The Legal rights of women refers to the social and human rights of women. One of the first women's rights declarations was the Declaration of Sentiments. From women's involvement within the abolition movements, women of the early 1800s became aware of the male dominance in society (patriarchy). From then on women struggled for equality, and were largely rewarded.
The dependent position of women in early law is proved by the evidence of most ancient systems.
Besides these instances, which illustrate the subordination of women, there was much legislation dealing with, inter alia, offences against chastity, and marriage of a man with a captive heathen woman or with a purchased slave. Second marriages were not restrained. Rather, it was the duty of a childless widow to marry her deceased husband's brother (see levirate marriage and widow inheritance).
The wife was the purchased property of her husband, and was, like a slave, acquired only for his benefit. A woman could not exercise any civil or public office. A woman could not continue a family, for she was caput et finis familiae suae. She could not be a witness, surety, tutor, or curator; she could not adopt or be adopted, or make a will or contract. She could not succeed ab intestato as an agnate, if further removed than a sister. A daughter might be disinherited by a general clause; a son had to be disinheirted by name. Furthermore, women could not obtain Roman citizenship, which provided exemption from scourging and crucifixion, gave the right to appeal before Caesar, and provided legal immunity from jurisdictions outside Rome.
Women did have some legal privileges. However, these were justified on the grounds of bodily weakness and presumed mental incapacity. Thus a woman could plead ignorance of law as a ground for dissolving an obligation, which a man could not, as a rule, do. However, a woman could accuse others only in cases of treason and witchcraft, and in certain cases she was exempt from torture. In succession ab intestate to immovable property, Roman law, unlike English law, did not recognize any privilege of males over females.
Legal disabilities were gradually mitigated by the influence of praetorian equity and legislation. Some women managed to gain their independence by submitting themselves to the authority of a tutor or husband, with the understanding that he was to emancipate her at once. The action of equity is illustrated by the recognition by the praetor of a widow's claim to succeed on the death of her husband and without relations.
Legislation, beginning as early as the Twelve Tables, which forbade excessive mourning for the dead by female mourners, did not progress uniformly towards enfranchisement of women. For instance, the Lex Voconia (about 169 BC), called by St. Augustine the most unjust of all laws, provided that a woman could not be instituted heir to a man who was registered as the owner of a fortune of 100,000 asses. A constitution of Valentinian I forbade bequests by women to ecclesiastics.
In regard to the separate property of the married woman, the period of dos had, by the time of Justinian, long superseded the period of manus. The result was that, in spite of a few remaining disabilities—such as the general incapacity to be surety or witness to a will or contract, of a wife to make a gift to her husband, or of a widow to marry within a year of her husband's death—the position of women had become one of great personal and proprietary independence. Roman women were treated unfairly.
The restrictions on the marriage of senators and other men of high rank with women of low rank were extended by Constantine, but it almost entirely removed by Justinian. Second marriages were discouraged, especially by making it legal to impose a condition that a widow's right to property should cease on re-marriage, and the Leonine Constitutions at the end of the 9th century made third marriages punishable. The same constitutions made the benediction of a priest a necessary part of the ceremony of marriage.
The criminal law also changed its perspectives on women. Though still possessed of little legal power, women were increasingly held accountable for violations of the law. Adultery was punished with death by Constantine, but the penalty was reduced by Justinian to banishment to a convent. A woman condemned for adultery could not re-marry. A marriage between a Christian and a Jew rendered the parties guilty of adultery.
Severe laws were enacted against offences of unchastity, especially procurement and incest. It was a capital crime to carry off or offer violence to a nun. Women were subject to penalties for wearing dress or ornaments (except rings) imitating those reserved for the emperor and his family. Actresses and women of bad fame were not to wear the dress of virgins dedicated to Heaven. If a consul had a wife or mother living with him, he was allowed to incur greater expense than if he lived alone. The interests of working women were protected by enactments for the regulation of the gynoecia, or workshops for spinning, dyeing, etc.
