The Medici Bank (1397 – 1494) was the largest and most respected bank in Europe during the 15th century. There are some estimates that the Medici family was for a period of time the wealthiest family in Europe. With this monetary wealth, the family acquired political power initially in Florence, and later in the wider spheres of Italy and Europe.
Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici was the first Medici to enter banking on his own, and while he became influential in Florentine government, it was not until his son Cosimo the Elder took over that in 1434 as gran maestro that the Medici became unofficial head of state of the Florentine republic.
While Giovanni's father Averardo (?-1363; known as "Bicci") was not a very successful businessman or banker, a distant cousin Vieri di Cambio (1323-1396) was, and further was one of Florence's more prominent bankers (the first of the various modestly upper-class Medici lineages, numbering around 20 in 1364). His banking house trained and employed Giovanni and his elder brother Francesco (c. 1350-1412), who eventually became partners in the firm. Francesco became a junior partner in 1382, while Giovanni rose to become general manager of the Rome branch in 1385, which was incorporated as a partnership, though it was not necessary to capitalize that branch (because the Church usually was depositing funds and not borrowing). Vieri was long-lived, but his bank split into three sometime between 1391 and 1392: one failed quickly, another helmed by Francesco and then his son survived until 1443 (a little less than a decade after Averardo's death), and the third was controlled by Giovanni in partnership with Benedetto di Lippaccio de' Bardi (1373-1420).
The Medici bank's founding is usually dated to 1397, since it was this year that Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici separated his bank from his nephew Averardo's bank (which had effectively been acting as a branch in Rome) moved his small bank from Rome to Florence. The branch in Rome was entrusted to Benedetto, and Giovanni took on Gentile di Baldassare Buoni (1371-1427) as a partner. They pooled 10000 gold florins and began (though Gentile soon left the firm). This move had certain advantages for a bank, in as much that the predominant large banks of the 1300s which were based in Florence (the Bardi, Acciaioli, Peruzzi) had met with problems, and saw their places usurped by the Alberti, who were just large enough to capture the Catholic Church's business. But the Alberti firm split over internecine quarrels, and the clan was banished from Florence in 1382 (though they would be allowed to return in 1434), creating yet another void. Giovanni's choice proved to be prescient, especially since what Florence was lacking was a good port on the Mediterranean - which it would obtain in 1406 with the conquest of Pisa and its Porto Pisano. A further advantage was that it was much easier to invest a bank's capital in Florence than in Rome, and because of the Holy See's deposits (obtained through Giovanni's long contacts with them), the bank had a fair amount in the way of deposits to invest with.
In 1420, Benedetto di' Bardi (the ministro or general manager of all the branches) died, and was succeeded by his younger brother Ilarione di' Bardi, who was the manager of the Rome branch. He dissolved one of the wool factories, among other reorganizations occasioned by partnerships coming to their designated end. This date is interesting because Ilarione's contract with his principal was done in the name of Cosimo and Lorenzo, and not their father Giovanni; this perhaps marks the beginnings of a transfer of responsibility and power. Two Portinaris were put in charge of the Florence and Venice branches as well.
Giovanni died in 1429; according to Lorenzo, his fortune upon his death was around 180,000 gold florins. His death affected little, and the transition to control by Cosimo went smoothly, aided by Ilarione, who was retained as ministro. Fortunately for the bank, Lorenzo di Giovanni di Bicci was on excellent terms with Cosimo, and so did not insist on dissolving the partnerships so he could receive his share of the patrimony (primogeniture not being operative here); many Florentine banks and businesses lasted only a generation or two because some of the inheriting sons usually wished to strike out on their own. At this point in time, the branch was flourishing: besides the branches in Rome and Florence, the Venetian and Genevan branches had been founded. Ilarione would not last long, and is mentioned as dead in a letter written in February of 1433; an unfortunate timing as it was this period in which the Albizzi government was moving against the young Medici led resistance (galvanized by the Albizzi government's failure in a war against Lucca and Milan), culminating in Cosimo's exile to Venice. Despite the unfavorable politics, in this period of the bank's history the branches in Italy turned in bumper profits, with as much as 62% coming from Rome (in 1427, the Rome branch had approximately 100,000 florins on deposit from the Curia; in comparison, the total capitalization of the entire Medici bank was about 25,000 gold florins) and 13% from Venice between 1420 and 1435 (with the Bruges, London, Pisa, Avignon, Milan, and Lyon branches contributing nothing as they had not been founded yet). At this time, there seems to have been some sort of office in Basel, and it seems to have lasted until 1443. de Roover speculates that it was a sub-branch of the Geneva branch serving the General Council of the Church, and was closed when the Council no longer made it worth their while to maintain it.
