After a series of operations, in which Republic of Vietnam (RVN or South Vietnam) commandos were captured after insertion into North Vietnam, SOG shifted the emphasis of its activities to maritime operations. A small fleet of fast patrol boats was acquired for use in the landing of small action teams and the offshore bombardment of small DRV military facilities (such as radar installations), with the pace of these operations doubling between June and July 1964.
During the same time frame, the U.S. Navy was conducting electronic surveillance operations (Desoto patrols) conducted by destroyers operating along the coast of North Vietnam. Although the two sets of operations were at least nominally independent of one another, the attacks carried out by the patrol boats provoked responses by the North Vietnamese military that were monitored by the American destroyers, thus providing very useful intelligence on DRV military capabilities.
On the morning of 2 August 1964, the morning after an attack on a North Vietnamese radio transmitter located on an offshore island — one of these destroyers, the USS Maddox, was reported to have come under attack by DRV naval patrol boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. This attack, and the ensuing naval actions, known as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, were seized upon by President Lyndon Johnson to secure passage by the U.S. Congress of the Southeast Asia Resolution (better known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) on 7 August 1964, leading to a dramatic escalation of the Vietnam conflict. It has since been shown that the entire Gulf of Tonkin Incident was a fabrication, including testimony by participants in the events themselves. (See Squadron commander James Stockdale, later Vice Admiral James Stockdale)