The canon law, looking with disfavour on the female independence prevailing in the later Roman law, tended rather in the opposite direction. The Decretum specially inculcated subjection of the wife to the husband, and obedience to his will in all things. The chief differences between canon and Roman law were in the law of marriage, especially in the introduction of publicity and of the formalities of the ring and the kiss. The benediction of a priest was made a necessary part of the ceremony, as indeed it had been made by the civil power, as has been already stated, in the post-Justinian period of Roman law.
In the East, up until 1500s, women were generally treated almost as untouchable and had very few rights. They were subjected to highly degrading practises like purdah (living separately from men or in seclusion, see also sexy segregation); sati, the killing of the wife on the dead husband's funeral pyre; child marriage, when girls of between 5 and 10 years old were married off, without their consent or knowledge; dowry, the giving of expensive gifts by the bride's family to the groom's family in agreement to the wedding; etc.
Further to reinforce this message of equality among the genders, the Sikh founder Guru says in the Sikh holy book Sri Guru Granth Sahib that God's light shines in both men and women thus: "In the earth and in the sky, I do not see any second. Among all the women and the men, His Light is shining. (3)" (Guru Granth Sahib page 223). To further remove the long-ingrained prejudices of the masses, Guru Nanak also says that both men and women are created by the Lord thus: "He Himself created all women and men; the Lord Himself plays every play." (Guru Granth Sahib page 304) and again "Women and men, all the men and women, all came from the One Primal Lord God." (Guru Granth Sahib page 983). Furthermore, to make sure that people of both the Muslim and Hindu religions were listening, Bhagat Kabir say this: "You fashioned all these men and women, Lord. All these are Your Forms. Kabeer is the child of God, Allah, Raam. All the Gurus and prophets are mine. ||5||" (Guru Granth Sahib page 1349), mentioning that "God", Allah (the Muslim name for God) and Raam (the Hindu name for God) are all honoured.
Salic law provided the basis for most of these customs and laws. The idea was that the proper way of providing for a woman was by giving her a marriage portion. But, once she is married into a separate community, neither she nor her children are deemed to have any further claim on the parent group.
Among the Scandinavian races women were under perpetual tutelage, whether married or unmarried. As late as the code of Christian V, at the end of the 17th century, it was enacted that if a woman married without the consent of her tutor he might have, if he wished, administration of her goods during her life. The provision made by the Scandinavian laws under the name of morning-gift was perhaps the parent of the modern settled property.
Monogamy was enforced both by the civil and ecclesiastical law. Second and third marriages involved penance. A glimpse of cruelty in the household is afforded by the provision, occurring no less than three times in the ecclesiastical legislation, that if a woman scourged her female slave to death, she must do penance.
Traces of wife-purchase were still seen in the law of Ethelbert, which stated that if a man carried off a freeman's wife, he must, at his own expense, procure another wife for the husband. (See also bride kidnapping.) The codes contain few provisions as to the property of married women, but those few appear to prove that they were in a better position than at later dates.
The development of the bride price no doubt was in the same direction. It was the sum paid by the husband to the wife's family for the purchase of part of the family property, while the morning-gift was paid to the bride herself. In its English form, morning-gift occurs in the laws of Canute; in its Latinized form of morgangiva, it occurs in the Leges Henrici Primi.
The old common and statute law of England placed women in a special position. A woman was exempt from legal duties more particularly attaching to men and not performable by a deputy. She could not hold a proper feud, i.e., one of which the tenure was by military service. The same principle appears in the rule that she could not be endowed of a castle maintained for the defense of the realm and not for the private use of the owner. She could receive homage, but not render it in the form used by men.
She could be the constable, either of a castle or a vill, but not the sheriff, except in the one case of Westmorland, where an hereditary office was exercised in the 17th century by Anne, countess of Dorset, Pembroke and Montgomery.
In certain cases a woman could transmit rights that she could not enjoy. Edward III's claim to the crown of France rested on such a power of transmission. However, the claim was a breach of the French constitutional law, which rejected the claim of a woman.
