The "pad" part of the name comes from early implementations where the key material was distributed as a pad of paper, so the top sheet could be easily torn off and destroyed after use. For easy concealment, the pad was sometimes reduced to such a small size that a powerful magnifying glass was required to use it. Photos accessible on the Internet show captured KGB pads that fit in the palm of one's hand , or in a walnut shell. . To increase security, one-time-pads were sometimes printed onto sheets of highly flammable nitrocellulose.
The one-time pad is derived from the Vernam cipher, named after Gilbert Vernam, one of its inventors. Vernam's system was a cipher that combined a message with a key read from a paper tape loop. In its original form, Vernam's system was not unbreakable because the key could be reused. One-time use came a little later when Joseph Mauborgne recognized that if the key tape was totally random, cryptanalytic difficulty would be increased.
There is some term ambiguity due to the fact that some authors use the term "Vernam cipher" synonymously for the "one-time-pad", while others refer to any additive stream cipher as a "Vernam cipher", including those based on a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG).
Despite Shannon's proof of its security, the one-time pad has serious drawbacks in practice:
Because the pad must be passed and kept secure, and the pad has to be at least as long as the message, there is often no point in using one-time padding, as you can simply send the plain text instead of the pad (as both are the same size and have to be sent securely). However, once a very long pad has been securely sent (e.g., a computer disk full of random data), it can be used for numerous future messages, until the sum of their sizes equals the size of the pad.
Implementation difficulties have led to one-time pad systems being broken, and are so serious that they have prevented the one-time pad from being adopted as a widespread tool in information security.
In particular, one-time use is absolutely necessary. If a one-time pad is used just twice, simple mathematical operations can reduce it to a running key cipher. If both plaintexts are in a natural language (e.g., English or Russian or Gaelic), even though both are secret, each stands a very high chance of being recovered by heuristic cryptanalysis, with possibly a few ambiguities. Of course the longer message can only be broken for the portion that overlaps the shorter message, plus, perhaps, a little more by completing a word or phrase. The most famous exploit of this vulnerability is the VENONA project.
The one time pad does not provide a mechanism to ensure message integrity and, in theory, a man-in-the-middle attacker who knows the exact message being sent can straightforwardly replace all or part of that message with text of their choosing which is the same length. Standard techniques to prevent this, such as the use of a message authentication code, can be used along with a one-time pad system, but they lack the perfect security the OTP itself has.
The first one-time pad system was electrical. In 1917, Gilbert Vernam (of AT&T) invented and later patented in 1919 a cipher based on Teletype machine technology. Each character in a message was electrically combined with a character on a paper tape key. Captain Joseph Mauborgne (then a captain in the United States Army and later chief of the Signal Corps) recognized that the character sequence on the key tape could be completely random and that, if so, cryptanalysis would be more difficult. Together they invented the first one-time tape system.
The second development was the paper pad system. Diplomats had long used codes and ciphers for confidentiality and to minimize telegraph costs. For the codes, words and phrases were converted to groups of numbers (typically 4 or 5 digits) using a dictionary-like codebook. For added security, secret numbers could be combined with (usually modular addition) each code group before transmission, with the secret numbers being changed periodically (this was called superencryption). In the early 1920s, three German cryptographers, Werner Kunze, Rudolf Schauffler and Erich Langlotz, who were involved in breaking such systems, realized that they could never be broken if a separate randomly chosen additive number was used for every code group. They had duplicate paper pads printed up with lines of random number groups. Each page had a serial number and eight lines. Each line had six 5-digit numbers. A page would be used as a work sheet to encode a message and then destroyed. The serial number of the page would be sent with the encoded message. The recipient would reverse the procedure and then destroy his copy of the page. The German foreign office put this system into operation by 1923.
A separate notion was the use of a one-time pad of letters to encode plaintext directly as in the example below. Leo Marks describes inventing such a system for the British Special Operations Executive during World War II, though he suspected at the time that it was already known in the highly compartmentalized world of cryptography, as for instance at Bletchley Park.
The final discovery was by Claude Shannon in the 1940s who recognized and proved the theoretical significance of the one-time pad system. Shannon delivered his results in a classified report in 1945, and published them openly in 1949. At the same time, Vladimir Kotelnikov had independently proven absolute security of the one-time pad; his results were delivered in 1941 in a report that apparently remains classified.
X M C K L
and the message is "HELLO", then the coding would be done as follows:
7 (H) 4 (E) 11 (L) 11 (L) 14 (O) message
+ 23 (X) 12 (M) 2 (C) 10 (K) 11 (L) key
= 30 16 13 21 25 message + key
= 4 (E) 16 (Q) 13 (N) 21 (V) 25 (Z) message + key (mod 26) >> ciphertext
Note that if a number is larger than 25, then in modular arithmetic fashion, the remainder after subtraction of 26 is taken. This simply means that, if your computations "go past" Z, you start again at A.
