Until 1694, England had an elaborate system of licensing. No publication was allowed without the accompaniment of a government-granted license.
The most stringent controls on speech in the colonial period were controls that outlawed or otherwise censored speech that was considered blasphemous in a religious sense. A 1646 Massachusetts law, for example, punished persons who denied the immortality of the soul. In 1612, a Virginia governor declared the death penalty for a person that denied the Trinity under Virginia's Laws Divine, Moral and Martial, which also outlawed blasphemy, speaking badly of ministers and royalty, and "disgraceful words.
More recent scholarship, focusing on seditious speech in the 17th-century colonies (when there was no press), has shown that from 1607 to 1700 the colonists' freedom of speech expanded dramatically, laying a foundation for the political dissent that flowered among the Revolutionary generation. See Larry D. Eldridge, A Distant Heritage: The Growth of Free Speech in Early America (NYU Press, 1994). Leonard Levy wrote of this book: "Anyone who has not read A Distant Heritage cannot know the history of freedom of speech."
The trial of John Peter Zenger in 1735 was a seditious libel prosecution for Zenger's publication of criticisms of the Governor of New York. Andrew Hamilton represented Zenger and argued that truth should be a defense to the crime of seditious libel, but the court rejected this argument. Hamilton persuaded the jury, however, to disregard the law and to acquit Zenger. The case is considered a victory for freedom of speech as well as a prime example jury nullification. The case marked the beginning of a trend of greater acceptance and tolerance of free speech.
The First Amendment was ratified on December 15, 1791. The Amendment states:
The law did allow truth as a defense and required proof of malicious intent. The 1798 Act, however, made ascertainment of the intent of the framers in regard to the First Amendment somewhat difficult, as some of the members of Congress that supported the adoption of the First Amendment also voted to adopt the 1798 Act. The Federalists under President John Adams aggressively used the law against their rivals, the Democratic-Republicans. The Alien and Sedition Act was a major political issue in the 1800 election, and after he was elected President, Thomas Jefferson pardoned those who had been convicted under the Act. The Act expired and the Supreme Court never ruled on its constitutionality.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court declared "Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history." 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
Restrictions that require examining the content of speech to be applied must pass strict scrutiny.
Restrictions that apply to certain viewpoints but not others face the highest level of scrutiny, and are almost always overturned, unless they fall into one of the court's special exceptions.
Obscenity, defined by the Miller test by applying contemporary community standards, is one exception. It is speech to which all of the following apply: appeals to the prurient interest, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. (This is usually applied to more hard-core forms of pornography.)
Fighting words are words or phrases that are likely to induce the listener to get in a fight. This previously applied to words like nigger, but with people getting less sensitive to words, this exception is little-used.
Speech that presents imminent lawless action (earlier, the legal test was for a clear and present danger, but this test has since been replaced by the imminent lawless action test) may also be restricted. The canonical example, enunciated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, is falsely yelling "Fire!" in a crowded movie theater. The trend since Holmes's time has been to restrict the clear and present danger exception to apply to speech which is completely apolitical in content.
Restrictions on commercial speech, defined as speech mainly in furtherance of selling a product, is subject to a lower level of scrutiny than other speech, although recently the court has taken steps to bring it closer to parity with other speech. This is why the government can ban advertisements for cigarettes and false information on corporate prospectuses (which try to sell stock in a company).
If the government tries to restrain speech before it is spoken, as opposed to punishing it afterwards, it must: clearly define what's illegal, cover the minimum speech necessary, make a quick decision, be backed up by a court, bear the burden of suing and proving the speech is illegal, and show that allowing the speech would "surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation and its people" (New York Times Co. v. United States). U.S. courts have not permitted most prior restraints since the case of Near v. Minnesota in 1931.
See also Roth v. United States
As of 2005, United States was ranked 44th of 167 countries in annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders. In the 2006 index the United States has fallen nine places and is now ranked 53rd of 168 countries. The US ranked 48th in 2007, however, moving back up 5 places.
While freedom of expression by non-speech means is commonly thought to be protected under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has only recently taken this view. As late as 1968 (United States v. O'Brien) the Supreme Court stated that regulating non-speech can justify limitations on speech. The Court carried this distinction between speech and expression through the early part of the 1980s (Clark v. CCNV, 1984). It was not until the flag-burning cases of 1989 (Texas v. Johnson) and 1990 (United States v. Eichman), that the Supreme Court accepted that non-speech means applied to freedom of expression and freedom of speech.
In a rare 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court extended the full protection of the First Amendment to the Internet in Reno v. ACLU, a decision which struck down portions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act, a law intended to outlaw so-called "indecent" online communication (that is, nonobscene material protected by the First Amendment.) The court's decision identified the Internet as a "free speech zone," and extended the same Constitutional protections given to books, magazines, films, and spoken expression to materials published on the Internet.
In United States v. American Library Association (2003) the Supreme Court ruled that Congress has the authority to require public schools and libraries receiving e-rate discounts to install filters as a condition of receiving federal funding. The justices said that any First Amendment concerns were addressed by the provisions in the Children's Internet Protection Act that permit adults to ask librarians to disable the filters or unblock individual sites.
Larry D. Eldridge, A Distant Heritage: The Growth of Free Speech in Early America (NYU Press, 1994).