe town beach, two flanking attacks by paratroops, a thousand sorties by Allied air forces and a naval bombardment. The Canadian 2nd Division would lead the attack, elements advancing as far as Arques. The operation was scaled down, especially the RAF bombing support as destruction of the town, and civilian casualties, was not desired, but the troops boarded their ships on 5 July. In an ominous occurrence foreshadowing future events, on the eve of Rutter's departure, which coincided with the final day of favourable maritime conditions forecast, German bombers swept through and attacked the 250 strong Allied flotilla moored off the south coast of England. In addition to causing the abortion of Operation Rutter, it also illustrated to the Allied command how difficult maintaining the element of surprise would be in carrying out such an invasion.
Almost all concerned believed that a raid on Dieppe was now out of the question; however, though Montgomery
wanted it cancelled indefinitely, Mountbatten did not. He began reorganising the raid from 11 July
as Operation Jubilee
. Despite not receiving Combined Chiefs of Staff authorisation, Mountbatten instructed his staff to proceed in late July. This lack of top-level go-ahead resulted in certain dislocations in the planning. For example, the failure to inform the Joint Intelligence Committee
or the Inter-Service Security Board
meant none of the intelligence agencies were involved, consequently the operation was mounted on information that was months out of date.
The paratroopers, which were dependent on weather and the availability of aircraft, were replaced by commandos. Flank attacks were to seize the headlands. To this was added an attack on a German HQ and an airfield further inland.
Order of battle
Operation Jubilee still relied on the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division
under Major-General J.H. Roberts
to attack Dieppe, Puys
, while the paratroop assault on the flank gun batteries was replaced by an amphibious assault
by British Commandos
and United States Army Rangers
. Ground support was provided by thirty of the new Churchill tanks
, to be delivered using the new Landing Craft Tanks
Two hundred and fifty ships and landing craft formed the fleet not including Royal Navy minesweepers and destroyers.
Dieppe and the flanking cliffs were relatively weakly defended. The German 571st Infantry Regiment
was understrength, with a total of 1,500 men. They were thinly deployed along the beaches of Dieppe and the neighboring towns, covering all the likely landing places. In respect of machine guns
it was adequately protected with a concentration on the main approach, (particularly in the myriad of cliff caves), and with a reserve at the rear. They were stationed not only in the towns themselves, but also between the towns in open areas and highlands that overlook the beaches. A garrison of only 150 men, for example, defended the beaches at Dieppe, while a smaller garrison of 50 men defended the beaches at Puys. Lacking in terms of infantry capacity, the Germans would focus on setting up extensive defensive perimeters throughout the area. Elements of the 571st defended the radar station
near Pourville and the battery over the Scie at Varengeville. To the west the 570th Infantry Regiment
were deployed near the battery at Berneval.
The massive Allied air support for the operation amounted to about 70 squadrons
, with the overwhelming majority coming from RAF Fighter Command
, including 48 squadrons of Spitfires
including all three Eagle Squadrons
. The opposing Luftwaffe
forces were: Jagdgeschwader 2
(JG2) and JG 26
, with 200 fighters, mostly the new Focke-Wulf Fw 190s
and about 100 bombers from Kampfgeschwader 2
(KG2), KG 45
and KG 77
, mostly Dornier 217s
. On paper at least, the Allies would have a numerical advantage.
The Allies were, in reverse to the Battle of Britain, at the extent of the operating range of most fighters and had a limited time over target, while the Germans were mostly flying from or could refuel at nearby airfields. This enabled the Germans to maintain air superiority over the battle area once they had concentrated their effort.
Minesweepers cleared paths through the English Channel
for the shipping. The Landing craft were escorted by Motor Gun Boats
, Motor Launches
, and Landing Craft Flak
for fire support.
Roughly 252 ships left various ports on the night of 18 August
and as they approached the French coast early on the 19th, things began to go wrong.
Left Flank, Yellow Beaches: No. 3 Commando
The mission of Lieutenant Colonel John Durnford-Slater's No. 3 Commando was to neutralize a German coastal battery (code named GOEBBELS), near Berneval, which could engage the landing at Dieppe some six km to the west. The three 170 mm and four 105 mm guns of 2/770 Batterie
had to be out of action by the time the main force approached the main beach.