The ciphertext to be sent to Bob is thus "EQNVZ." Bob uses the matching key page and the same process, but in reverse, to obtain the plaintext. Here, the key is subtracted from the ciphertext, again using modular arithmetic:
4 (E) 16 (Q) 13 (N) 21 (V) 25 (Z) ciphertext
- 23 (X) 12 (M) 2 (C) 10 (K) 11 (L) key
= -19 4 11 11 14 ciphertext - key
= 7 (H) 4 (E) 11 (L) 11 (L) 14 (O) ciphertext - key (mod 26) >> message
Similar to above, if a number is negative, 26 is added to make the number positive.
Thus, Bob recovers Alice's plaintext, the message "HELLO". Both Alice and Bob destroy the key sheet immediately after use, thus preventing reuse and an attack against the cipher. The KGB often issued its agents one-time pads printed on tiny sheets of "flash paper"—paper chemically converted to nitrocellulose, which burns almost instantly and leaves no ash.
The classical one-time pad of espionage used actual pads of minuscule, easily-concealed paper, a sharp pencil, and some mental arithmetic. The method can be implemented now as a software program, using data files as input (plaintext), output (ciphertext) and key material (the required random sequence). The XOR operation is often used to combine the plaintext and the key elements, and is especially attractive on computers since it is usually a native machine instruction and is therefore very fast. However, ensuring that the key material is actually random, is used only once, never becomes known to the opposition, and is completely destroyed after use is hard to do. The auxiliary parts of a software one-time pad implementation present real challenges: secure handling/transmission of plaintext, truly random keys, and one-time-only use of the key.
4 (E) 16 (Q) 13 (N) 21 (V) 25 (Z) ciphertext
− 19 (T) 16 (Q) 20 (U) 17 (R) 8 (I) possible key
= −15 0 −7 4 17 ciphertext-key
= 11 (L) 0 (A) 19 (T) 4 (E) 17 (R) ciphertext-key (mod 26)In fact, it is possible to "decrypt" out of the ciphertext any message whatsoever with the same number of characters, simply by using a different key, and there is no information in the ciphertext which will allow Eve to choose among the various possible readings of the ciphertext.
Conventional symmetric encryption algorithms use complex patterns of substitution and transpositions. For the best of these currently in use, it is not known whether there can be a cryptanalytic procedure which can reverse (or, usefully, partially reverse) these transformations without knowing the key used during encryption. Asymmetric encryption algorithms depend on mathematical problems that are thought to be difficult to solve, such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms. However there is no proof that these problems are hard and a mathematical breakthrough could make existing systems vulnerable to attack.
The theoretical perfect security of the one-time-pad applies only in a theoretically perfect setting; no real-world implementation of any cryptosystem can provide perfect security because practical considerations introduce potential vulnerabilities. These practical considerations of security and convenience have meant that the one-time-pad is, in practice, little-used.
Nonetheless, the one-time-pad retains some limited practical interest:
One-time pads have been used in special circumstances since the early 1900s. The Weimar Republic Diplomatic Service began using the method in about 1920. The breaking of poor Soviet cryptography by the British, with messages made public for political reasons in two instances in the 1920s, appear to have induced the USSR to adopt one-time pads for some purposes by around 1930. KGB spies are also known to have used pencil and paper one-time pads more recently. Examples include Colonel Rudolf Abel, who was arrested and convicted in New York City in the 1950s, and the 'Krogers' (ie, Morris and Lona Cohen), who were arrested and convicted of espionage in the United Kingdom in the early 1960s. Both were found with physical one-time pads in their possession.
A number of nations have used one-time pad systems for their sensitive traffic. Leo Marks reports that the British Special Operations Executive used one-time pads in World War II to encode traffic between its offices. One-time pads for use with its overseas agents were introduced late in the war. Other one-time tape cipher machines include the British machines Rockex and Noreen.
The World War II voice scrambler SIGSALY was also a form of one-time system. It added analog noise to the signal at one end and removed it at the other end. The noise was distributed to the channel ends in the form of large shellac records of which only two were made. There were both starting synchronization and longer-term phase drift problems which arose and were solved before the system could be used.
The hotline between Moscow and Washington D.C., established in 1963 after the Cuban missile crisis, used teleprinters protected by a commercial one-time tape system. Each country prepared the keying tapes used to encode its messages and delivered them via their embassy in the other country. A unique advantage of the OTP in this case was that neither country had to reveal more sensitive encryption methods to the other. p.715
The British Army's BATCO tactical communication code is a pencil-and-paper one-time-pad system. Key material is provided on paper sheets that are kept in a special plastic wallet with a sliding pointer that indicates the last key used. New sheets are provided daily (though a small series of "training BATCO" is usually recycled on exercise) and the old ones destroyed. BATCO is used on battlefield voice nets; the most sensitive portions of a message (typically grid references) are encoded and the ciphertext is read out letter by letter.
A related notion is the one-time code—a signal, used only once, eg "Alpha" for "mission completed" and "Bravo" for "mission failed" cannot be "decrypted" in any reasonable sense of the word. Understanding the message will require additional information, often 'depth' of repetition, or some traffic analysis. However, such strategies (though often used by real operatives, and baseball coaches) are not a cryptographic one-time pad in any significant sense.
