The 1948 Invasion of Hyderabad, also termed as “Hyderabad Police Action” and code-named “Operation Polo” by the Indian military was the Indian armed forces action that ended the rule of the Nizam of Hyderabad and led to the incorporation of the princely state of Hyderabad in Southern India, into the Indian Union.

The military operation was carried out because the State of Hyderabad under Osman Ali Khan, Asif Jah VII, decided to remain independent after the partition of India. Wary of a Muslim ruled state right in the middle of India, Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel decided to annex the state of Hyderabad. Though backed by Qasim Razvi's armed militias, known as Razakars, and a distant moral support of Pakistan, the Hyderabad State Forces were easily defeated by the Armed Forces of India within five days.

At that time, Hyderabad state had some 17 polo grounds, largest in India, hence the name Operation Polo.

Background

The State of Hyderabad, located over most of the Deccan Plateau in Southern India, was established in 1724 by Nizam-ul-Mulk Asif Jha after the collapse of the Mughal Indian Empire. As was the case in several Indian royal states, the Nizam was a Moslem, while a majority of the subject population was Hindu. In 1798, Hyderabad became the first Indian royal state to accede to British protection under the policy of Subsidiary Alliances instituted by Arthur Wellesley. When the British finally departed from the Indian cubcontinent in 1947, they offered the various princely states in the sub-continent the option of assimilating into either India or Pakistan, or of staying on as an independent nation.

By this time, the State of Hyderabad under the leadership of its 7th Nizam, Mir Usman Ali, had become the largest and most prosperous of all princely states in India. It covered 82,698 square miles of fairly homogenous territory and comprised a population of roughly 16.34 million people (as per the 1941 census) of which a majority (85%) was Hindu. Hyderabad, at the time, had its own army, as well as its own airline, telecommunication system, railway network, postal system, currency and radio broadcasting service, with a GDP larger than that of Belgium.

It was in this context that the Nizam, then the richest man in the world, desired to retain independence for his state. The Indians however, were wary of having an independent - and possibly hostile - Islamic nation in the heart of its territory, and were determined to assimilate Hyderabad into the Indian Union, in the same manner as the other five hundred and sixty five royal states that had already acceded.

Events Preceding Hostilities

Political and Diplomatic Negotiations

The Nizam of Hyderabad initially approached the British government with a request to take on the status of an independent constitutional monarchy under the British Commonwealth of Nations. This request was however rejected.

When Indian Home Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel requested the Hyderabad Government to sign the instrument of accession, the Nizam refused, and instead declared Hyderabad as an independent nation on the 15th of August 1947, the same day that India declared its own independence. Alarmed at the idea of an independent Hyderabad in the heart of Indian territory, Patel approached the governor general of India, Lord Mountbatten who advised him to resolve the issue without the use of force.

Accordingly, the Indian government offered the Hyderabadis a ‘Standstill Agreement’ which made an assurance that the status quo would be maintained and no military action would be taken. Unlike in the case of other royal states, instead of an explicit guarantee of eventual accession to India, only a guarantee stating that Hyderabad would not join Pakistan was given. Negotiations were opened through K.M. Munshi, India’s envoy and agent general to Hyderabad, and the Nizam’s envoys, Laik Ali and Sir Walter Monckton. Lord Mountbatten, who presided over the negotiations, offered several possible deals to the Hyderabad government which were rejected. The Hyderabadi envoys accused India of setting up armed barricades on all land routes and of attempting to economically isolate their nation. The Indians retaliated by accusing the Hyderabad government of importing arms from Pakistan. Hyderabad had given Rupees 200 million to Pakistan, and had stationed a bomber squadron there.

In June 1948, Mountbatten prepared the ‘Heads of Agreement’ deal which offered Hyderabad the status of an autonomous dominion nation under India. The deal called for the restriction of the regular Hyderabadi armed forces along with a disbanding of its notorious irregular forces. While it allowed the Nizam to continue as the executive head of the state, it called for a plebiscite along with general democratic elections to set up a constituent assembly. The Hyderabad government would continue to administer its territory as before, leaving only foreign affairs to be handled by the Indian government.

Although the plan was approved and signed by the Indians, it was rejected by the Nizam who demanded only complete independence or the status of a dominion under the British Commonwealth.

The Nizam also made unsuccessful attempts to seek the arbitration of the United States President Harry S Truman and of the United Nations.