The craft carrying No. 3 Commando, No. 5 Group, approaching the coast to the east were not warned of the approach of a German coastal convoy that had been located by British "Chain Home" radar stations at 2130 hours. German S-boats escorting a German tanker torpedoed some of the landing craft and disabled the escorting Steam Gun Boat 5. Subsequently Motor Launch 346 and Landing Craft Flak 1 combined to drive off the German boats but the Group was dispersed, with some losses, and the enemy's coastal defences were alerted. Only a handful of commandos under the Second in Command, Major Peter Young, landed and scaled the barbed wire-laced cliffs. Eventually 18 Commandos reached the perimeter of the GOEBBELS Battery via Bernevall and engaged their target with small arms fire. Unable to destroy the guns, their sniping of the German gun crews, however, prevented the guns from firing effectively on the main assault. Thus, just a handful of determined British soldiers neutralised the most dangerous German coastal battery in the area of the raid for the most critical period of the operation.
Right Flank, Orange Beaches: No. 4 Commando
No. 4 Commando landed in force and destroyed their targets, providing the only success of the operation. Most of No. 4 safely returned to England. This portion of the raid was considered a model for future commando raids. Lord Lovat
became famous as an officer here on Orange Beach (and was awarded the Distinguished Service Order
for his part), and Captain Patrick Porteous
attached to No. 4 Commando, won the Victoria Cross
The Canadians in the centre suffered greatly, at least in part due to the inexperience of Roberts, who unwisely committed the reserve force to the main beaches. Poor small unit leadership has also been blamed for failures once men went ashore.
The landing at Blue Beach near Puys by the Royal Regiment of Canada was delayed and the potential advantages of surprise and darkness were lost. The well-placed German forces held the Canadians that did land on the beach with little difficulty. A total of 225 men were killed, 264 surrendered and 33 made it back to England. The beach was defended by just 60 Germans, who at no time felt the need to reinforce their position. Several platoons of the Black Watch were also employed at Blue Beach; some of their casualties were suffered in a grenade-priming accident on the transport ships during the channel crossing.
On the other side of the town at Pourville (codenamed Green Beach) the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada made it ashore with few losses. The Saskatchewan advance on Dieppe was soon halted while the Camerons were halted just short of their objective. With time running out, both regiments suffered more as they withdrew; the bravery of the landing craft crew allowed 341 men to embark but increasing pressure meant that the rest were left to surrender. Another 141 had died. The CO of the Saskatchewans, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Cecil Ingersoll Merritt was awarded the VC for his gallantry before being made a POW.
One of the special objectives of the Dieppe Raid was to discover the importance and accuracy of a German radar station emplaced on the cliff-top just to the east of the town of Pourville. To achieve this, RAF Flight Sergeant Jack Nissenthall, a radar specialist who had also completed Commando training in his spare time, was attached to the Saskatchewans. He was to attempt to enter the radar station and learn its secrets, accompanied by a small unit of the Saskatchewans as bodyguards. Nissenthall volunteered for the mission fully aware that, due to the highly sensitive nature of his knowledge of Allied radar technology, his Saskatchewan bodyguard unit were under orders to kill him if necessary to prevent him being captured. He also carried a cyanide pill as a last resort. Nissenthall and his Saskatchewan bodyguards failed to enter the radar station due to strong defences, but Nissenthall was able to crawl up to the rear of the station under enemy fire and cut all telephone wires leading to it. This forced the crew inside to resort to radio transmissions to talk to their commanders, transmissions which were intercepted by listening posts on the south coast of England. The Allies were able to learn a great deal about the arrays of German radar stations along the channel coast thanks to this one simple act, which helped to convince Allied commanders of the importance of developing radar jamming technology. Jack Nissenthall managed to escape back to England despite a large number of the Saskatchewans being captured.
The main attack was at three points: the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment (Calgary Regiment)
in the middle with The Essex Scottish Regiment
to the east and The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
to the west. Attacking thirty minutes after the flanking assaults and onto a steep pebble beach all the groups were met with intense fire. The eastern assault was held at the beach. By the end of the raid, The Essex Scottish Regiment
had suffered 121 fatal casualties, with many others wounded and captured. The western assault gained a hold in a shore-front casino but few soldiers made it across the road and they were soon held. The tanks arrived a little late to discover their landing point was difficult. Twenty-nine of 58 tanks disembarked, two "drowned" in deep water, 27 made it ashore but only 15 managed to climb the chert pebbles of the beach and cross both the anti-tank ditch that the Germans were still digging, and the sea-wall onto the esplanade under fire from pill boxes and flanking cliff top positions. However, they were completely stopped by anti-tank
walls blocking exits from the Esplanade, were immobilized, or later returned to the beach to cover the withdrawal. The engineers
whose job it was to clear such obstacles were unable to do so because of heavy fire which the tanks could not suppress. Back on the beach, the tanks provided fire support, as best they could, and covered the withdrawal.
