Steel-framed 102-story building designed by Shreve, Lamb & Harmon Associates and completed in New York City in 1931. At a height of 1,250 ft (381 m), it surpassed the Chrysler Building to become the highest structure in the world (until 1954). It is notable for its use of the setback.
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"State building provided for the emergence of specialized personnel, control over consolidated territory, loyalty, and durability, permanent institutions with a centralized and autonomous state that held the monopoly of violence over a given population".
The second strand of theory and definitions gained momentum following the signing in 2007 of an international accord between donor nations on their work in conflict affected and weak states (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf). This accord committed richer countries to consider supporting `state-building' as their `central objective' in conflict affected countries. The result has been a steady stream of new work commissioned by donor countries on definitions, knowledge and practice in state-building, much of this co-ordinated by a Task Team of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. This work has tended to draw heavily on political science. It has produced definitions that view state-building as an indigenous, national process driven by state-society relations. This view believes that countries can not do state-building outside their own borders, they can only influence, support or hinder such processes. Illustrations of this approach include a think-piece commissioned for OECD (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf) and a research study produced by the Overseas Development Institute (http://www.odi.org.uk/pppg/politics_and_governance/publications/ODI_state_building_paper.pdf).
In 2008 the British Government's Department for International Development released a Working Paper on state-building that helped bring together new thinking in this field. It drew heavily on the more recent studies, and also on views of a panel of academic experts(http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/Expert-feedback.pdf). The paper moved the debate forward by offering models of how indegenous state-building dynamics may work in practice (the Whaites model). The paper argues that state-building is primarily a `political' process rather than just a question of technical capacity enhancements. It sees state-building as involving a threefold dynamic of: political (usually elite) deals, the prioritization of core government functions and the willingness to respond to public expecations (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/State-in-Development-Wkg-Paper.pdf). See also Political settlement
Across the two streams of theory and writing there is a broader consensus that lessons on how to support state-building processes have not yet been fully learnt. Some believe that supporting state-building requires the fostering of legitimate and sustainable state institutions, but many accept that strategies to achieve this have not yet been fully developed. Little of the post-conflict support to state-building undertaken so far has been entirely successful. Sustained focus on supporting state-building has tended to happen in states frequently characterized by brutalized civilian populations, destroyed economies, institutions, infrastructure, and environments, widely accessible small arms, large numbers of disgruntled soldiers to be demobilized and reintegrated, and ethnically or religiously divided peoples. These obstacles are compounded by the fundamental difficulty of grafting democratic and human rights values onto countries with different political, cultural, and religious heritages. {Fact|date=April 2007}}
While approaches such as the Whaites model (DFID) have tried to argue that state-building takes place in all countries and that much can be learnt from successful state-building there is a tendency to narrow the discussion to the most problematic contexts. As a result much of the literature on state-building is preoccupied with post conflict issues. See eg (Dahrendorf, 2003), (The Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 2003), (Collier, 2003) (Fukuyama, 2004), (Paris, 2004), (Samuels 2005). Common critiques include inadequate strategy and a lack of coordination, staffing weaknesses, and that funding is insufficient or poorly timed. Moreover, it is increasingly recognized that many of the tasks sought to be achieved are extremely complex and there is little clarity on how to best proceed. For instance, it is extremely difficult to provide security in a conflictual environment, or to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate armies successfully. It remains practically impossible to address vast unemployment in states where the economy is destroyed and there is high illiteracy, or to strengthen the rule of law in a society where it has collapsed. Moreover, the unintended negative consequences of international aid are more and more evident. These range from distortion of the economy to skewing relationship of accountability by the political elite towards internationals rather than domestic population.
The first approach to State-building, an activity by external actors/countries, is perhaps the more controversial of the two strands of thinking. It is viewed as having overtones of imperialism and colonialism, whereby local populations view the foreign power as an oppressor attempting to impose a foreign system and culture. In this sense, critics argue that wars could even be lengthened to cause additional damage to the adversary's infrastructure. By doing so, critics contend, economic opportunities emerge. Examples of such occurrences put forward by proponents of such a theory include the rebuilding of Germany in the aftermath of World War II via the Marshall Plan, the rebuilding of Japan following the United States' fire-bombing campaign, and more recently, the use of private corporations.
The second strand of thinking (an indigenous process of state-society relations) has less interventionist overtones and makes clear that national leadership and vision is centrally important. It does, however, potentially leave a gap in terms of strategies for the international community to support positive state-building processes in poor, post-conflict and weak states. More work is needed to convert the ideas and models of the second strand of thinking into clear poliicies to help conflict affected states.
In the American context, some commentators use the term "nation-building" interchangeably with "state-building" (eg Rand report on America's role in nation-building). However in both major schools of theory the state is the focus of thinking rather than the "nation" (nation conventionally refers to the population itself, as united by identity history, culture and language). The issues debated related to the structures of the state (and its relationship to society) and as result state-building is the more broadly accepted term. In political science `nation-building' usually has a quite distinct meaning, defined as the process of encouraging a sense of national identity within a given group of people, a definition that relates more to socialisation than state capacity (see the ODI, OECD, and DFID reports cited above).
Similarly, state-building (nation-building) has at times been conflated with military intervention or regime change (again often in the American context). This derives in part from the military actions in Germany and Japan in World War II and resulting states, and became especially prevalent following the military interventions in Afghanistan (October 2001) and Iraq (March 2003). However, the conflation of these two concepts has been highly controversial, and has been used by opposing ideological and political forces to attempt to justify, or reject as an illegal military occupation, the actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hence, regime change by outside intervention should be differentiated from state-building.
The term "state" can be used to mean both a geographic sovereign political entity with a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with the other states, as defined under international law (Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933, Article 1), as well as a set of social institutions claiming a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory (Max Weber, 1919).
For the purposes of state-building in environments of instability, the sub-structures of states can be defined as a political regime (or system of government), a governance framework (or constitution), and a set of state institutions (or organizations) such as the armed forces, the parliament, and the justice system. State capacity refers to the strength and capability of the state institutions. Nation conventionally refers to the population itself, as united by identity, history, culture and language.