As mentioned previously, Cosimo's uncle had begun a bank with his third of Vieri's bank, and it closed in 1443 with the death of the grandson of Averardo - taking with it their branch in Pisa. Formerly, any business that the Medici needed to transact in Pisa (such as Cosimo forwarding Donatello money to buy marble) had been done through them. In 26 December 1442, a limited liability partnership was formed with two outsiders. Over time, the Medici progressively reduced their investment in this partnership, until they seem to have withdrawn completely sometime shortly after 1457; one partner kept it running until 1476.
1446 saw the start of two branches: the sub-branch of the Bruges branch was converted into a full partnership, and a limited liability partnership was established in Avignon (which was the largest center of trade in southern France despite the departure of the Papacy), and within 2 years converted into a full partnership. The branch at Lyons was not actually founded as a separate branch, because it came about as a result of the gradual move of the Geneva branch, due to the reduction in traffic to the fairs at Geneva and the establishment of four major fairs in Lyons (which attracted around 140 other Florentine businesses). The move was completed in 1466.
The structure and functions of the bank had largely settled into their final form by this point; a branch would be opened in Milan in late 1452 or early 1453, at the instigation of the grateful Sforza. Its first manager Pigello Portinari (1421 - October 1468) was very capable and it did well in loaning to the Sforza court and, like the Roman branch, selling luxuries such as jewels - until he died and was replaced by his feckless brother Accerrito (1427-c. 1503) who could not manage the massive amounts lent to the court and Sforza (who didn't repay his debts of 179,000 ducatsbefore his death in 1478). A similar problem would plague the Bruges branch when managed by the third Portinari brother, Tommaso.
Still, this period (1435-155) under Cosimo and his ministro Giovanni Benci was the bank's greatest period. With Cosimo's death on 1 August 1464, the decline of the bank began.
Whether Machiavelli is overstating issues and Piero had merely ordered a thorough accounting is unknown; Machiavelli can probably be trusted here since there was a rash of bankruptcies and bank failures in Florence shortly after Cosimo's death which led to a small recession; de Roover mentions however the war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire and the relevant firms' connections to that area as a possible factor as well.. It is certain however that Piero tried to wind up the London branch and recover as much of the loans to Edward as possible, ordered the Milan branch to loan less, instructed Tommaso Portinari of the Bruges branch to get rid of the galleys and not make any loans to secular rulers, and attempted to shut down the Venice branch which was no longer profitable. From the perspective of carrying out his policies, Piero was in a bad place: it was politically costly to demand that loans be repaid, and such demands could cost Piero dearly close to home: the king of England had him over a barrel as the king could block any attempts to export English wool, and the English wool was desperately needed by the bank for two reasons. The first was that English wool was the finest in the world; if Florence did not have a supply of English wool to weave, it could not sell its wares and more importantly could not employ the lower classes which specialized in textiles. Flemish wool had once served in English wool's place, but after the 1350s, it no longer had a market in Italy and was essentially not imported after 1400. Unemployment generated considerable unrest and revolts, which would be aimed at Piero since he was seen as the true ruler of Florence. The second reason was that there was a systemic problem in the Medici bank in which currency flowed south to Italy from the northern countries, and the wool was necessary to provide a conduit for currency to flow north and balance the books. So when Edward demanded loans, the London branch had little choice but to oblige him.
