Able Danger was a classified military planning effort under the command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). It was created as a result of a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early October 1999 by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hugh Shelton, to develop an Information Operations Campaign Plan against transnational terrorism, "specifically al-Qaeda."
According to statements by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and those of four others, Able Danger had identified the September 11, 2001, attacks leader Mohamed Atta, and three of the 9/11 plot's other 19 hijackers, as possible members of an al Qaeda cell linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This theory was heavily investigated and researched by Republican Representative Curt Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services and House Homeland Security committees. In December 2006, an investigation by the US Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that those assertions could not be confirmed. It stated that they were unable to find supporting evidence regarding "one of the most disturbing claims about the Sept. 11 terrorist strikes." This report released by the Senate Intelligence Committee copied, nearly verbatim, the DoD IG's September 2006 report on Able Danger. The public coverage of the release of these reports left out the fact that the DoD IG report concluded that while Army pre-9/11 data bases were found to contain the name "Atta" in context of a potential terrorism threat, it was not ABLE DANGER related due to the name being found in an Army database; the DoD IG report failing to mention the fact that the Army database in question was the source database for the SOCOM ABLE DANGER team .
Mr. Speaker, I rise because information has come to my attention over the past several months that is very disturbing. I have learned that, in fact, one of our Federal agencies had, in fact, identified the major New York cell of Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11; and I have learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September 2000, that Federal agency actually was prepared to bring the FBI in and prepared to work with the FBI to take down the cell that Mohamed Atta was involved in in New York City, along with two of the other terrorists. I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that when that recommendation was discussed within that Federal agency, the lawyers in the administration at that time said, you cannot pursue contact with the FBI against that cell. Mohamed Atta is in the U.S. on a green card, and we are fearful of the fallout from the Waco incident. So we did not allow that Federal agency to proceed.Rep. Weldon later reiterated these concerns during news conferences on February 14, 2006. He stated that Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta 13 separate times prior to 9/11 and that the unit also identified a potential problem in Yemen two weeks prior to the 12 October 2000 attack on the USS Cole. The Pentagon released a statement in response, stating that they wished to address these issues during a congressional hearing before a House Armed Services subcommittee scheduled for Wednesday, February 15, 2006.
Curt Weldon's assertion that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers was picked up by the national media in August 2005, after it was reported in the bimonthly Government Security News. In addition to asserting that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers and was prevented from passing that information onto the FBI, Weldon also alleged the intelligence concerning Able Danger was provided to the 9/11 Commission and ignored. Two 9/11 Commission members, Timothy J. Roemer and John F. Lehman, both claimed not to have received any information on Able Danger.
Following the GSN report, members of the 9/11 Commission began commenting on the information they had on Able Danger and Atta. Lee H. Hamilton, former Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission, and Al Felzenberg, a former spokesman for the 9/11 Commission, both denied that the 9/11 Commission had any information on the identification of Mohammed Atta prior to the attacks. Hamilton told the media, "The Sept. 11 commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell.... Had we learned of it obviously it would've been a major focus of our investigation.
On August 12, 2005, Hamilton and former 9/11 Commission chairman Thomas Kean issued a in response to media inquiries about the Commission's investigation of the Able Danger program. They stated the Commission had been aware of the Able Danger program, and requested and obtained information about it from the Department of Defense (DoD), but none of the information provided had indicated the program had identified Atta or other 9/11 hijackers. They further stated that a claim about Atta having been identified prior to the attacks had been made to the 9/11 Commission on July 12, 2004 (just days before the Commission's report was released), by a United States Navy officer employed at DOD, but that
The interviewee had no documentary evidence and said he had only seen the document briefly some years earlier. He could not describe what information had led to this supposed Atta identification. Nor could the interviewee recall, when questioned, any details about how he thought a link to Atta could have been made by this DOD program in 2000 or any time before 9/11. The Department of Defense documents had mentioned nothing about Atta, nor had anyone come forward between September 2001 and July 2004 with any similar information. Weighing this with the information about Atta's actual activities, the negligible information available about Atta to other U.S. government agencies and the German government before 9/11, and the interviewer's assessment of the interviewee's knowledge and credibility, the Commission staff concluded that the officer's account was not sufficiently reliable to warrant revision of the report or further investigation.