Civil Unrest in Hyderabad

Even as India and Hyderabad negotiated at the table, most of the sub-continent had been thrown into chaos as a result of communal Hindu-Muslim riots pending the imminent partition of India. Fearing a Hindu civil uprising in his own kingdom, the Nizam allowed Qasim Razwi, a close advisor, and leader of the radical Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM) Party, to set up an irregular militia of Muslims called the ‘Razakars’. The Razakars - who numbered up to 200,000 at the height of the conflict - swore to uphold Islamic domination in Hyderabad and the Deccan plateau in the face of growing public opinion amongst the majority Hindu population favouring the accession of Hyderabad into the Indian Union

Initially tasked with the job of protecting vulnerable Muslim communities from Hindu atrocities, the Razakars began resorting to widespread assassinations and murders to silence political dissidents opposed to the Nizam’s regime. Shoiabullah Khan, editor of the Urdu daily Imroz, was reportedly stabbed to death by Razakars after expressing views against the Nizam.

As the manpower and arsenal of the Razakars grew, there was an escalation of violence with Razakars units involved in massacres of entire villages of Hindus - first, within Hyderabadi territory and later on Indian soil. In all, more than 150 villages - 70 in Indian territory - were attacked. In retaliation, Hindu nationalist organisations like the RSS attempted armed confrontations with the Razakars in areas adjoining the border with India. In Telengana, large groups of peasants, aided by the Communist Party of India, and led by Swami Ramanand Teerth, revolted against local landlords, and also came into direct confrontation with the Razakars. Meanwhile, parties like the Hyderabad State Congress were involved in non violent protests against the Nizam’s rule.

On December 4, 1947, Narayan Rao Pawar, a member of a Hindu nationalist organisation called the Arya Samaj made a failed attempt to assasinate the Nizam outside his palace.

Hyderabadi Military Preparations

The Nizam of Hyderabad had a large army with a tradition of hiring mercenary forces. These included Arabs, Rohillas, North Indian Muslims and Pathans. The State Army consisted of 3 armoured regiments, a horsed cavalry regiment, 11 infantry battalions and artillery. These were supplemented by irregular units with a horse cavalry, four infantry battalions (termed as the Saraf-e-khas, paigah, Arab and Refugee) and a garrison battalion - all forming a total of 22,000 men. This army was commanded by Major General El Edroos, an Arab. 55% of the Hyderabadi army was composed of Muslims, with 1268 Muslims in a total of 1765 officers as of 1941.

In addition to these, there were about 200,000 irregular militia called the Razakars under the command of civilian leader Qasim Razwi. A quarter of these were armed with modern small firearms, while the rest were predominantly armed with muzzleloaders and swords.

It is reported that the Nizam received arms supplies from Pakistan and from the Portuguese administration based in Goa. In addition, additional arms supplies were received via air drops from Australian arms trader Sydney Cotton.

Breakdown of Negotiations

As the Indian government received information that Hyderabad was arming itself and was preparing to ally with Pakistan in any future war with India, Sardar Patel described the idea of an independent Hyderabad as an ulcer in the heart of India - which had to removed surgically. In response, Hyderabad’s prime minister Laik Ali stated "India thinks that if Pakistan attacks her, Hyderabad will stab her in the back. I am not so sure we would not.". Sardar Patel responded later by stating “If you threaten us with violence, swords will be met with swords”.

In Hyderabad, militia leader Qasim Razwi told a crowd of Razakars “Death with the sword in hand, is always preferable to extinction by a mere stroke of the pen.". Razwi was later described by Indian government officials as “The Nizam’s Frankenstein Monster”. In response to reports that India was planning to invade Hyderabad he stated,"If India attacks us I can and will create a turmoil throughout India. We will perish but India will perish also." Time Magazine pointed out that if India invaded Hyderabad, the Razakars would massacre Hindus, which would lead to retaliatory massacres of Muslims across India.

Skirmish at Kodar

On September 6th, a police post near Chillakallu village came under heavy fire from Razakar units. The Indian army command sent a squadron of the Poona Horse and a company of 2/5 Gorkha Rifles to investigate who were also fired upon by the Razakars. The tanks of the Poona horse then chased the Razakars to Kodar, in Hyderabad territory. Here they were opposed by the armoured cars of 1 Hyderabad Lancers. In a brief action the Poona Horse destroyed one armoured car and forced the surrender of the state garrison at Kodar.

Indian Military Preparations

On receiving directions from the government to seize and annex Hyderabad, the Indian army came up with the Goddard Plan (laid out by Lt. Gen E.N. Goddard, the C-in-C of the Southern Command). The plan envisaged two main thrusts - from Vijaywada in the East and Sholapur in the West - while smaller units pinned down the Hyderabadi army along the border. Overall command was placed in the hands of Lt. Gen. Rajendrasinghji, DSO.

