Interest in RMA and the structure of future United States armed forces is strong within the China's People's Liberation Army and incorporated to current Chinese strategic thinking. Many other militaries have researched and considered RMA as an organizational concept, including Canada, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore, Republic of China (Taiwan), India, Russia and Germany. However, the infrastructure and investment demands are very expensive for many countries and nations unwilling to invest substantial sums in defense.
Renewed interest was placed on RMA theory and practice after what many saw as a stunning, one-sided victory by the United States in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. American dominance through superior satellite, weapons-guiding, and communications technology emphasized the enormous relative power of the US through technological advances, even against an Iraqi military that was by no means an insignificant rival. After the Kosovo War where the United States did not lose a single life, others suggested that war had become too sanitized, creating an almost "Virtual War". Consequently, US difficulties capturing Osama Bin Laden and problems in the U.S. occupation of Iraq have caused some to question RMA's build-up as a military nirvana. U.S. foes may increasingly resort to asymmetrical warfare to counter the advantages of RMA.
In 1997 the US Army mounted an exercise (code name 'Force 21') to test the application of digital technologies in warfare. The goal of Force 21 was to improve the communications and logistics through the application of computer technology generated in the private sector and adapted for military use. The specific aims were to increase awareness of one's own position on the battlefield and to have a clear sense of the enemy's position, in pursuit of the following goals: (1) increased lethality, (2) increased control of the tempo of warfare, (3) the reduction of instances caused by friendly fire (with improvement in Identification Friend or Foe).
When reviewing the gamut of theories, three fundamental versions of RMA come to the forefront. The first perspective focuses primarily upon changes in the nation-state and the role of an organised military in using force. This approach highlights the political, social, and economic factors worldwide, which might require a completely different type of military and organisational structure to apply force in the future. Authors such as RAND's Sean J. A. Edwards (advocate of BattleSwarm tactics), Carl H. Builder and Lt. Col. Ralph Peters emphasized the decline of the nation-state, the nature of the emerging international order, and the different types of forces needed in the near future.
The second perspective — most commonly assigned the term RMA — highlights the evolution of weapons technology, information technology, military organization, and military doctrine among advanced powers. This "System of Systems" perspective on RMA has been ardently supported by Admiral William Owens, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who identified three overlapping areas for force assets. These are intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, command, control, communications and intelligence processing, and precision force.
Advanced versions of RMA incorporate other sophisticated technologies, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), nanotechnology, robotics, and biotechnology. Recently, the RMA debate focussed on "network-centric warfare" which is a doctrine that aims to connect all troops on the battlefield.
Finally, the third concept is that a "true" revolution in military affairs has not yet occurred or is unlikely to. Authors such as Michael O’Hanlon and Frederick Kagan, point to the fact much of the technology and weapons systems ascribed to the contemporary RMA were in development long before 1991 and the flashy Internet and information technology boom. Several critics point out that a "revolution" within the military ranks might carry detrimental consequences, produce severe economic strain, and ultimately prove counterproductive. Such authors tend to profess a much more gradual "evolution" in military affairs, as opposed a rapid revolution.