WMCF builds on earlier books by Lakoff (1987) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999), whose probing analyses of metaphor, image schemata, and other concepts from second-generation cognitive science are not for the faint of heart. Some of the riches of these earlier books, such as the interesting technical ideas in Lakoff (1987), are absent from WMCF. Lakoff and Núñez hold that mathematics results from the human cognitive apparatus and must therefore be understood in cognitive terms. WMCF advocates (and includes some examples of) a cognitive idea analysis of mathematics which analyzes mathematical ideas in terms of the human experiences, metaphors, generalizations, and other cognitive mechanisms giving rise to them. Idea analysis is distinct from mathematics and cannot be performed by mathematicians unless they are trained in cognitive science.
Lakoff and Núñez start by reviewing the psychological literature, concluding that humans appear to have an innate ability, called subitizing, to count, add, and subtract up to about 4 or 5. They document this conclusion by reviewing the literature, published in recent decades, describing experiments with infant subjects. For example, infants quickly become excited or curious when presented with "impossible" situations, such as having three toys appear when only two were initially present.
The authors argue that mathematics goes far beyond this very elementary level thanks to a large number of metaphorical constructions. For example, they argue that the Pythagorean position that all is number, and the associated crisis of confidence that came about with the discovery of the irrationality of the square root of two, arises solely from a metaphorical relation between the length of the diagonal of a square, and the possible numbers of objects.
Much of WMCF deals with the important concepts of infinity and of limit processes, seeking to explain how finite humans living in a finite world could eventually conceive of the actual infinite. Thus much of WMCF is, in effect, a study of the epistemological foundations of the calculus. Lakoff and Núñez conclude that while the potential infinite is not metaphorical, the actual infinite is. Moreover, they deem all manifestations of actual infinity to be instances of what they call the "Basic Metaphor of Infinity."
WMCF emphatically rejects the Platonistic philosophy of mathematics. They emphasize that all we know and can ever know is human mathematics, the mathematics arising from the human intellect. Whether a transcendent mathematics, independent of human thought, can be said to exist is probably an unanswerable question, and perhaps even a meaningless one.
WMCF (p. 81) likewise criticizes the emphasis mathematicians place on the concept of closure. Lakoff and Núñez argue that the expectation of closure is an artifact of the human mind's ability to relate fundamentally different concepts via metaphor.
WMCF concerns itself mainly with proposing and establishing an alternative view of mathematics, one grounding the field in the realities of human biology and experience. It is not a work of technical mathematics or philosophy. Lakoff and Núñez are not the first to argue that conventional approaches to the philosophy of mathematics are flawed. For example, they do not seem all that familiar with the content of Davis and Hersh (1981), even though WMCF warmly acknowledges Reuben Hersh's support.
Lakoff and Núñez cite Saunders MacLane (the inventor, with Samuel Eilenberg, of category theory) in support of their position. MacLane (1986), an overview of mathematics intended for philosophers, proposes that mathematical concepts are ultimately grounded in ordinary human activities, mostly interactions with the physical world. See From Action to Mathematics per Mac Lane.
Educators have taken some interest in what WMCF suggests about how mathematics is learned, and why students find some elementary concepts more difficult than others.
Mathematical reasoning requires variables ranging over some universe of discourse, so that we can reason about generalities rather than merely about particulars. WMCF argues that reasoning with such variables implicitly relies on what it terms the Fundamental Metonymy of Algebra.
By (1), A is the set {1,2}. But (1) and (2) together say that A is also the ordered pair (0,1). Both statements cannot be correct; the ordered pair (0,1) and the unordered pair {1,2} are fully distinct concepts. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) term this situation "metaphorically ambiguous." This simple example calls into question any Platonistic foundations for mathematics.
