However, each state applies its own standards to determine negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. For example, in New York, courts have generally held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies if, first, the accident would not occur in the absence of negligence; second, the instrumentality causing injury was within the exclusive control of the defendant; and third, the plaintiff's voluntary or involuntary actions did not contribute to the accident. Often in dispute is the second element of exclusive control. The defendant's exclusivity of control must be such that the likelihood of injury was, more likely than not, the result of the defendant's negligence. The likelihood of other possibilities do not need to be eliminated altogether but they must be so reduced that the greater probability lies with the defendant.
This is usually referred to in the "scalpel left behind" example of obvious negligence in the case of a physician, in which a person goes in to a doctor for abdominal pains after having his appendix removed. X-rays determine the patient has a metal object the size and shape of a scalpel in his abdomen. It requires no further explanation to show the surgeon who removed the appendix was negligent, as there is no legitimate reason for a doctor to leave a scalpel behind in an appendectomy.
The "exclusive control" element has largely given way in modern cases to a less rigid formulation, where the plaintiff must prove that other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence. As a consequence, the third element, that the plaintiff did not contribute to his injury, is subsumed by the new formulation. In addition, it is important to note that contributory negligence is, in modern case law, reckoned in "comparison" to the injury caused by the other. For example, if the negligence of the other is 95% the cause of the plaintiff's injury, and the plaintiff is 5% responsible, the plaintiff's slight fault will not negate the negligence of the other (This new type of split liability is commonly called ''Comparative Fault).
The difference between the two is that prima facie is a term meaning the matter seems obvious and self-explanatory. Res ipsa loquitur is then the legal argument that because it is so obvious, the plaintiff can stop their explanation there and does not have to provide any further in-depth details to prove liability, because it "speaks for itself." Example:
The expression res ipsa loquitur is not a doctrine but a “mode of inferential reasoning” applies only to accidents of unknown cause. (see Sanfield Building Contractors Ltd v Li Kai Cheong [2003] 6 HKCFAR 207 and Schellenbery v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121)
The res ipsa loquitur mode of inferential reasoning comes into play where an accident of unknown cause is one that would not normally happen without negligence on the part of the defendant in control of the object or activity which injured the plaintiff or damaged his property. In such a situation the court is able to infer negligence on the defendant's part unless he offers an acceptable explanation consistent with his having taken reasonable care. (see Sanfield Building Contractors Ltd v Li Kai Cheong [2003] 6 HKCFAR 207)
The doctrine was not initially welcome in medical malpractice law. In Gray v. Wright, 142 W. Va. 490, 96 S.E. 2d 671 (1957), a seven-inch hemostat was left in Mrs. Gray during gall bladder surgery in June, 1947, and despite her chronic complaints about stomach pain over the years, the device was not found until an x-ray in March, 1953, when it was removed. Her $12,000 award was reversed by the Supreme Court of West Virginia because she was outside the statutes of limitation when she filed and could not prove that the doctor concealed knowledge of his error. This "guilty knowledge" requirement would disappear over the years, and the "discovery rule" by which statutes of limitation run from the date of discovery of the wrongdoing rather than the date of the occurrence has become the rule in most states, allowing "res ipsa loquitur" to take its rightful place. It was part of the commentary in a train collision in California in 2008: "If two trains are in the same place at the same time, someone was negligent."
Forty years later, leaving a medical device in a patient was medical malpractice provable without expert testimony in almost any jurisdiction. Fieux v. Cardiovascular & Thoracic Clinic, P.C., 159 Or. App. 637, 641, 978 P.2d 429, 433 (1999); Steinkamp v. Caremark, 3 S.W.3d 191, 198-99 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999); Baumgardner v. Yusuf, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1381, 1392, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1381, 1392 (2006); Fox v. Green, 161 N.C. App. 460, 465, 588 S.E. 2d 899, 904 (2003).
"In Virginia the doctrine, if not entirely abolished, has been limited and restricted to a very material extent." It may be utilized only when the circumstances of the incident, without further proof, are such that, in the ordinary course of events, the incident could not have happened except on the theory of negligence..." Lewis v. Carpenter Co., 252 Va. 296, 477 S.E.2d 492 (1996). Virginia Legal Doctrines
A contention of res ipsa loquitur commonly is made in cases of commercial airplane accidents.
"Res Ipsa Loquitur" is also the slogan of the The Bulletin newspaper of Philadelphia.
Hunter S. Thompson is quoted as saying : "Maybe there is no Heaven. Or maybe this is all pure gibberish a product of the demented imagination of a lazy drunken hillbilly with a heart full of hate who has found a way to live out where the real winds blow to sleep late, have fun, get wild, drink whisky, and drive fast on empty streets with nothing in mind except falling in love and not getting arrested... Res ipsa loquitur. Let the good times roll." Gonzo Papers, Vol. 2: Generation of Swine: Tales of Shame and Degradation in the '80s (1988)
In English tort law, the effect of res ipsa loquitur is a strong inference in favour of the claimant that negligence has taken place. It does not however fully reverse the burden of proof (Ng Chun Pui v Li Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298).
The requirement of control is important in English law. This requirement was not satisfied in Easson v. LNE Ry [1944] 2 KB 421, where a small child fell off a train several miles after it had left the station. It was considered that the door of the train was not sufficiently under control of the railway company after the train started moving and could have been opened by somebody for whom the company was not responsible. This case was distinguished from the earlier case of Gee v. Metropolitan Ry (1873) LR QB 161 where the plaitiff fell from the train immediately after it left the station, when the door through which he fell could still be considered to be fully controlled by the railway company.
The requirement that the exact cause of the accident must be unknown is illustrated by the case of Barkway v. South Wales Transport [1950] 1 All ER 392. In this case a bus veered across the road and it was known that the accident was caused by a flat tire. In this case, the plaintiff could not be assisted by res ipsa loquitur and had to go on to prove that the flat tire was caused by the transport company's negligence.
See the article on Res Ipsa Loquitor under Oklahoma law at LegalWikiPro.com.