The supporting naval bombardment was supplied by six Hunt class destroyers; these lacked an appropriate coastal bombardment round or sufficient weight of broadside, and did not have the range to destroy the German strongpoints without themselves coming under heavy fire. They were also unable to communicate directly with those on the shore to make their bombardment effective.
The debacle was compounded when, acting on fragmentary messages, the reserve was committed to the Dieppe beach at around 0700 hours. The 584 men of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal took fire during their run-in to the beach and once ashore, with only 125 returning to England at day's end. The other part of the reserve comprised 369 men of "A" Commando , General Robert's reserve and, in their first action, ordered to White Beach to support "if possible". The first of their craft landed under withering machine gun fire and their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph "Tiger" Phillips, put on white gloves to semaphore the order to his landing craft to withdraw. He was hit and killed in the process. All but one saw the signal and withdrew, though several craft were already hit. None of the Commandos who landed advanced more than a few yards onto the shore.
At 1050 hours a general order to withdraw was issued.
Casualty figures vary: according to one source, of 6,090 men, 1,027 were killed and 2,340 captured. The Official History of the Canadian Army: Six Years of War (Vol 1 2nd ed) gives the figures of 907 Canadians being killed, including while in captivity
. Some 2,210 Canadians of 4,963 that were sent made it back to England (it must be noted that nearly 1,000 of these never landed). The total number of fatal and non-fatal casualties, some of whom were evacuated off the beach, is given as 3,367. Overhead the Allied air forces lost 119 aircraft while the Luftwaffe
lost just 46. As well, of the 58 tanks sent, 29 were landed and lost. The German losses amounted to 311 killed, wounded, and missing.
William Southam brought ashore his copy of the assault plan, classified as a secret document. Although he attempted to bury it under the pebbles at the time of his surrender, he was spotted and the plan retrieved by the Germans. The plan, later criticised for its size and needless complexity, contained orders to shackle prisoners. The Germans later also received reports of the bodies of German prisoners who had been accidentally killed by German fire during the Canadian withdrawal washing ashore with their hands tied. When this was brought to Hitler
's attention he ordered the shackling of Canadian prisoners, which led to a reciprocating order by Churchill for German prisoners in Canada. Both orders quickly lost momentum in prison camps
until being abandoned after intercession by the Swiss
. It is however, believed to have contributed to Hitler's decision to issue the Commando Order
later that year.
There have been various attempts to re-evaluate the raid against larger objectives. Picknet, Prince and Prior in Friendly Fire...
(2005) describe the raid's origins arising from fundamental disagreements between the Allies over strategy. The USSR
was demanding a second front
be opened immediately, to relieve the pressure on them of German attack. They suspected the West of being quite happy to see the Communists
destroy each other. Roosevelt
in reality was eager to accommodate Stalin, and also motivated by domestic politics
. Left-wingers were following the Soviet line, former anti-war Isolationists
were asking pointedly why Japan
was not to be dealt with first, and the Press were impatient for action either way. Without consulting his other ally he therefore promised to Molotov
during meetings in Washington May/June 1942, that he was prepared to hazard up to 120,000 men that year to help relieve pressure on the Eastern front
(knowing well that they could not and would not be American forces, still organizing and building up).
Churchill was aghast. While he fully appreciated the need to keep the Soviet Union in the war and America focused on the European theatre, and therefore saw the political logic for a show of force, understandably he balked at a full-scale strategic commitment uncertain of success. One Gallipoli (a First World War debacle in which Churchill had himself played a role) in a lifetime was quite enough. Playing for time, he agreed to countersign their Washington Communique promising a second front in 1942, on the understanding it was to be "misinformation". The raid became the British response to this American and Soviet fait accompli, a counterpart, unasked for "compromise". No evidence has ever come to light to support the dark rumours the operation was deliberately sabotaged. Nevertheless its failure had a desirable effect for the British on American overconfidence. One example of this retrospective justification was the presence by 1943 of 33 divisions on the Atlantic Wall.