Congressman Curt Weldon issued a response to the 9/11 Commission statement clarifying the mission of Able Danger, expressing concern over the statements made by various members of the 9/11 Commission, and promising to push forward until it is understood why the DoD was unable to pass the information uncovered by Able Danger to the FBI, and why the 9/11 Commission failed to follow up on the information they were given on Able Danger.
Please note that Congressman Curt Weldon was defeated in the November, 2006 election and that as a result his website was taken down and all links to his Congressional website are now dead.
The 9/11 Commission has released multiple statements over the past week, each of which has significantly changed – from initially denying ever being briefed to acknowledging being briefed on both operation ABLE DANGER and Mohammed Atta. The information was omitted primarily because they found it to be suspect despite having been briefed on it two times by two different military officers on active duty. Additionally, the 9/11 Commission also received documents from the Department of Defense on ABLE DANGER.Congressman Weldon reiterated these statements in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 21, 2005. The Committee has said it will be looking into these claims.
Congressman Peter Hoekstra, who was chairman of the House Intelligence Committee until the Republican party lost control of the House following the 2006 elections, investigated the matter at Weldon's request, was reported to have cautioned against "hyperventilating" before the completion of a "thorough" probe. Pentagon officials said they were unaware that any Able Danger material named Atta. They declined to comment on the reports as they worked to clarify the matter.
On August 14, 2005, Mike Kelly, a columnist for The (Bergen) Record (New Jersey), described a telephone interview, arranged by the staff of Rep. Curt Weldon, with a man who identified himself as a member of the Able Danger team, but asked that his name not be revealed. In the interview, the man claimed his team had identified Mohamed Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers as likely al Qaeda terrorists operating in the United States, but were prevented from passing this information on to the FBI by government lawyers. He also claimed he was ignored by the 9/11 Commission's staff when he approached them on two occasions to explain Able Danger's work.
Able Danger's 2.5 Terabytes is a small percentage of all available internet data. A University of California, Berkeley study "showed that, in 2002, 532,897 terabytes of new data flowed across the Internet, 440,606 terabytes of email was sent, and the Web contained 167 terabytes of data that was accessible to all users, plus another 91,850 terabytes in the Deep web where access is controlled." Data collected by data mining techniques, such as was used in Able Danger, could result in large amounts of data; thus the quality of the data in those 2.5 terabytes is much more relevant than the amount, if it was insignificant or significant data.
Shaffer's lawyer, Mark Zaid, has revealed that Shaffer had been placed on paid administrative leave for what he called "petty and frivolous" reasons and had his security clearance suspended in March 2004, following a dispute over travel mileage expenses and personal use of a work cell phone.
As LtCol Shaffer received a memorandum of OPCON status (viewable at ABLE DANGER blog.com) from Joint Task Force (JTF) 121, confirming his attachment to this element 1 November through 1 December 2004, and participating in the 75th Ranger Regiment's nighttime air assault of 11 November 2003, the controversy of his wearing the 75th Ranger Regiment patch as his "combat patch" is closed in his favor. In the Army Reserve, LtCol Shaffer is now assigned as the G6 of the 94th Division (Prov), Ft. Lee, VA.
Congressman Weldon has asked for a new probe into the activities undertaken to silence Lt. Col Shaffer from publicly commenting on Able Danger and Able Danger's identification of the 9/11 hijackers. Weldon called the activities "a deliberate campaign of character assassination."
Shaffer has also told the story of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) opposition to Able Danger, prior to 9/11, based on the view Able Danger was encroaching on CIA turf. According to Shaffer, the CIA representative said, "I clearly understand. We're going after the leadership. You guys are going after the body. But, it doesn't matter. The bottom line is, CIA will never give you the best information from 'Alex Base' or anywhere else. CIA will never provide that to you because if you were successful in your effort to target Al Qaeda, you will steal our thunder. Therefore, we will not support this."