The attack from Sholapur was led by Major General J.N. Chaudhari and was composed of four task forces - (a) Strike Force comprising a mix of fast moving infantry, cavalry and light artillery , (b) Smash Force consisting of predominantly armoured units and artillery, (c ) Kill Force composed of infantry and engineering units and (d) Vir Force which comprised infantry, anti-tank and engineering units. The attack from Vijaywada was led by Major General A.A. Rudra and comprised the 2/5 Gorkha Rifles, 1 squadron of the 17th Horse, and a troop from the 19th Field Battery along with engineering and ancillary units. In addition, 4 infantry battalions were to neutralize and protect lines of communication. 2 squadrons of tempest aircrafts were prepared for air support from the Pune base.

The date for the attack was fixed as 13 September, even though General Bucher, the Indian chief of staff, had objected on grounds that Hyderabad would be an additional front for the Indian army after Kashmir.

Commencement of Hostilities

Day 1, September 13

The 1st battle was fought at Naldurg Fort on the Sholapur Secundarabad Highway between a defending force of the 1 Hyderabad infantry and the attacking force of the 7th Brigade. Using speed and surprise, the 7th brigade managed to secure a vital bridge on the Bori river intact, following which an assault was made on the Hyderabadi positions at Naldurg by the 2nd Sikh infantry. The bridge and road secured, an armoured column of the 1st Armoured Brigade- part of the smash force - moved into the town of Jalkot, 8 km from Naldurg, at 0900 hours paving the way for the Strike Force units under Lt. Col Ram Singh to pass through. This armoured column reached the town of Umarge, 61 km inside Hyderabad by 1515 hours, where it quickly overpowered resistance from Razakar units defending the town. Meanwhile another column consisting of a squadron of 3rd Cavalry, a troop from 18th cavalry, a troop from 9 Para field regiment, 10 Field company engineers, 3/2 Punjab Regiment, 2/1 Gorkha Rifles, 1 Mewar Infantry and ancillary units attacked the town of Tuljapur, about 34 km north-west of Naldurg. They reached Tuljapur at dawn, where they encountered resistance from a unit of the 1st Hyderabad infantry and about 200 Razakars who fought for two hours before surrendering. Further advance towards the town of Lohara was stalled as the river had swollen. The 1st day on the Western front ended with the Indians inflicting heavy casualties on the Hyderabadis and capturing large tracts of territory. Amongst the captured defenders was a British mercenary who had been tasked with blowing up the bridge near Naldurg.

In the East, forces led by Lt. Gen A.A. Rudra met with fierce resistance from 2 armoured units of Humbers and Staghounds, but managed to reach the town of Kodar by 0830 hours. Pressing on, the force reached Mungala by afternoon.

There were further incidents in Hospet - where the 1st Mysore assaulted and secured a sugar factory from units of Razakars and Pathans - and at Tungabhadra - where the 5/5 Gorkha attacked and secured a vital bridge from the Hyderabadi army.

Day 2, September 14

The force that had camped at Umarge proceeded to the town of Rajasur, 48 km east. As aerial recon had shown well entrenched ambush positions set up along the way, the air strikes from squadrons of Tempests were called in. These air strikes effectively cleared the route and allowed the land forces to reach and secure Rajasur by the afternoon.

The assault force from the East was meanwhile slowed down by an anti tank ditch and later came under heavy fire from hillside positions of the 1st lancer and 5th Infantry 6 km from Surriapet. The positions were assaulted by the 2/5 Gorkha - veterans of the Burma Campaign - and was neutralised with the Hyderabadis taking severe casualties.

At the same time, the 3/11 Gorkha Rifles and a squadron of 8th cavalry attacked Osmanabad and took the town after heavy street combat with the Razakars who gave a determined resistance to the Indians.

A force under the command of Maj. Gen. D.S. Brar was tasked with capturing the city of Aurangabad. The city was attacked by 6 columns of infantry and cavalry, resulting in the civil administration emerging in the afternoon and offering a surrender to the Indians.

There were further incidents in Jalna where 3 Sikh, a company of 2 Jodhpur infantry and some tanks from 18 Cavalry faced stubborn resistance from Hyderabadi forces.

Day 3, September 15

Leaving a company of 3/11 Gorkhas to occupy the town of Jalna, the remainder of the force moved to Latur, and later to Mominabad where they faced action against the 3 Golconda Lancers who gave a token resistance and soon surrendered.

At the town of Surriapet, air strikes cleared most of the Hyderabadi defences, although some Razakar units still gave resistance to the 2/5 Gorkhas who occupied the town. The retreating Hyderabadi forces destroyed the bridge at Musi to delay the Indians but failed to offer covering fire, allowing the bridge to be quickly repaired. Another incident occurred at Narkatpalli where a Razakar unit was decimated by the Indians.