By 1494, the Milan branch too ceased to exist. The branches that did not die off on their own generally met their end with the Medicis in general in 1494, when Florence and the Pope struck against them. The Florence banco was burned by a mob, the Lyons one taken over by a rival firm, the Roman branch struck off on its own despite the branch being bankrupt in general (ironically, they would suffer still more debts when a certain cardinal became pope and inquired after the 11243 gold florins he had deposited with the bank back when it was with the Medici bank). Even at the time of its downfall, it was the biggest bank in Europe, with at least seven branches and over fifty factors, an astounding number.
de Roover attributes the beginning of the bank's decline to Cosimo. He spent the vast majority of his time politicking, and when he was not preoccupied with the intricate plotting and other characteristics of Florence; when he was not engaged in such activities, he was patronizing the many fine scholars and artists, or engaged in composing his own renowned poetry. This left minimal time for the careful selection of branch managers and alert watch against fraud within the bank which was needed. Most of the duties were placed on the shoulders of Francesco Sassetti, who had risen from being a mere factor in the Avignon branch to general manager, and then a post in Geneva eventually to end up in 1458 in Florence proper at Cosimo's side. Sassetti was increasingly left to handle much of the business himself; in the end, it turned out badly. Whether simply due to bad luck, old age, increasing laziness or diversion of his time to studying secular humanism like Cosimo, Sassetti failed to discover the fraud at the Lyons branch until it was too late for it to hope to remain solvent. The branch manager Lionetto de' Rossi had attempted to cover up his incompetence by being far too optimistic as to the number of bad loans the branch would have to cover, and by borrowing funds - thus artificially inflating his profits.
That is not the only factor he identifies. A long term trend of the devaluation of gold against silver (which held steady) between 1475 and 1485 - possibly thanks to increased output by German silver mines - meant that as the debtors, the Medici bank was on the wrong side of the trend - their deposits were held in gold, and interest was paid in gold. This trend was in part attributable to Florence's reluctance to debase the gold florin, which was internationally esteemed for its value, prestige, and reliability. But Florence's dual coinage system only aggravated the problem. This shift in the monetary system perhaps reflected a systemic slowdown or recession in Europe in general: if the failure of the Medici bank were solely due to internal issues, then why do the Arte del Cambio's records of member banks record such a drastic decline in membership that the guild fell from 71 banks in 1399, to 33 in 1460, to fall so low that the guild itself fell into disuse and one must turn to an outside chronicler like Giovanni Cambi, who notes that of the 9 large banks left in Florence by 1516, one failed December 25? This decline does not appear to have been Florence specific, with similar declines seen in Bruges and Venice (although apparently not in Spain). Similarly, the northern branches were squeezed by a general decline the supply of English wool.
Agreement on these aggravating factors does not seem to be universal; Richard A. Goldthwaite writes in 1987 that "these economic conditions have never been adequately explained. It appears more likely that the contraction and decline of the Medici bank under Lorenzo - it was reduced to branches in only Florence, Rome and Lyons by the time he died in 1492 - were due simply to bad management. He also claims that guild memberships cannot be used as a proxy for general economic conditions, as the problem could be that "By this time, in fact, Florentine guilds had long lost much of an economic function in the areas of their formally defined activity, with the result that the quality of their internal administration deteriorated; but this institutional history cannot be taken as an indicator of the vitality of the respective sectors of the economy the guilds nominally represented.
Piero died on 2 December 1469. He was succeeded by his two sons, Lorenzo and Giuliano. The two had not attained their majority and so Lorenzo (Piero's brother, that is) took over Piero's fortune to hold it in trust (a poor choice as he would later raid Piero's estate when the financial situation grew more dire). His interest in politics and art (which led to his appellation "the Magnificent") forced him to rely on his ministro Francesco Sassetti to handle most affairs of the bank. Sassetti can be faulted and inculpated in the decline of the bank for failing to prevent the disasters of Lyon and Bruges, and Lorenzo for relying too much on Sassetti and not listening to him when Sassetti did notice problems or tried to fix things. Indeed, Lorenzo once said when Angelo Tani (who had tried to prevent the failure of the Bruges branch) appealed to him to overrule Sassetti and restrict the lending of the London branch, that "he [Lorenzo] did not understand such matters." He would later admit that his lack of knowledge and understanding was the reason he approved Tommaso Portinari's disastrous schemes. Goldthwaite faults Lorenzo in no uncertain terms:
"...Lorenzo il Magnifico, for whom politics always took priority over business. Service to the court and the aristocracy was probably the chief reason for establishing branches in both Milan in 1452 or 1453 and Naples in 1471, and over-extension of credit through personal loans created severe and ultimately insurmountable problems for both operations.
