Possibly originating with the Quakers, it was adopted by Africans, Indians, and U.S. civil-rights and anti-Vietnam War protesters. Among its most articulate advocates have been Gandhi, who maintained that action needs to be accompanied by love and a willingness to search for the truth, and Martin Luther King, Jr., who called for "tough-mindedness and tenderheartedness." Two of the most massive examples of passive resistance were the Solidarity movement in Poland (1980-81) and the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia (1989). Opponents of passive resistance as a means of forcing a change in policy have criticized it for potentially fostering a general disrespect for law that could result in anarchy.
Refusal to obey government demands or commands and nonresistance to consequent arrest and punishment. It is used especially as a nonviolent and usually collective means of forcing government concessions and has been a major tactic of nationalist movements in Africa and India, of the U.S. civil rights movement, and of labour and antiwar movements in many countries. Civil disobedience is a symbolic or ritualistic violation of the law, rather than a rejection of the system as a whole. The civil disobedient, finding legitimate avenues of change blocked or nonexistent, sees himself as obligated by a higher, extralegal principle to break some specific law. By submitting to punishment, the civil disobedient hopes to set a moral example that will provoke the majority or the government into effecting meaningful political, social, or economic change. The philosophical roots of civil disobedience lie deep in Western thought. Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, and John Locke, among others, appealed to systems of natural law that take precedence over the laws created by communities or states (positive law). More modern advocates and practitioners of civil disobedience include Henry David Thoreau, Mohandas K. Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr.
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Passive resistance began immediately after the 1848-1849 war of independence was crushed by the Austrians in August 1849, and became crystallized as a movement under the "leadership" of Ferenc Deák, a former moderate leader of the Reformist party in the 1840s. In 1850 Austrian minister of justice Schmerling requested Deák to participate in a committee of the legislation in order to bring about consolidation between Austria and Hungary. Deák's response ("After the dismal events in the near past, under the circumstances that still prevail, my cooperation in public matters is impossible") was widely distributed in secret and served as a call for other notables to join Deák's passive resistance. The journal Pesti Napló, edited by novelist Zsigmond Kemény became the chief organ of the movement, which was instrumental in keeping up hope and spirit in a Hungary fully incorporated into Austria and characterized by reprisals against political dissidents, thousands of treason trials, military governance, centralization, absolutism, censorship and direct control of Vienna over every aspect of public life. Deák, Kemény and other leaders of the resistance carefully avoided any political agitation or criticism of the establishment (which was impossible anyway), and, strictly in the framework of civic organizations, concentrated on national issues of non-political nature, such as the use of the Hungarian language, development of the Hungarian economy or protection of the legal standing of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Their followers, a considerable part of the intelligentisa and the landed gentry, either completely withdrew to private life or similarly limited themselves to non-political activities and, through various means of civil disobedience, refused to lend support or recognition to the authorities. Through their non-cooperation they managed to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the institutions of the Austrian oppression, which came to be dependent on foreign (mostly Czech) civil servants and discredited collaborationists collectively known by the sobriquet Bach hussars. (Alexander Bach was Austrian minister of the interior at the time with the mission of transforming Hungarian public administration in such a way that all chance for commotion should be eradicated; the 1850s are therefore also referred to as Bach era in Hungarian historiography.)
Besides the absence of authentic personalities from state institutions, passive resistance was increasingly characterised by a wide-spread refusal to pay taxes, avoidance of military service and desertion.
By the end of the decade, the worsening diplomatic isolation of Austria and events such as the 1859 Second Italian War of Independence undermined the Habsburg Empire militarily and financially, increasing Vienna's willingness to come to a compromise with the Hungarians. In 1859 Bach, the symbol of repression was dismissed; this, and the issuance of two successive "constitutions" for the Empire (the October Diploma and the February Patent, issued in 1860 and 1861, respectively) paved the way for Hungarian political leaders Ferenc Deák and József Eötvös to abandon their passive resistance and actively engage in politics again at the Diet convened by the Emperor on 2 April 1861.
However, the Hungarian Estates and the Viennese Court were unable to arrive at an agreement. The constitution proposed by Emperor Francis Joseph was seen as curbing Hungarian autonomy to an extent unacceptable by Hungarians, many of whom were still unwilling to give up their hopes of seceding Hungary from Austria entirely. The constitution was therefore rejected by the Diet, which was, in turn, dissolved by the Emperor with the threat of military violence.
After the dissolution of the Diet, Deák resumed his policies of passive resistance; however, political fermentation started in 1860-61 proved unstoppable. Deák expressed his willingness to resume negotiations with Vienna in his famous 1865 article (the so-called Easter article), marking the end of the era of passive resistance.
The worsening politico-military situation of the Empire, especially the disastrous defeat in the Austro-Prussian War strengthened the support of reform in Vienna, while the diminishing moral and financial reserves of the Hungarian nobility also proved instrumental in bringing the majority of Hungarian leaders to acquiescing in their inability of achieving the complete independence of Hungary. The necessity of coming to a modus vivendi was therefore increasingly accepted by both parties; eventually, these tendencies and the interdependence of Austria and Hungary led to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the creation of Austria-Hungary.