After several days of diplomatic talks with European and Arab partners, President of the United States Ronald Reagan ordered the strike on Libya on April 14. Eighteen F-111F strike aircraft of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, flying from RAF Lakenheath supported by four EF-111A Ravens of the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing, from RAF Upper Heyford in England, in conjunction with twenty-seven A-6, A-7, and F/A-18 attack aircraft from the aircraft carriers USS America and USS Coral Sea on station in the Gulf of Sidra struck five targets at 02:00 on April 15, in the stated objective that their destruction would send a message and reduce Libya's ability to support and train terrorists. Commander TJ Coughlin and his strike group of A6 Intruders caused considerable damage to the Libyan Navy by sinking 2 Combattante Guided Missile Cruisers. Cdr. Coughlin is credited with the sinking of both of these ships.
The United States was denied overflight rights by France and Spain as well as the use of European continental bases, forcing the Air Force portion of the operation to be flown around France and through the Straits of Gibraltar, adding 1,300 miles (2,100 km) each way and requiring multiple aerial refuelings. The attack lasted about ten minutes. Several targets were hit and destroyed, but some civilian and diplomatic sites in Tripoli were struck as well, notably the French embassy , when a number of bombs missed their intended targets.
| Target | Planned planes over target | Planned bombing | Actual planes over target | Actual bombing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Azizyah barracks | 9 F-111Fs | 36 GBU-10 2,000 lb LGB | 3 F-111Fs bombed 1 F-111F missed 4 aborts 1 lost | 13 hits 3 misses |
| Murat Sidi Bilal camp | 3 F-111Fs | 12 GBU-10 2,000 lb LGB | 3 F-111Fs bombed | 12 hits |
| Tripoli airfield (fmr. Wheelus Air Base) | 6 F-111Fs | 72 Mk 82 500 lb RDB | 5 F-111F bombed 1 F-111F abort | 60 hits |
| Jamahiriyah (Benghazi) barracks | 7 A-6Es | 84 Mk 82 500 lb RDB | 6 A-6Es bombed 1 A-6E abort on deck | 70 hits 2 misses |
| Benina airfield | 8 A-6Es | 72 Mk 20 500 lb CBU 24 Mk 82 500 lb RDB | 6 A-6Es bombed 2 aborts | 60 Mk 20 hits 12 Mk 82 hits |
| Tripoli air defense network | 6 A-7E | 8 Shrikes 16 HARMS | 6 A-7E fired | 8 Shrikes 16 HARMS |
| Benghazi air defense network | 6 F/A-18s | 4 Shrikes 20 HARMS | 6 F/A-18s fired | 4 Shrikes 20 HARMS |
| Totals | 45 aircraft | 300 bombs 48 missiles | 35 bombed 1 missed 1 lost 8 aborts | 227 hits 5 misses 48 homing missiles |
Covering Tripoli alone were:
Cold War International History Project
In July 2008, Gaddafi's son Saif al Islam announced that an agreement was being negotiated with the United States whereby Libya would make any future compensation payments to American victims of terror attacks conditional upon the settlement of claims by victims of the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986. On August 14, 2008 the resultant U.S.-Libya Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement was signed in Tripoli by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, David Welch, and by Libya's Secretary for American Affairs, Ahmad Fituri.
In 2001, Theodore D. Karantsalis, a reference librarian at Miami-Dade College, enlisted the aid of Congressman Wally Herger's office to urge Libya to return Lorence's remains on behalf of his family and friends. Karantsalis also created a website and invited visitors to sign a petition to Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart seeking the return of Capt. Lorence's remains. On January 27, 2005, Karantsalis filed a federal lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) against the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force seeking "to know where Captain Paul Lorence's remains are located." Karantsalis had hoped to locate the remains before the 20th anniversary of Lorence's death.
Gaddafi quashed an internal revolt, the organization of which he blamed on the United States. Although Gaddafi appeared to have left the public sphere for a while in 1986/87, it later emerged that he had significantly increased Libyan arms shipments to terrorist groups in this period – especially to the Provisional IRA.
The Libyan government was alleged to have retaliated by ordering the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Pakistan on September 5, 1986. The allegation did not come to light until it was reported by The Sunday Times in March 2004--days after British prime minister, Tony Blair, paid the first official visit to Tripoli by a Western leader in a generation.
