Moses warned the Israelites against sacrificing an ox or sheep with any serious defect.
If the Israelites found a person who worshiped other gods, the sun, the moon, or any celestial body, then they were to make a thorough inquiry, and if they established the fact on the testimony of two or more witnesses, then they were to stone the person to death, with the witnesses throwing the first stones. If a case proved too baffling for them to decide, then they were promptly to go to the place that God would choose for God’s shrine, appear before the priests or the magistrate in charge and present their problem, and carry out any verdict that was announced there without deviating either to the right or to the left. They were to execute any man who presumptuously disregarded the priest or the magistrate, so that all the people would hear, be afraid, and not act presumptuously again. ()
God would raise a prophet from among them like Moses, and the Israelites were to heed him. When at Horeb the Israelites asked God not to hear God’s voice directly, God created the role of the prophet to speak God’s words, promising to hold to account anybody who failed to heed the prophet’s words. But any prophet who presumed to speak an oracle in God’s name that God had not commanded the prophet to utter, or who spoke in the name of other gods, was to die. This was how the people were to determine whether the oracle was spoken by God: If the prophet spoke in the name of God and the oracle did not come true, then that oracle was not spoken by God, the prophet had uttered it presumptuously, and the people were not to fear him. ()
Only a manslayer who had killed another unwittingly, without being the other’s enemy, might flee there and live. For instance, if a man went with his neighbor into a grove to cut wood, and as he swung an ax to cut down a tree, the ax-head flew off the handle and struck and killed the neighbor, then the man could flee to one of the cities of refuge and live. If, however, one who was the enemy of another lay in wait, struck the other a fatal blow, and then fled to a city of refuge, the elders of the slayer’s town were to have the slayer turned over to the blood-avenger to be put to death. ()
When the Israelites approached a town to attack it, they were to offer it terms of peace, and if the town surrendered, then all the people of the town were to serve the Israelites as forced labor. But if the town did not surrender, then the Israelites were to lay siege to the town, and when God granted victory, kill all its men and take as booty the women, children, livestock, and everything else in the town. Those were the rules for towns that lay very far from Israel, but for the towns of the nations in the land — the Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites — the Israelites were to kill everyone, lest they lead the Israelites into doing all the abhorrent things that those nations had done for their gods. When the Israelites besieged a city for a long time, they could eat the fruit of the city’s trees, but they were not to cut down any trees that could yield food.
Resh Lakish contrasted “In justice shall you judge your neighbor,” with “Justice, justice shall you pursue,” and concluded that referred to an apparently genuine claim, while referred to the redoubled scrutiny appropriate to a suit that one suspected to be dishonest. Rav Ashi found no contradiction, however, between the two verses, for a Baraita taught that in the two mentions of “justice” in one mention referred to a decision based on strict law, while the other referred to compromise. For example, where two boats meet on a narrow river headed in opposite directions, if both attempted to pass at the same time, both would sink, but if one made way for the other, both could pass without mishap. Similarly, if two camels met on the ascent to Beth-horon, if they both ascended at the same time, both could fall into the valley, but if they ascended one after another, both could ascend safely. These were the principles by which the travelers were to resolve their impasse: If one was loaded and the other unloaded, then the unloaded was to give way to the loaded. If one was nearer to its destination than the other, then the nearer was to give way to the farther. If they were equally near to their destinations, then they were to compromise and the one that went first was to compensate the one who gave way. (Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 32b.)
The Rabbis taught in a Baraita that the words “Justice, justice shall you pursue” meant that one should pursue the most respected jurist to the place where the jurist held court. The Rabbis also taught a Baraita that the words “Justice, justice shall you pursue” meant that one should follow sages to their academies. (Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 32b.)
The Mishnah taught that the words of “Blessed is the man who trusts in the Lord and whose hope is the Lord,” apply to a judge who judges truly and with integrity. The Mishnah taught that the words of “Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue,” apply to tell that an able-bodied person who feigned to be disabled would become disabled. And similarly, the words of “And a gift shall you not accept; for a gift blinds them that have sight,” apply to tell that a judge who accepted a bribe or who perverted justice would become poor of vision. (Mishnah Peah 8:9.)