While (1) and (2) above are admittedly canonical, especially within the consensus set theory known as the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatization, WMCF does not let on that they are but one of several definitions that have been proposed since the dawning of set theory. For example, Frege, Principia Mathematica, and New Foundations (a body of axiomatic set theory begun by Quine in 1937) define cardinals and ordinals as equivalence classes under the relations of equinumerosity and similarity, so that this conundrum does not arise. In Quinian set theory, A is simply an instance of the number 2. For technical reasons, defining the ordered pair as in (2) above is awkward in Quinian set theory. Two solutions have been proposed:
It is very much an open question whether WMCF will eventually prove to be the start of a new school in the philosophy of mathematics. Hence the main value of WMCF so far may be a critical one: its critique of Platonism in mathematics, and the Romance of Mathematics.
Critiques of WMCF include the humorous:
and the physically informed:
Mathematicians have also complained that Lakoff and Núñez have misunderstood some basic mathematical notions. The authors reply that the errors found in earlier printings of WMCF are now corrected.
Neither Lakoff nor Núñez is a trained mathematician. Lakoff made his reputation by linking linguistics to cognitive science and the analysis of metaphor. Núñez, educated in Switzerland, is a product of Jean Piaget's school of cognitive psychology as a basis for logic and mathematics. Núñez has thought much about the foundations of real analysis, the real and complex numbers, and the Basic Metaphor of Infinity. These topics, however, worthy though they be, form part of the superstructure of mathematics. Cognitive science should take more interest in the foundations of mathematics. And indeed, the authors do pay a fair bit of attention early on to logic, Boolean algebra and the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, even lingering a bit over group theory. But neither author is well-trained in logic (there is no index entry for "quantifier" or "quantification"), the philosophy of set theory, the axiomatic method, metamathematics, and model theory. Nor does WMCF say enough about the derivation of number systems (the Peano axioms go unmentioned), abstract algebra, equivalence and order relations, mereology, topology, and geometry.
Lakoff and Núñez tend to dismiss the negative opinions mathematicians have expressed about WMCF, because their critics do not appreciate the insights of cognitive science. Lakoff and Núñez maintain that their argument can only be understood using the discoveries of recent decades about the way human brains process language and meaning. They argue that any arguments or criticisms that are not grounded in this understanding cannot address the content of the book.
It has been pointed out that it is not at all clear that WMCF establishes that the claim "intelligent alien life would have mathematical ability" is a myth. To do this, it would be required to show that intelligence and mathematical ability are separable, and this has not been done. On Earth, intelligence and mathematical ability seem to go hand in hand in all life-forms, as pointed out by Keith Devlin among others. The authors of WMCF have not explained how this situation would (or even could) be different anywhere else. From this point of view, whatever one's views on Platonism (right, wrong, meaningless), the 'invention' of mathematical concepts such as number would be impossible since they are hard-wired into our brains from the moment we are born. Also, the word "invention" insinuates that things could somehow be different, so that we could have invented a number theory where 1+1=3, or prime decomposition is false. However, any such number theory immediately falls apart in the face of simple reasoning. In reality, 1+1=3 is obviously false, and Euclid and the ancient Indians stumbled upon prime decomposition rather than inventing it.
Another criticism is that WMCF does not explain where arithmetic comes from (if that is even possible or makes sense). Rather, it merely concluded that humans possess innate arithmetical ability. Some argue that WMCF is entirely consistent with the Platonic philosophy which it rejects.
Lakoff and Núñez also appear not to appreciate the extent to which intuitionists and constructivists have anticipated their attack on the Romance of (Platonic) Mathematics. Brouwer, the founder of the intuitionist/constructivist point of view, wrote "Mathematics is a free construction of the human mind." Hence at least one person writing before Lakoff and Núñez were born concluded that mathematics emerged to serve human purposes and has no existence apart from this fact.
The cognitive approach to formal systems, as described and implemented in WMCF, need not be confined to mathematics, but should also prove fruitful when applied to formal logic, and to formal philosophy such as Edward Zalta's theory of abstract objects Lakoff and Johnson (1999) fruitfully employ the cognitive approach to rethink a good deal of the philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and the history of ideas.