Smith stated that Atta's name had emerged during an examination of individuals known to have ties to Omar Abdel Rahman, a leading figure in the first World Trade Center bombing.
Anonymous Pentagon sources have alleged Smith was fired after a similar data analysis project to examine Chinese strategic and business connections in the U.S. identified Condoleezza Rice and former Defense Secretary William Perry based on their associations through Stanford University Kevin Drum has interpreted these allegations as a possible attempt to construct an alibi, and hence an indication that it is likely that Able Danger did identify a person named Mohamed Atta as a terrorist
This assertion was disputed by former senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), a member of the 9-11 Commission, who said, "nothing Jamie Gorelick wrote had the slightest impact on the Department of Defense or its willingness or ability to share intelligence information with other intelligence agencies." Gorton also asserted that "the wall" was a long-standing policy that had resulted from the Church committee in the 1970s, and that the policy only prohibits transfer of certain information from prosecutors to the intelligence services and never prohibited information flowing in the opposite direction.
Another variation of the Two Attas theory reported by Kaus notes that Omar Abdel Rahman also had an associate with the name Mohamed El-Amir (a name sometimes used by Atta) who was not the Mohamed Atta involved in the 9/11 hijacking.
However, Shaffer clarified that. He told 9/11 Commission staffers Able Danger identified three of the individuals in the terrorist cells that conducted the 9/11 attacks, to include Atta - Shaffer did not mention the names of any other of the 9/11 hijackers in his disclosure to the 9/11 staff. A fourth 9/11 terrorist came from the second cell. Eric Umansky states the problem this way: "In fact, the two-Atta theory only leaves one major issue unexplained: What about the three other 9/11 hijackers that Able Danger purportedly fingered? The DoD IG:
When we reviewed INS records, they appeared to reflect two entries by Atta into the United States on January 10, 2001, which initially raised a question as to whether Atta had entered twice on the same day or whether a second person posing as Atta also entered on January 10, 2001. The NIIS printout for the first entry reflects that Atta entered with an admission period of January 10, 2001, to September 8, 2001 (admission number 68653985708). The second record reflects a second entry on January 10, 2001, with an admission period from January 10, 2001, to July 9, 2001 (admission number 10847166009).
It should be noted that IG report is disputed by Lt. Col. Shaffer and other Able Danger team members, some of whom were never interviewed by the IG's office nor the 9/11 commission. Congressman Weldon also claims the report was a hurried, botched up investigation that was intended to close the books on the subject rather than report on the actual facts.
Broeckers/Hauss described in their last German book the existence of two Attas, two Jarrahs , two Hanjours and al-Shehhis. Evidence in data, handwritten documents, INS-Report, description of faces and much more.
For example this lead was never followed: "Normen Pentolino, operations manager at the Hollywood store, said two cashiers told FBI agents they might have recognized Atta, but weren't certain. Sources inside the store said Atta may have held a BJ's membership card for more than two years." Two years - counted from 9/11 backwards. Not "last year" or so ...
Since 9/11, of course, we have retrieved every scrap of information ever known about Mohamed Atta, so we know what information would have been available to the Able Danger data mining operation. And what we know is that Mohamed Atta sent his first email to friends in the U.S. in March 2000 and received his first U.S. visa on May 18, 2000. Moreover, that was the first time he had ever gone by the name "Mohamed Atta." His full name is "Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta," and prior to 2000 he went by "Mohamed el-Amir."
Senator Specter wondered if the Posse Comitatus Act may have been the reason Defense Department attorneys would not allow Able Danger to turn over information to the FBI. The Posse Comitatus Act prevents the military from being engaged in law enforcement activities, including gathering information on U.S. persons, despite the aliens were not specifically United States citizens. Speaking on behalf of Lt. Col Shaffer, attorney Mark Zaid testified "Those within Able Danger were confident they weren't compiling information on US persons. They were potentially people connected to US persons."