Rabbi Samuel ben Nahmani taught in the name of Rabbi Jonathan that when a judge unjustly takes the possessions of one and gives them to another, God takes that judge’s life, as says: “Rob not the poor because he is poor; neither oppress the afflicted in the gate, for the Lord will plead their cause, and will despoil of life those that despoil them.” Rabbi Samuel ben Nahmani also taught in the name of Rabbi Jonathan that judges should always think of themselves as if they had a sword hanging over them and Gehenna gaping under them, as says: “Behold, it is the litter of Solomon; 60 mighty men are about it, of the mighty men of Israel. They all handle the sword, and are expert in war; every man has his sword upon his thigh, because of dread in the night.” And Rabbi Josiah (or others say Rav Nahman bar Isaac) interpreted the words, “O house of David, thus says the Lord: 'Execute justice in the morning and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor,'” in to mean that judges should render judgment only if the judgment that they are about to give is as clear to them as the morning light. (Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 7a–b.)
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob deduced from the prohibition against any kind of tree beside the altar in that wooden columns were not allowed in the Temple courtyard. The Gemara explained that it was not permitted to build with wood near the altar. Rav Hisda taught that stone columns were permitted. (Babylonian Talmud Tamid 28b.)
Rav Joseph reported that a Baraita interpreted the reference to “the priests” in to teach that when the priests served in the Temple, a judge could hand down capital punishment, but when the priesthood is not functioning, the judge may not issue such judgments. (Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 52b.)
The Mishnah explained the process by which one was found to be a rebellious elder within the meaning of Three courts of law sat in Jerusalem: one at the entrance to the Temple Mount, a second at the door of the Temple Court, and the third, the Great Sanhedrin, in the Hall of Hewn Stones in the Temple Court. The dissenting elder and the other members of the local court with whom the elder disputed went to the court at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and the elder stated what the elder and the elder’s colleagues expounded. If the first court had heard a ruling on the matter, then the court stated it. If not, the litigants and the judges went to the second court, at the entrance of the Temple Court, and the elder once again declared what the elder and the elder’s colleagues expounded. If this second court had heard a ruling on the matter, then this court stated it. If not, then they all proceeded to the Great Sanhedrin at the Hall of Hewn Stones, which issued instruction to all Israel, for said that “they shall declare to you from that place that the Lord shall choose,” meaning the Temple. If the elder then returned to the elder’s town and issued a decision contrary to what the Great Sanhedrin had instructed, then the elder was guilty of acting “presumptuously” within the meaning of But if one of the elder’s disciples issued a decision opposed to the Great Sanhedrin, the disciple was exempt from judgment, for the very stringency that kept the disciple from having yet been ordained served as a source of leniency to prevent the disciple from being found to be a rebellious elder. (Mishnah Sanhedrin 11:2; Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 86b.)
Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4 –5 and Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 20b–22b interpreted the laws governing the king in
The Mishnah taught that the king could lead the army to a voluntary war on the decision of a court of 71. He could force a way through private property, and none could stop him. There was no limit to the size of the king's road. And he had first choice of the plunder taken by the people in war. (Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4; Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 20b.)
The Rabbis disagreed about the powers of the king. The Gemara reported that Rab Judah said in Samuel’s name that a king was permitted to take all the actions that enumerated, but Rab said that was intended only to frighten the people, citing the emphatic double verb in the words “You shall surely set a king over you” in to indicate that the people would fear the king. And the Gemara also reported the same dispute among other Tannaim; in this account, Rabbi Jose said that a king was permitted to take all the actions that enumerated, but Rabbi Judah said that was intended only to frighten the people, citing the emphatic double verb in the words “You shall surely set a king over you” in to indicate that the people would fear the king. Rabbi Judah (or others say Rabbi Jose) said that three commandments were given to the Israelites when they entered the land: (1) the commandment of to appoint a king, (2) the commandment of to blot out Amalek, and (3) the commandment of to build the Temple in Jerusalem. Rabbi Nehorai, on the other hand, said that did not command the Israelites to choose a king, but was spoken only in anticipation of the Israelites’ future complaints, as says, “And (you) shall say, ‘I will set a king over me.’” (Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 20b.)
The Mishnah interpreted the words “He shall not multiply horses to himself” in to limit the king to only as many horses as his chariots required. (Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4; Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 21b.)