The Fish ciphers used by the German military in WWII turned out to be insecure stream ciphers, not practical automated one-time pads as their designers had intended. Bletchley Park broke one of them, the Lorenz cipher machine, regularly.
However, if a modern so-called cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator is used, it can form the basis for an empirically secure stream cipher. There are many well-vetted designs in the public domain, ranging from the simplicity of RC4 to using a block cipher like AES in counter mode. There would appear to be little reason to invent new stream ciphers, yet it has long been thought that NSA and its comparable agencies devote considerable effort to stream ciphers for their government customers.
As well, publicly known values such as the terminal digits of marathon race times, closing stock prices from any source however obscure, daily temperatures or atmospheric pressures, etc, though seemingly random, are predictable -- after the fact. Indeed, even truly random sequences which have been published cannot be used as they are now predictable if identified. An example is the RAND Corporation's 1950s publication of a million random digits; it has passed every statistical test for randomness thus far and is thought to be actually random. But, having been published, it is fully predictable. So are the digits of pi, e, phi, and other irrational or transcendental numbers; the sequences may be statistically random (an open question, actually), but are fully predictable nonetheless.
For use in a one-time pad, data should exhibit perfect randomness. Most practical sources exhibit some imperfection or bias. The quality of randomness is measured by entropy. A perfectly random bit has an entropy of one bit. An idea due to Von Neumann is to use an algorithm to combine multiple, imperfectly random bits, each with entropy less than one, to create a single bit with entropy equal to one. This process is called entropy distillation or entropy extraction. Von Neumann proposed the following method, called "Von Neumann whitening":
|01||Output "0" bit.|
|10||Output "1" bit.|
This will produce uniformly random output bits if the input bits are statistically independent and all drawn from the same distribution. However, that is not a realistic assumption since most physical randomness sources may have some correlation in the output, and the distribution may change with the device temperature, etc. In 2003, Boaz Barak, Ronen Shaltiel, and Eran Tromer stated some reasonable security criteria for entropy distillation and constructed an algorithm for doing it. (description needed).
In Linux (and some other Unix-like systems) the kernel's random number generator, /dev/random, uses environmental noise to generate random data and is better than many such system call designs. It attempts to estimate the amount of entropy it collects and blocks if the entropy pool is exhausted. It is intended to be, and is widely thought to actually be, better than most such generators, and if so is rather closer to satisfactorily random. But this process will be slow on systems which have few usable noise sources. It can, however, be fed additional entropy by reading from an attached noise generating device.
Linux also provides /dev/urandom which uses a deterministic algorithm to generate the data whenever environmental noise is unavailable. Improved designs, such as the Yarrow algorithm are available. One-time pad key material generated in this way (ie, from deterministic random number generators) lacks the information-theoretic security of a one-time pad. Yarrow offers at least as much strength as a block cipher based on Triple DES.
If a computer used for one-time pad generation is compromised, by a computer virus or other malware or by an adversary gaining physical access, the software can be modified to leak the pad data or generate apparently random data that is in fact predictable. See random number generator attack. One way to reduce this risk is to generate pads on a machine that is never connected to any computer network and preferably not used for any other purpose. Collecting key material on new, blank media (e.g. floppy disks or CD-Rs) eliminates another route for malware infection. If paper pads are to be produced, the printer is best dedicated as well. One approach might be to use an older laptop for OTP generation, purged and rebuilt with a fresh, traceable copy of an open source operating system, such as Linux or BSD. The smaller size would allow it to be easily locked up in a safe when not in use.
One-time pads were originally made without the use of a computer and this is still possible today. The process can be tedious, but if done correctly and the pad used only once, the result is unbreakable.
There are two components needed to make a one-time pad: a way to generate letters at random and a way to record two copies of the result. The traditional way to do the latter was to use a typewriter and carbon paper. The carbon paper and typewriter ribbon would then be destroyed since it may be possible for the pad data to be recovered from them. As typewriters have become scarce, it is also acceptable to hand write the letters neatly in groups of five on two part carbonless copy paper sheets, which can be purchased at office supply stores. Each sheet should be given a serial number or some other unique marking.
The simplest way to generate random letters is to obtain 26 identical objects with each letter of the alphabet marked on one object. Tiles from the game Scrabble can be used (as long as only one of each letter is selected). Kits for making name charm bracelets are another possibility. One can also write the letters on 26 pennies with a marking pen. The objects are placed in a box or cup and shaken vigorously, then one object is withdrawn and its letter is recorded. The object is returned to the box and the process is repeated.
Publication No. WO/2010/037006 Published on April 1, Assigned to IdeaStream Consumer Products for Refillable, Reusable Pad (American Inventor)
Apr 05, 2010; GENEVA, April 7 -- Curtis Patrick Taylor, the U.S., has developed a refillable and reusable pad. The patent has been assigned to...