Zaid also strongly asserted on behalf of his clients,
"Let me emphasize two specific items for clarification purposes because they have been distorted and invited undue criticism from some.At no time did Able Danger identify Mohammed Atta as being physically present in the United States.No information obtained at the time would have led anyone to believe criminal activity had taken place or that any specific terrorist activities were being planned. Again, the identification of the four 9/11 hijackers was simply through associational activities. Those associations could have been completely innocuous or nefarious. It was impossible to tell which, and the unclassified work of Able Danger was not designed to address that question."
He further added that
"unfortunately we are not aware of the continuing existence of any chart containing Mohammed Atta’s name or photograph. The copies that would have been in the possession of the U.S. Army were apparently destroyed by March 2001. The copies within Lt Col Shaffer’s files were destroyed by the DIA in approximately Spring 2004. The destruction of these files is an important element to this story and I encourage the Committee to investigate it further. It would appear, particularly given the Defense Department’s outright refusal to allow those involved with Able Danger to testify today, that an obstructionist attitude exists. The question for this Committee is to investigate how far that position extends and why."
The Department of Defense did indeed investigate Zaid's claims, and their report is discussed below.
Former Army Major Erik Kleinsmith, former head of the Pentagon's Land Warfare Analysis Department, testified that he was instructed to destroy data and documents related to Able Danger in May and June 2000. The instruction came from a top Pentagon lawyer. He testified, "I go to bed every night and other members of our team do as well [thinking] that if [Able Danger] had not been shut down that we would have at least been able to prevent something or assist the United States in some way. Could we have prevented 9/11? I could never speculate to that extent."
On February 14, 2006, Congressmen Curt Weldon charged that contrary to testimony, not all the data on Able Danger had been destroyed. Weldon claimed to be in contact with people in the government still able to do data-mining who got 13 hits on Mohamed Atta. Weldon also claimed that Able Danger information was found in Pentagon files as recently as two weeks ago and that a general was present when the files were taken from the cabinet. Able Danger will be the subject of hearings by the Armed Services Committee on February 15, 2006.
On September 21, 2006, The Washington Post reported that a Defense Department investigation into Able Danger found that Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta or any other hijacker before the September 11 attacks, and that a widely discussed chart was "a sample document passed to the military as an example of how to organize large amounts of data," and was created after 9/11. Congressman Weldon disputed the inspectors claims, stating "I am appalled that the DoD IG would expect the American people to actually consider this a full and thorough investigation," Weldon said in an e-mailed statement. "I question their motives and the content of the report, and I reject the conclusions they have drawn."
In December 2006, a sixteen-month investigation by the US Senate Intelligence Committee concluded "Able Danger did not identify Mohammed Atta or any other 9/11 hijacker at any time prior to Sept. 11, 2001," and dismissed other assertions that have fueled 9/11 conspiracy theories. The Senate panel of investigators said there was no evidence DoD lawyers stopped analysts from sharing findings with the FBI before the attacks. No Able Danger information was improperly destroyed by Pentagon lawyers. Analysts had created charts that included pictures of then-known Al Qaeda operatives, but none including Atta. A follow-up chart made after the attacks did show Atta. The Senate Committee said its findings were consistent with those of the DoD inspector general, released in September 2006.
The Department of Defense investigation concluded,
"A. The anti-terrorist program, Able Danger, did not identify Mohammed Atta or any other 9/11 terrorists before the 9/11 attack.
"B. Able Danger members were not prohibited from sharing intelligence information with law enforcement authorities or other agencies that could have acted on that information. In fact, Able Danger produced no actionable intelligence information.
"C. The destruction of Able Danger documentation at LIWA and Garland was appropriate and complied with applicable DoD regulations.
"D. The Able Danger program was not terminated prematurely. It concluded after it had achieved its objective and its work products were used in follow-on intelligence gathering efforts at USSOCOM.