On Lorenzo's death on 8 April 1492, the succession passed to his 20 year old son Piero di Lorenzo (1472-1521). Piero had no talent for running the bank and depended on his secretary and his great-uncle Giovanni Tornabuoni to handle everything. Needless to say, the two mismanaged the bank and balked the new ministro (Sassetti having died of a stroke in March 1490) Giovambattista Bracci. If the Medici family and its bank had not been overthrown in 1494, it would probably have shortly failed in a long-delayed bankruptcy.
Another factor was the spending habits of Lorenzo. According to Lorenzo, between 1434 and 1471, he spent an average of 17,467 gold florins a year.
Another misjudgement or failure by Sassetti was placing his trust in Tommaso Portinari instead of in more trustworthy managers like Angelo Tani; Portinari would eventually cause the collapse of the Bruges branch.
Niccolò Machiavelli gave a more contemporary viewpoint in his Istorie fiorentine, asserting that the fall of the Medici was due to the loose rein on bank managers who began to act like princes and not sensible businessmen and merchants.
Eventually, the fiscal problems grew severe enough to force Lorenzo to begin raiding Florence's state treasuries - at one point defrauding the Monte delle Dote, a charitable fund for paying for dowries. Shortly thereafter, the political pressure of Charles VIII of France's 1494 invasion of Italy caused Piero di Lorenzo de' Medici to concede to the dual forces of Charles and the impending insolvency of the Medici bank. The assets and records were seized and distributed to creditors and others, and all the branches were declared dissolved.
This study is based mainly on the business records of the Medici Bank: partnership agreements, correspondence, and account books. The extant material is unfortunately fragmentary; for example, no balance sheets have survived. Only a few pages of some of the account books have escaped destruction by a frenzied mob.
Nevertheless, the sources are sufficiently numerous (exceeded only by the Datini's bank's archives, in Tuscany/Prato) that the Medici bank is well understood, especially as the remains of the Medici records were given to the city of Florence by a descendant of the Medici.
So the Medici were represented by the firm of Filippo Strozzi and Co. in Naples, by Piero del Fede and Co. in Valencia, by Nicolaio d'Ameleto and Antonio Bonafe in Bologna, by Filippo and Federigo Centurioni in Genoa, by Gherardo Bueri - a close relative of Cosimo - in Lübeck, and so forth.
A crucial distinction between the Medici Bank and its older rivals (the Peruzzi, the Bardi, the Acciaioli etc.) was that its "decentralization" was not merely geographic: it was legal and financial. The Peruzzi bank was taken over by outsiders in 1331 because there was but one partnership, based in Florence and held largely by Peruzzi family members, which owned everything - the employees were only paid a salary for their service. So the nine original outsiders could slowly leverage their 21 1/4 shares to overwhelm the Peruzzi's collective 36 3/4 shares - although lack of clear leadership when the leading partner died has been suggested as another factor in the failure of the Bardi and Peruzzi banks.
The branch manager (the governatore, or "governor", would have put up a portion of his own money at the start of the partnership) and the investing partners could take out their profits at this point, since salaries or dividends were not paid when the partnership agreement was in effect, but usually the Florentine partners (maggiori, "seniors") and the branch manager would then incorporate a fresh partnership if the manager's performance had been satisfactory. Managers were not paid salaries, but were considered to have invested in the partnership a sum greater than they actually had (ex. in 1455 the Venice branch's partnership agreement was renewed and the manager Alessandro Martelli invested 2000 of the 14000 ducats. He would be paid of the total profits not his fair 1/7th, but rather 1/5th).