The Mishnah interpreted the words “Neither shall he multiply wives to himself” in to limit him to no more than 18 wives. Rabbi Judah said that he could have more wives, provided that they did not turn away his heart. But Rabbi Simeon said that he must not marry even one wife who would turn away his heart. The Mishnah concluded that prohibited the king from marrying more than 18 wives, even if they were all as righteous as Abigail the wife of David. (Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4; Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 21a.) The Gemara noted that Rabbi Judah did not always employ the rationale behind a Biblical passage as a basis for limiting its legal effect, as he did here in Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4. The Gemara explained that Rabbi Judah employed the rationale behind the law here because itself expounds the rationale behind its legal constraint: The reason behind the command, “he shall not multiply wives to himself,” is so “that his heart be not turned aside.” Thus Rabbi Judah reasoned that itself restricts the law to these conditions, and a king could have more wives if “his heart be not turned aside.” And the Gemara noted that Rabbi Simeon did not always interpret a Biblical passage strictly by its plain meaning, as he appeared to do here in Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4. The Gemara explained that Rabbi Simeon could have reasoned that adds the words, “that his heart turn not away,” to imply that the king must not marry even a single wife who might turn away his heart. And one could interpret the words “he shall not multiply” to mean that the king must not marry many wives even if they, like Abigail, would never turn away his heart. The Gemara then analyzed how the anonymous first view in Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4 came to its conclusion that the king could have no more than 18 wives. The Gemara noted that refers to the children of six of David’s wives born to David in Hebron. And the Gemara reasoned that Nathan the Prophet referred to these six wives in when he said, “And if that were too little, then would I add to you the like of these, and the like of these,” each “these” implying six more wives. Thus with the original six, these two additions of six would make 18 in all. (Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 21a.)
The Mishnah interpreted the words “and silver and gold he shall not greatly multiply to himself” in to limit the king to only as much silver and gold as he needed to pay his soldiers. (Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4; Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 21b.)
The Mishnah interpreted the words “he shall write a copy of this law in a book” in to teach that when he went to war, he was to take it with him; on returning, he was to bring it back; when he sat in judgment, it was to be with him; and when he sat down to eat, it was to be before him, to fulfill the words of “and it shall be with him and he shall read in it all the days of his life.” (Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4; Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 21b.)
Chapter 1 of tractate Makkot in the Mishnah, Tosefta, and Babylonian Talmud interpreted the laws of perjury in (Mishnah Makkot 1:1–9; Tosefta Makkot 1:1–11; Babylonian Talmud Makkot 2a–7a.) According to the Mishnah, if witnesses testified that a person was liable to receive 40 lashes, and the witnesses turned out to have perjured themselves, then Rabbi Meir taught that the perjurers received 80 lashes — 40 on account of the commandment of (in the JPS; Exodus 20:13 in the NJPS) not to bear false witness and 40 on account of the instruction of to do to perjurers as they intended to do to their victims — but the Sages said that they received only 40 lashes. (Mishnah Makkot 1:3; Babylonian Talmud Makkot 4a.)
The Gemara taught that the words “eye for eye” in meant pecuniary compensation. Rabbi Simon ben Yohai asked those who would take the words literally how they would enforce equal justice where a blind man put out the eye of another man, or an amputee cut off the hand of another, or where a lame person broke the leg of another. The school of Rabbi Ishmael cited the words “so shall it be given to him” in and deduced that the word “give” could apply only to pecuniary compensation. The school of Rabbi Hiyya cited the words “hand for hand” in to mean that an article was given from hand to hand, namely money. Abaye reported that a sage of the school of Hezekiah taught that said “eye for eye” and “life for life,” but not “life and eye for eye,” and it could sometimes happen that eye and life would be taken for an eye, as when the offender died while being blinded. Rav Papa said in the name of Raba that referred explicitly to healing, and the verse would not make sense if one assumed that retaliation was meant. And Rav Ashi taught that the principle of pecuniary compensation could be derived from the analogous use of the term “for” in in the expression “eye for eye” and in in the expression “he shall surely pay ox for ox.” As the latter case plainly indicated pecuniary compensation, so must the former. (Babylonian Talmud Bava Kamma 84a.)
Even though one might conclude from and 15–18 that the Israelites were not to offer peace to the Canaanites, Rabbi Samuel bar Nachman taught that Joshua sent three edicts to the inhabitants of the Land of Israel before the Israelites entered the land: first, that whoever wanted to leave the land should leave; second, that whoever wished to make peace and agree to pay taxes should do so; and third, that whoever wished to make war should do so. The Girgashites vacated their land and thus merited receiving land in Africa. And the Gibeonites made peace with the Israelites, as reported in (Jerusalem Talmud Sheviit 45b.)
(Sefer HaHinnuch: The Book of [Mitzvah] Education. Translated by Charles Wengrov, 5:2–155. Jerusalem: Feldheim Pub., 1988. ISBN 0-87306-497-6.)