Debate over German foreknowledge
First hand accounts and memoirs of many Canadian veterans who documented their experiences on the shores of Dieppe remark about the preparedness of the German defenses as if they knew of the raid ahead of time. Commanding officer Lt. Colonel Labatt testified to having seen markers on the beach used for mortar practice, which appeared to have recently been placed. Furthermore, upon touching down on the Dieppe shore, the landing ships were immediately shelled with the utmost precision as troops began exiting. The recent target practice and subsequent precision shelling is indicative of a well prepared army. Although official historian C.P. Stacey discounts that mortar targets alluded to foreknowledge, Labatt's personal experience on the shores of Dieppe and testimony is one of many that hint that the Germans were expecting an attack. In another instance Major C. E. Page, while interrogating a German soldier, found out that 4 machine gun battalions were brought in specifically
in anticipation of a raid. However, the most compelling information supporting German foreknowledge resides with the numerous accounts of interrogated German prisoners, German captors, and French citizens who all conveyed to Canadians that the Germans had been preparing for the anticipated allied landings for weeks. The German Army was clearly ready for an assault at its peak strength in 1942, mainly because of the high level of training for German soldiers and the large number of German military personnel still available for the defense of France during the summer. Historian Brian Loring-Villa goes further and suggests in his book that news of the Raid may have been deliberately leaked to the Germans.
Other forces involved
- A total of 50 US Rangers went ashore at various locations in order to gain battle experience, suffering the first American land casualties of the war in Europe. Lt. Edward V Loustalot of Louisiana is widely believed to have been the first of the three Americans to die in the fighting.
- Twenty men of No. 3 Troop No. 10 (inter-allied) Commando participated in the raid. The various troops of No. 10 (inter-allied) Commando were generally known by their country of origin, be it Free French (No. 1 Troop), Dutch (No. 2 Troop), Belgian (No. 4 Troop), Norwegian (No. 5 Troop), Polish (No. 6 Troop), or Yugoslavian (No. 7 Troop). No. 3 was also known as X-Troop because it was composed of German speaking Jewish refugees from the continent. It was not until long after the war the origin of the men in this troop was made known.
- During the raid, a mortar platoon from the Calgary Highlanders commanded by Lt. F.J. Reynolds was attached to the landing force but stayed offshore. Sergeants Lyster and Pittaway were decorated with a Mention in Despatches for their part in shooting down two German aircraft, and one officer of the regiment was killed while ashore with a brigade headquarters.
- Seven Free French ships were part of the naval component.
- Out of six Hunt class destroyers supporting the landing, one was Polish ORP Ślązak
- There were at least 69 RAF squadrons committed. This included British (46), Canadian (9), Polish (7), Czech (2), Norwegian (2), Belgian (1), French (1), and New Zealand (1) squadrons. B-17s of 340th, 341st, 342nd, and 414th squadrons of the USAAF 97th Bombardment Group were also tasked.
- Foreign Ministry translator Paul Schmidt was tasked with the questioning of the captured Allied soldiers.
Some have argued that the lessons learned at Dieppe in 1942 were put to good use later in the war. Mountbatten later claimed, “I have no doubt that the Battle of Normandy was won on the beaches of Dieppe. For every man who died in Dieppe at least ten more must have been spared in Normandy in 1944.The amphibious assaults
at North Africa
were only three months away. The more successful Normandy landings
would occur two years later, in 1944. On the other hand, amphibious assaults had already been developed as early as Gallipoli
, and the lessons allegedly learned at Dieppe might have been discovered – albeit at a cost – in subsequent operations such as the invasion of Sicily
), the landings at Salerno
), and Anzio
Regardless, following the experience at Dieppe, the British developed a whole range of specialist armoured vehicles which allowed their engineers to perform many of their tasks protected by armour, most famously Hobart's Funnies. These vehicles were used successfully in the British and Canadian landings in Normandy in 1944. There were also improvements made in shore-to-sea communications, and many more and bigger ships were used for ship-to-shore bombardment.
- Three Victoria Crosses were awarded for the operation, one British (Patrick Anthony Porteous, Royal Artillery in No. 4 Army Commando) and two Canadians, (The Reverend John Weir Foote padre to Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and Charles Cecil Ingersoll Merritt O/C the South Saskatchewan Regiment).
- The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division liberated Dieppe, and held a victory parade shortly afterwards, in the first week of September 1944. The German garrison fled as the division approached.
- Major General J.H. "Ham" Roberts, the commander of the 2nd Division, commanded the division for several months after the raid. In early 1943 he was transferred to command of reinforcement units in the United Kingdom. While some, including Roberts himself, feel he was made a scapegoat for Dieppe, historian Jack Granatstein in his book The Generals insists Roberts was simply not up to commanding a division and the cause of his dismissal was failure to perform adequately on Exercise SPARTAN, well after Dieppe. Roberts had served in the First World War as an artillery officer, and won the Military Cross in summer 1940 as a lieutenant colonel for saving the guns of his regiment (Royal Canadian Horse Artillery) from abandonment in France during the evacuation of the Second BEF.