The manager could, if he wished, attempt to start a rival bank, but he could not legally claim to be part of the Medici Bank, since a right to use that trademarked name came with the partnership; this measure would turn out to be effective against ambitious dissident juniors like Tommaso Portinari. However, even before the shares' profits were paid out, any sums invested in the branch outside of an ownership of shares were repaid at a set interest rate - sometimes leading to one branch paying another for the latter's investment in the former.
Governors were given wide latitude in daily operation and in the management of their seven or eight assistant managers, clerks, cashiers, accountants, couriers etc. who lived and boarded at the Medici-rented employee housing (although the managers had little say in their selection, which was done by the Florence bank), but policy was set by the seniors, and often firmly - the Bruges branch was, when first incorporated, strictly forbidden by the terms of the partnership to lend money to temporal lords and kings. Policy would generally be communicated to the branch managers during their biennial or triennial trips to Florence to report in person and discuss important issues, or in the private letters and reports their couriers carried.
Discretionary deposits were a partial way out, but the bank made most of its money by selling holographic "bills of exchange"; these bills certified that a particular person or company had paid a particular Medici branch a certain sum of money, as verified by the general or assistant manager of that branch (who were the only ones allowed to make out such bills). The bill instructed the recipient Medici branch to pay back that sum in local currency - but not at whatever the local exchange rate for the two currencies concerned happened to be at the moment the bill was presented to be cashed in, but rather at the exchange rate set when the presenting (or current owner; bills of exchange could be sold and traded freely) person bought the bill of exchange. That there was a difference in time was guaranteed by the terms of the bill - a specific date could be set, but generally the time between a bill was issued in one city and could be cashed in at another was set by long-standing custom, or at usance. The usance between Florence and London was 3 months, for example.
A fictional but illustrative example: a merchant is travelling from Florence to London. He buys a bill of exchange for 10 florins, with the understanding that the London branch will cash that bill at half a pound to the florin, for a total of 5 pounds.
If he reaches London and discovers that the florin has become stronger against the pound, to the point where a florin buys a whole pound, he takes a loss: instead of the 10 pounds he could have gotten had he not bought the bill of exchange, he will instead receive only 5. Similarly, if the florin weakens greatly, he could well reap a windfall at the expense of the London branch.
Clearly the branches would want to try to maximize sales of bills of exchange in the former situation, where the rate of the issuing currency increases between the time of issuance and payment; this they attempted to do with frequent letters between branches and paying close attention to exchange rates. While close to loans, the element of risk meant that this practice did not actually become usury, except in the case of "dry exchange", where the moving around of money was fictitious. With appropriate issuances of bills, branches could move around money and actually make money. Similarly, they could be fairly certain of a profit when a bill was issued in one of the Italian branches because they could demand a premium of sorts for being asked to deliver money in a far away place at however far in the future usance set the maturation date. de Roover offers this real example:
Around July 15, 1441, the Medici of Venice bought a bill on Bruges at the rate of 54 1/2 groats per Venetian ducat. Two months later, when the bill matured, they received in Bruges 54 1/2 groats for each ducat. With the proceeds of this bill the Bruges branch, acting as [an] agent for the Venice branch, bought a bill on Venice, payable at the end of two months, at the rate of 51 1/2 groats per ducat. The Medici of Venice thus made a profit of 3 groats on each ducat over a period of four months, since they received 54 1/2 groats and paid 51 1/2 groats. If the exchange rate in Bruges had been 54 1/2 groats instead of 51 1/2 per ducat, the Medici of Venice would have broken even because they would have paid and received the same number of groats for each ducat.
The silk shop produced some of the finest silk wares, and were usually sold to Florentine exporters or shipped to the branch in Bruges as a consignment to feed the Burgundian court's strong appetite for such goods; or to the branch in Milan to sell to the Sforza court. The cloth manufacturers similarly produced very high-quality pieces and sold a good deal of their output to Milan and the Sforzas.