Day 4, September 16

The task force under Lt. Col. Ram Singh moved towards Zahirabad at dawn, but was slowed down by a mine field which had to be cleared. On reaching the junction of the Bidar road with the Sholapur-Hyderabad City Highway, the forces encountered gunfire from ambush positions. However, leaving some of the units to handle the ambush, the bulk of the force moved on to reach 15 kilometres beyond Zahirabad by nightfall in spite of sporadic resistance along the way. Most of the resistance was from Razakar units who ambushed the Indians as they passed through urban areas. The Razakars were able to use the terrain to their advantage until the Indians brought in their 75mm guns.

Day 5, September 17

In the early hours of September 17, the Indian army entered Bidar. Meanwhile, forces led by the 1st Armoured regiment were at the town of Chityal about 60 km from the capital city, while another column took over the town of Hingoli. By the morning of the 5th day of hostilities, it had become clear that the Hyderabad army and the Razakars had been routed on all fronts and with extremely heavy casualties. The Nizam’s defeat was now imminent.

Capitulation and Surrender

Consultations with Indian Envoy

On the noon of 17th September, a messenger brought a personal note from the Nizam to K.M.Munshi asking him whether he could see the Nizam at 4-00 p.m. Earlier, the Nizam had spent the morning in hectic consultations. His premier had seen him twice already. The Nizam had summoned him the previous day and asked for his resignation by the morning of the next day. The cabinet decided to resign forthwith.

As soon as Munshi entered the sitting room, a reportedly desolate ruler said: “The vultures have resigned. I don't know what to do”. He handed him the letter of resignation of Mir Laiq Ali, the Prime Minister. His hands were shaking. He had this problem for some time, which became pronounced, when he was tense or angry.
Munshi had come to know about the resignation earlier from Mir Laiq Ali himself. He said that he was worried about the safety of the citizens. He suggested that Commander-in-Chief of Hyderabad State General El Edroos should be asked to take steps to preserve law and order in the city. The Nizam then sent for his commander-in-chief and told him accordingly

Radio Broadcast of Surrender Offer

Munshi also suggested that the Nizam might make a broadcast welcoming the Police Action and withdrawing his complaint to the Security Council. Munshi explained and offered to help draft the speech.

It was the Nizam's first visit to the Radio Station. No red carpet was spread for him; no formalities were observed. No music, no anthem was played before or after the broadcast. The speech was in English. Nobody bothered to translate it into Urdu. After the broadcast the Nizam drove back to King Kothi to brood. Munshi on his way to Bolarum found the streets full of excited crowds shouting national slogans. Munshi was mobbed and had to address groups of people en route.

That night the city changed a great deal. Many khaki uniforms were discarded, many beards shaved. The shouting, rampaging crowds of razakars disappeared magically. The citizens emerged from their cocoons. People of all ages came out in throngs waving the tricolour of India.

The Surrender Ceremony

The surrender ceremony was fixed at 4 p.m.

General Chaudhuri spoke gravely: “I have been ordered by Lt. General Maharaj Rajendrasinhji, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command to take the surrender of your army”.

“You have it”. “You understand that this surrender is unconditional”. “Yes, I understand”.

Chaudhuri smiled and shook hands with Edroos. Then he opened his cigarette case and offered him a cigarette. Edroos proffered a lighter. Chaudhuri's team joined them.

The party drove to the residence of India's Agent General. A jubilant crowd cheered the victorious general there. He waved in return and then sat down to discuss the details with Munshi, Edroos and others.

The Aftermath

There were large scale communal riots in various parts of the state in the immediate aftermath of the military operation. The Nizam received the ceremonial post of Rajpramukh in 1950, but resigned from this office when the states were re-organized in 1956 on linguistic basis and large parts of Hyderabad state went to Bombay state. Many officials and members of the royal family fled and re-settled in Pakistan where they now live.

References

• Zubrzycki, John. (2006) The Last Nizam: An Indian Prince in the Australian Outback. Pan Macmillan, Australia. ISBN 978-0-3304-2321-2.

External links

• A Blog by Narendra Luther on Operation polo
• Picture of VII Nizam with Sardar Patel after his surrender
• From the Sunderlal Report - Excerpts in FRONTLINE
• Of a massacre untold - A.G.Noorani
• In the Nizam's dominion
• Armchair Historian - Operation Polo (Monday, 18 September 2006) - Contributed by Sidin Sunny Vadukut - Last Updated (Monday, 18 September 2006)