- Air losses consisted of 64 Spitfires (including six USAAF aircraft), 20 Hurricane fighter bombers, six Boston bombers and ten Mustang Mk 1 Army Co-operation aircraft (for 62 Killed, 30 wounded, 17 POW). Luftwaffe losses were 23 Fw 190 fighter aircraft, and 25 Dornier Do 217 bombers.
- Screen and theater actor Gerald MacIntosh Johnston was captured during the raid and later died in a German POW camp.
Based on Brian Loring-Villa's book, "Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid," Dieppe
(1993), was critical of Mountbatten and another planner, General Montgomery
. Discussion of the film and the raid are found here:. The film is an accurate portrayal of life for the common soldier of the Canadian Army in England. A low budget meant only the attack on Blue Beach is depicted; however, the focus of the film is divided between the grand strategic aims of the high command, the operational aims of the division staff, and the personal lives of the soldiers. Documentary
Dieppe, Bell Canada television commercial (c. 2003) depicts a modern-day Canadian traveller calling his grandfather at home in Canada from France. When the grandfather inquires about Paris, the traveller reports that he is actually in Dieppe, and called to offer his thanks.
The song "Dieppe", by French-Canadian folk-rock band (appearing on their 1990 eponymous album) speaks indirectly of the sacrifice of war and the proud, combative and fatally stubborn French-Canadian attitude of the time, as well as the disagreement between the Allied forces command. The lyrics of longest song on the album (4:36), "Dieppe", are in French, and never include any direct name references. Only concepts are explored. The lyrics are written by singer Rudy Caya.
The song "Nautical Disaster" by Canadian cult band the Tragically Hip is sometimes assumed by fans to refer to the Dieppe raid. The lyrics, however, are ambiguous. The band's frontman Gordon Downie has variously stated that the sinking of the Bismarck was the true inspiration, and that the lyrics only use naval allusions as part of a metaphor for a failed romantic relationship.
- Buckingham, William. D-Day the First 72 hours. Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Tempus Publishing. 2004. ISBN 0-75242-842-X.
- Churchill, Sir Winston. The Second World War. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1953.
- Henry, Hugh G. Dieppe Through the Lens of the German War photographer London: After the Battle, 1993. ISBN 0-900-91376-2 A Canadian historian covers the actions of each one of the 29 tanks disembarked on the raid with photos, oral history and primary sources. The author later did his PhD dissertation on the raid.
- Leasor, James. Green Beach. London: Corgi Books, 1976. ISBN 0-552-10245-8.
- Picknet, Lynn, Clive Prince and Stephen Prior. Friendly Fire: the Secret War Between the Allies. London: Mainstream Publishing, 2005. ISBN 1-84018-632-1.
- Poolton, Jack with Jayne Poolton-Turney. Destined to Survive: A Dieppe Veteran's Story. Toronto: Dundurn Press 1998. ISBN 1-55002-311-X.
- Robertson, Terrence. The Shame and the Glory. Toronto: McLelland & Stewart, 1967. ISBN 0-7710-7542-1.
- Stacey, Colonel C.P. Canadian Military Preliminary Report: Report No.83. Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Military Headquarters, 1942. Canadian Military Preliminary Report
- Stacey, Colonel C.P. Report No. 128: The Lessons of Dieppe and their Influence on the Operation Overlord. Ottawa, Canada: Department of National Defense Canadian Forces, 1944. The Lessons of Dieppe
- Villa, Brian Lorring. Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991. ISBN 0-19540-679-6.
- Whitaker, Denis and Shelagh. Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph. Whitby, Ontario: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1993. ISBN 0-07-551641-1.
- Ford, Ken. Dieppe 1942: Prelude to D-Day (Campaign Series #127) London: Osprey Publishing, 2003. Primer with 3-dimensional artwork of the battle area.
- McGlashan, Kenneth B, with Owen P. Zupp. Down to Earth: A Fighter Pilot Recounts His Experiences of Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, Dieppe, D-Day and Beyond. London. Grub Street Publishing, 2007. ISBN 1-90494-384-5.
- Mordal, Jacques. Dieppe: The Dawn of Decision. London: Souvenir Press, 1963. ISBN 0-450-05004-1.
- Neillands, Robin. The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 Mission. London: Aurum Press, 2005. ISBN 1-84513-116-9. An overview by a British Historian.
- Reynolds, Quentin. Dress Rehearsal: The Story of Dieppe. New York: Blue Ribbon Books, Random House Inc., 1943. Story of the Dieppe Raid by a journalist.
- Saunders, Tim. Dieppe Operation Jubilee- Battleground Europe. Barnsley S Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword, 2005. ISBN 1-84415-245-6.