While lucrative, the revenues realized from the three factories should not be overemphasized: while the Medici often had invested more than 7,900 gold florins in the three factories in 1458 for example, the sum invested in banks in 1458 was more than 28,800 - and that figure is low, for it excludes the Rome branch serving the Pope, the Medici's interest-bearing deposits in their branches, and also omits any accounting of several years' profit which were inaccessible (since the relevant partnerships had not yet been dissolved; this may seem to be a flaw in the system, but it built up capital in a branch and allowed it to lend out more than it had been incorporated with). Part of the reason for maintaining these factories when the funds could have been more profitably invested in the banks or trade could have been social: it seems to have a bit of a Florentine tradition to run such factories to provide employment for the poor - a social obligation, as it were.
The first beginnings of the factories came in 1402. Giovanni di Bicci began a partnership to run a wool factory with an experienced manager, one Michele di Baldo di ser Michele. This first woolshop was followed by a second one in 1408, this time with Taddeo di Filippo. The first one was ended in 1420; de Roover speculates that it was poorly run and so not very profitable. Eventually another one was opened in 1439; the original eventually came to an end between 1458 and 1469 for unknown reasons ("probably because of the manager's death.). The last one was apparently being liquidated in 1480 amidst a general decline in the Florentine textile industry, and doesn't appear again in the tax records. The silkshop is known to have not existed before 1430; the libro segreto ("secret records"; the second set of books kept to record partners' profits, and generally more accurate than the public books, inasmuch as they state the real profits and losses and which depositers were real) mention that they entered into a short partnership with two silk manufacturers. When the partnership ended, one of the two manufacturers became the manager of the silk factory until his death in 1446 or 1447; the silkshop endured until 1480, when the last descendant of that partner died.
The Roman branch of the bank was not merely charged with the normal deposit and bill of exchange business of the bank, nor with just the mechanics of being "fiscal agents of the Holy See (which entailed handling and moving the papal revenues, paying out designated subsidies to countries fighting the Islamic & heathen Turks and fees etc, but the Medici did not actually collect the monies from sales of indulgences or taxes due the Papacy) but also with managing a certain piece of Papal property: the Tolta alum mines, an interest they had acquired in 1473 in exchange for forgiving some of the Pope's long overdue debts to the Medici, although they had a previous interest in the "Societas Aluminum" (the company which farmed the mines after their discovery in 1460 in Tolta near Civitavecchia; the agreement forming this company had three partners, one of whom was the mines' discover Giovanni da Castro, and was ratified by the pope in 3 September 1462) dating back to 1466, expecting that by breaking the Turkish monopoly of alum imported from the Middle East (from the mines in Asia Minor, at Phocea near Smyrna) they could reap far more than their investments in the form of never to be repaid loans. The Medicis immediately set about trying to eliminate the competition, of which there were three main sources of large amounts of decent quality alum: Turkey, the mines in Ischia, and the mines in Volterra.
The Pope's share of the revenue was to be used to finance campaigns against the Hussites as well as the Turks, so buying Turkish alum was declared by him to be utterly immoral in that it helped the infidel enemy and hurt the faithful. Turkish alum was to be seized where it was found.
They discouraged the alum mining near Volterra in Italy, apparently pushing its inhabitants to revolt against Florentine rule. At Lorenzo's directing, the insurrection was brutally oppressed and the mines reduced in output and safely under Florentine (and thus, Medici) control. The sad outcome of this episode was that the sack was entirely unnecessary: exploitation of this mine was abandoned in 1483 simply because the mine was so poor that it was unprofitable.
Ischia was under the ownership and protection of the King of Naples, so the Medici and the company then exploiting the Ischia mines signed a 25 year cartel agreement to restrict output and boost prices by only selling at a fixed price. This cartel flagrantly violated the teachings of the church, which tried to justify it by pointing to the virtuous military campaigns it would finance. Regardless, the cartel was not particularly successful. Turkish alum was never satisfactorily suppressed (the Pazzi bank is known to have smuggled Turkish alum into the Low Countries, for example), and the cartel was not well organized with conflict between the Medici branches - the Bruges branch and its manager Tommaso Portinari were convinced that the papal mines were simply producing far too much alum and glutting the market. They would not accept more alum on consignment until the alum they then had had finally sold.