Then came the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which exploded in mid-air over the town of Lockerbie in Scotland. Iran was initially thought to have been responsible for the bombing, but two Libyans were charged in 1991, one of whom was convicted for the crime on January 31, 2001. The Libyan Government formally accepted responsibility for the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing on May 29, 2002, and offered $2.7 billion to compensate the families of the 270 victims.
The attack was widely condemned in strong terms. By a vote of 79 in favor to 28 against with 33 abstentions, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 41/38 which "condemns the military attack perpetrated against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 15 April 1986, which constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law.
The Government of Libya said that the United States had fallen prey to the arrogance and madness of power and wanted to become the world's policeman. It charged that any party that did not agree to become an American vassal was an outlaw, a terrorist, and a devil. A meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement said that it condemned the dastardly, blatant and unprovoked act of aggression. The League of Arab States expressed that it was outraged at the United States aggression and that it reinforced an element of anarchy in international relations. The Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union in its declaration said that the deliberate attempt to kill Libyans violated the principles of international law. The Government of Iran asserted that the attack constituted a policy of aggression, gunboat diplomacy, an act of war, and called for an extensive political and economic boycott of the United States. Others saw the United States motive as an attempt to eliminate Libya's revolution.
The Government of China felt that the U.S. attack violated norms of international relations and had aggravated tension in the region. The Government of the USSR believed that there was a clear link between the attack and U.S. policy aimed at subjecting countries to its diktat, at stirring up existing hotbeds of tension and creating new ones, and at destabilizing the international situation.
Some observers held the opinion that Article 51 of the UN Charter set limitations on the use of force in exercising the legitimate right of self-defense in the absence of an act of aggression, and affirmed that there was no such act by Libya. It was charged that the United States did not bother to exhaust the Charter provisions for settling disputes under Article 33. Others asserted that Libya was innocent in the bombing of the West Berlin discotheque.
The U.S. received support from the United Kingdom, Australia, Israel, and a few others. Its doctrine of declaring a war on what it called "terrorist havens" was not repeated until 1998, when President Bill Clinton ordered strikes on six terrorist camps in Afghanistan. Margaret Thatcher's approval of the use of Royal Air Force bases led to substantial criticism, including an unprecedented story in The Sunday Times suggesting the Queen was upset by an "uncaring" Prime Minister. Gaddafi himself responded by saying "Thatcher is a murderer...Thatcher is a prostitute. She sold herself to Reagan".
The overall European reaction to the United States’ bombing of Libya was extremely negative. Nearly every European government opposed the American attack. Public opinion in almost every state was overwhelmingly against the action. While the United Kingdom permitted the United States to use its bases to launch the attack, both France and Spain denied fly-over rights, giving rise to much anti-French sentiment in the United States. The West German government, although officially opposed to the attack, was somewhat ambivalent and understanding in post-attack statements by Helmut Kohl. Interestingly, only in France, which had history of conflict with Libya over Chad, was public opinion supportive of the U.S. action, with initially about 60% approving.
Although the Soviet Union was ostensibly in cooperation with Libya, it had, by the time of the Libya bombing, made its increasing ambivalence toward Libya apparent in public communications. Gaddafi had a history of verbally attacking the policy agendas and ideology of the Soviet Union, and he often engaged in various international interventions and meddlings that conflicted with Soviet goals in a variety of spheres. During a period where the Soviet Union was apparently attempting to lead a subtle diplomatic effort that could impact its global status, close association with the whims of Gaddafi became a liability.
In the entire crisis, the Soviet Union explicitly announced that it would not provide additional help to Libya beyond resupplying basic armaments and munitions. It made no attempt to militarily intimidate the United States, despite the ongoing American operations in the Gulf of Sidra and its previous knowledge that the United States might launch an attack. However, the Soviet Union also did not completely ignore the propaganda gift and it issued a standard denunciation of this 'wild' and 'barbaric' act by the United States.
After the raid, Moscow did cancel a planned visit to the United States by foreign affairs minister Eduard Shevardnadze. At the same time, it clearly signaled that it did not want this action to affect negotiations about the upcoming summer summit between the United States and the Soviet Union and its plans for new arms control agreements.
"Hanna [Gaddafi's adopted daughter] will be honored tonight because of the fact that you've attached peace to her name."