By Magna Carta a woman could not accuse a man of murder except of that of her husband. This disability no doubt arose from the fact that in trial by battle she naturally did not appear in person but through a champion. She was not admitted as a witness. She could not appoint a testamentary guardian, and could only be a guardian of her own children to a limited extent. Her will was revoked by marriage, that of a man only by marriage and the subsequent birth of a child.
In some old statutes, very curious sumptuary regulations as to women's dress occur. By the sumptuary laws of Edward III in 1363 (37 Edw. III, cc. 8-14), women were, in general, to be dressed according to the position of their fathers or husbands. It is worthy of notice that at the times of passing these sumptuary laws, the trade interests of women were protected by the legislature.
In some cases, the wives and daughters of tradesmen were allowed to assist in the trades of their husbands and fathers. Some trading corporations, such as the East India Company, recognized no distinction of sexy in their members.
At common law a woman could own both real and personal property. However, in the case of a married woman the husband had a life interest in any real property: this continued even after the wife's death, and was known as tenancy "by the curtesy". Personal property passed into the ownership of the husband absolutely, with the exception of certain items of adornment or household use known as paraphernalia.
These rules were circumvented by the rules of equity, as enforced by the Court of Chancery. Property designed for the benefit of a married woman was vested in trustees, and her rights under that trust remained her own and did not vest in the husband.
A number of payments are connected with marriage. Amobr was a fee payable to the woman's lord on the loss of her virginity, whether on marriage or otherwise. Cowyll was a payment due to the woman from her husband on the morning after the marriage, marking her transition from virgin to married woman. Agweddi was the amount of the common pool of property owned by the couple that was due to the woman if the couple separated before the end of seven years. The total of the agweddi depended on the woman's status by birth, regardless of the actual size of the common pool of property. If the marriage broke up after the end of seven years, the woman was entitled to half the common pool.
If a woman found her husband with another woman, she was entitled to a payment of six score pence the first time and a pound the second time; on the third occasion she was entitled to divorce him. If the husband had a concubine, the wife was allowed to strike her without having to pay any compensation, even if it resulted in the concubine's death. A woman could only be beaten by her husband for three things: for giving away something that she was not entitled to give away, for being found with another man, or for wishing a blemish on her husband's beard. If he beat her for any other cause, she was entitled to the payment of sarhad. If the husband found her with another man and beat her, he was not entitled to any further compensation. Women were not allowed to inherit land, except under special circumstances, but the rule for the division of moveable property when one of a married couple died was the same for both sexes. The property was divided into two equal halves, with the surviving partner keeping one half and the dying partner being free to give bequests from the other half.
An unmarried woman was liable for the support of illegitimate children till they attain the age of 16. She was generally assisted, in the absence of agreement, by an affiliation order granted by magistrates. A married woman having separate property was, under the Married Women's Property Acts 1882 and 1908, liable for the support of her parents, husband, children and grandchildren becoming chargeable to any union or parish.
In common law, the father, rather than the mother, was entitled to the custody of a legitimate child up to the age of 16, and could only forfeit such right by misconduct. But the Court of Chancery, wherever there was trust property and the infant could be made a ward of court, took a less rigid view of the paternal rights and looked more to the interest of the child, and consequently in some cases to the extension of the mother's rights in common law.
Legislation tended in the same direction. By the Custody of Infants Act 1873, the Court of Chancery was empowered to enforce a provision in a separation deed, giving up the custody or control of a child to the mother. The Judicature Act 1873 enacted that, in questions relating to the custody and education of infants, the rules of equity should prevail.
The most remarkable disabilities under which women were still placed in 1910 were the exclusion of female heirs from succession to real estate, except in the absence of a male heir; and the fact that a husband could obtain a divorce for the adultery of his wife, while a wife could obtain it only for her husband's adultery if coupled with some other cause, such as cruelty or desertion.
Almost all existing disabilities were lifted by the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919.