Between this internal dissension, the dissension between cartel partners, the constant flow of Turkish alum, the organized opposition of consumer groups, the alum interest never raised as much money as they banked on. But regardless of its success or lack there of, the alum interest ended after the Pazzi Conspiracy, in 1478, after which Pope Sixtus IV confiscated all the Medici property he could.
This branch was always busy. The Papal court was attended upon by hundreds of minor officials, ecclesiastical and secular, along with their attendants, and their needs were such that there was a measurable rise in the frequency of money shortages where the court went - leading to a direct need for banking services that the Medici could provide. The various bishops and cardinals prelates and such often held Church or private estates in far-flung states in and beyond Italy, the revenues from which needed to be transferred to where they could use it - which was where they physically were in the Court. A more practical reason was that alternate investments generally took the form of real estate, and any cardinal or bishop who invested overly much in real estate (which they were not supposed to) or relied on income from Church lands might see his investments confiscated under a new Pope who might not favor him so much or even turned over to a replacement. Accounts with the Medici were kept secret and generally free from prying ecclesiastical eyes, especially in the case of discretionary deposits.
Persons not already at the court made use of the branch for cashing letters of credit to make their pilgrimage or journey the safer. Tribute from the many dioceses and institutions the Church controlled needed to be consolidated (but not collected by the Medici) and safely then safely transmitted: that service too the Medici could provide to a degree, though not in all areas To carry out their services, the papal bankers were often given considerable power: if a banker could not collect the rents due the pope, they had but to complain and the offending cleric would be automatically excommunicated (a threat aired in 1441 against the slow Bishop of Nevers; or they could block appointments, as they threatened to do to John Kemp, whose nephew had just been appointed to the bishopric of London with their aid, if the proper payments were not soon made.
Officially, the branch could not make its money by lending at a profit to the Popes (who were lax in repaying the Medici), and taking in many deposits at interest. It did, to a degree, but the principal means of profiting came from commercial transactions: "the Medici overcharged the pope on the silks and brocades, the jewels and other commodities they supplied... These payments were entirely one way and not exchanges: Rome and Italy generally produced little to nothing of value and so the balance of trade was greatly unequal. It could be alleviated by the production from northern silver mines, but in general the main commodity Italy was willing to exchange specie for was English wool. The decline in availability of English wool to be imported, and the general concomitant economic problems have been identified as one of the contributing causes to the banks decline.
More consequently, the Popes in this period were frequently holding great councils and conferences. The meetings of eminent (and especially wealthy) individuals itself gave rise to a need for advanced banking services, to such a degree that the Medici were not the only Italian bank to open up temporary branches wherever such councils were convened.
The close relation between the papacy and the branch declined over the years, with the decline especially pronounced after 1464, with few to no branch managers being selected to be the "depositary-general" - the official who was essentially the fiscal agent for the Apostolic Chamber, or the Church's treasury. Pope Sixtus IV would repudiate the Medici's control of the alum trade and also his debts to them, as well seize Medici property in Rome after the Pazzi Conspiracy in 1478; the Pazzi's interlocked businesses and banks had captured the alum business after the Medici were removed from it, and were supplying the depositary-general from their ranks, indicating that they were trying to follow the Medici route of initially building up their empire through papal custom. The papacy would eventually agree to repay the debts, but did so extremely slowly; so slowly that the branch manager Giovanni Tornabouni agreed to take stocks of alum instead - despite the depressed market for alum. Tornabuoni would still be in charge when 1494 came and the edifice of the Medici came crashing down. Because the branch had been doing so poorly, it owed more than it was due, so the Roman government was satisfied to allow Tornabouni to assume the rest of the partnership's equity and debts.
Head of the firm