Campaign costs in the United States have become enormous, with political advertising, especially television, being the greatest expense. As a result, parties and candidates need to raise many millions of dollars. Financial contributions by corporations, labor unions, and other other organizations, individuals, and federal employees as well as expenditures by the parties' national committees have been restricted by law. Closer regulation of contributions was attempted by establishment of the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) in 1974 and 1976; the FEC provides public financing in return for spending limits.

In the late 1990s, however, the FEC negated some of its own rules and weakened the restrictions. Additionally, political action committees are permitted as private campaign-funding vehicles, and unlimited "soft money" may be raised by political parties (as opposed to candidates) for "party development" (nearly $500 million in 2000). Also, a number of presidential candidates, beginning with George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential campaign, have chosen to forgo public financing in order to avoid the associated spending limits. Thus the reforms have not slowed the escalating cost of campaigns.

Attempts in the late 1990s to revamp the way national political campaigns are financed were successfully filibustered in the U.S. Senate, but in 2002 Congress passed legislation to eliminate soft money on the national level and restrict it on the state and local level while increasing the amount that could be donated to a candidate. The bill also restricted the ability of political action committees to mention candidates by name immediately before an election. That and the provisions regarding soft money were challenged in court but narrowly upheld (2003) by the Supreme Court; the restrictions on political action committees were narrowed by a 2007 Supreme Court decision that permitted advertising that was not overtly advocating voting for or against a candidate.

In Great Britain the system of parliamentary government permits the overthrow of the cabinet by a vote of no confidence at any time, and, compared with U.S. congressional elections, this results in a more unified party campaign. British parliamentary and local elections are never held concurrently; campaigns are short and intensive, and party expenditures are comparatively very moderate and are fixed by law.

The Plan

Early in 1862, Gen. George B. McClellan, who had kept the Army of the Potomac inactive through the winter, proposed a plan for transporting his troops by sea to Urbana, near the mouth of the Rappahannock River, and from there advancing on Richmond. This plan was soon rendered unfeasible by the advance of the Confederate army under Joseph E. Johnston to the Rappahannock, so McClellan chose Fort Monroe (at the tip of the peninsula between the York and James rivers) as the debarkation point for his offensive. President Lincoln, who preferred an overland advance, reluctantly agreed to McClellan's plan, provided that a force was left behind to protect Washington. The 1st Corps, under Irvin McDowell, was detached from the Army of the Potomac for that purpose.

Evacuation of Yorktown

Early in Apr., 1862, McClellan had about 100,000 men at Fort Monroe. Instead of trying to break through the Confederate line across the peninsula, he prepared to besiege Yorktown, the strongest point in the line. General Johnston evacuated Yorktown (May 3) just as McClellan had completed his preparations. An indecisive, though severely contested, rear-guard action was fought at Williamsburg (May 5) as the Confederates retired toward Richmond. The evacuation of Yorktown opened up the York River to the Union fleet, and on May 16, McClellan established his base at White House Landing (c.20 mi/32 km east of Richmond) on the Pamunkey River.

Union Advance and Jackson's Diversion

At the same time as Yorktown, the Union advance into the interior forced the Confederates to abandon Norfolk (May 10) and to scuttle their formidable ironclad, the Virginia (see Monitor and Merrimack), thus opening up the James as far as Drewry's Bluff (9 m/14 km south of Richmond), where Confederate batteries repulsed them on May 15. McClellan soon had his army encamped on both sides of the Chickahominy River near Richmond: the 3d and 4th corps were on the south side; the 2d, 5th, and 6th on the north. Irvin McDowell's corps (now called the Army of the Rappahannock) was to march south from its position near Fredericksburg and unite with the right wing north of the Chickahominy. McClellan would then move against the inferior forces of Johnston. However, the brilliant campaign of Thomas (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley caused the diversion of McDowell's corps from the army threatening Richmond.

The End of the Campaign

Late in May heavy rains swelled the Chickahominy so that communication between the two wings of McClellan's army became precarious. On May 31, Johnston moved against the left wing (on the south side of the river), where the lines extended to Fair Oaks, a railroad station c.6 mi (9 km) east of Richmond. In the ensuing battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines (May 31-June 1, 1862), the Confederate attack, led by James Longstreet, was badly executed. With the help of some divisions of the 2d corps, which managed to cross the river, the Union left wing held its ground. Johnston, severely wounded on May 31, was succeeded on June 1 by Gen. Robert E. Lee, who withdrew the Army of Northern Virginia to Richmond. Lee's subsequent counteroffensive in the Seven Days battles led to McClellan's withdrawal and the close of the campaign. Union forces did not again come so close to Richmond until 1864.

The Road to Gettysburg

After his victory in the battle of Chancellorsville, Confederate general Robert E. Lee undertook a second invasion of the North. The reorganized Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac (June 17) via the Shenandoah valley, which Richard S. Ewell (2d Corps), as leader of the advance, swept clear of Union forces. By late June, Ewell was seriously threatening Harrisburg, Pa., while Lee, with James Longstreet (1st Corps) and A. P. Hill (3d Corps), was at Chambersburg, Pa. However, with the absence of his cavalry under J. E. B. Stuart, which was raiding in the area between Washington and the position of the Union army, Lee was unable to determine the enemy's strength and movements.

When he finally learned that George G. Meade was concentrating N of the Potomac, he ordered the concentration of his own force. Meade, intending to make his stand at Pipe Creek in Maryland, sent ahead John F. Reynolds, commanding the left wing. But on July 1, John Buford's cavalry, covering Reynolds, came into contact with Harry Heth's division of Hill's corps on the Chambersburg pike just W of Gettysburg. The environs of Gettysburg thus became the unintended site of the greatest battle of the war (July 1-3, 1863).

The Battles

The Federals had the best of A. P. Hill's forces until midafternoon on the first day at Gettysburg, when, outflanked by Ewell, advancing from the north, they were driven to Cemetery Hill, south of the town. Meade on the recommendation of Winfield Scott Hancock abandoned his Pipe Creek plans and hurried up his whole force. On July 2, against the Union left, Longstreet led the main attack, which was not delivered until about 4 P.M.; the Army of the Potomac thus had time to consolidate its strong position. The Confederates took the Peach Orchard but were repulsed when they attempted to seize Round Top and Little Round Top, commanding eminences at the south end of Cemetery Ridge. On the Union right, Ewell carried Culp's Hill but was beaten off at Cemetery Hill.

Meade's counterattack on the morning of July 3 retook Culp's Hill. Lee ordered Longstreet to attack the Union center with George E. Pickett's division, supported by part of Hill's corps (about 15,000 men in all). After a bombardment of the Union position by the massed Confederate artillery, Pickett moved forward in his famous charge. In the face of terrific artillery and musket fire, the gallant Southerners reached and momentarily held the first Union line. But Pickett's support gave way, and Hancock drove him back with tremendous losses. Meanwhile Stuart's cavalry, in an attempt to get at the Union right and rear, was defeated by David M. Gregg. Both armies, exhausted, held their positions until the night of July 4, when Lee withdrew. High water in the Potomac delayed his crossing back to Virginia, but Meade did not attack him in force.

Aftermath

The Union army, which had been the more numerous, lost 23,000 men either killed, wounded, or missing; the Confederate army lost 25,000 (although that figure is questionable). Both commanding generals have been criticized for their conduct of the campaign—Lee for his unwarranted reliance on unseasoned commanders and his authorization of Pickett's charge; Meade for failing to organize his forces to counterattack and pursue the fleeing enemy. The campaign marked the high point of the Confederate activity during the war; thereafter the fortunes of the South went into a marked decline.