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Bay of Pigs Invasion

Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1961, an unsuccessful invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles, supported by the U.S. government. On Apr. 17, 1961, an armed force of about 1,500 Cuban exiles landed in the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on the south coast of Cuba. Trained since May, 1960, in Guatemala by members of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the approval of the Eisenhower administration, and supplied with arms by the U.S. government, the rebels intended to foment an insurrection in Cuba and overthrow the Communist regime of Fidel Castro. The Cuban army easily defeated the rebels and by Apr. 20, most were either killed or captured. The invasion provoked anti-U.S. demonstrations in Latin America and Europe and further embittered U.S.-Cuban relations. Poorly planned and executed, the invasion subjected President Kennedy to severe criticism at home. Cuban exile leader José Miró Cardona, president of the U.S.-based National Revolutionary Council, blamed the failure on the CIA and the refusal of Kennedy to authorize air cover for the invasion force, but perhaps more crucial was the fact that the uprising the exiles hoped and needed to spark did not happened. Much later it was revealed that the CIA task force planning the invasion had predicted that the invasion's goals unachievable without U.S. military involvement; it is unclear whether Kennedy or CIA chief Allen Dulles knew of the assessment. In Dec., 1962, Castro released 1,113 captured rebels in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine raised by private donations in the United States.

See K. E. Meyer and T. Szulc, The Cuban Invasion (1962); H. B. Johnson, The Bay of Pigs (1964).

The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia Copyright © 2004.
Licensed from Columbia University Press

The Bay of Pigs Invasion (aka Playa Girón), was an unsuccessful attempt by a U.S.-trained force of Cuban exiles to invade south-west Cuba and overthrow the Cuban government of Fidel Castro. The invasion — planned and funded by the United States government beginning in 1960 — was launched in April 1961, several months after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in the United States. The Cuban military defeated the invading force in a matter of days and the event accelerated a rapid deterioration in Cuban-American relations, which was further worsened by the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year.

The invasion is named after the Bay of Pigs, inaccurately translated from the Spanish Bahía de Cochinos, the landing having taken place at the beach named Playa Girón.

Background

Prior warnings of invasion

The Cuban security apparatus knew the invasion was coming, via their secret intelligence network, as well as loose talk by members of the brigade, some of which was heard in Miami and was repeated in US and foreign newspaper reports. Nevertheless, days before the invasion, multiple acts of sabotage were carried out, such as the bombing of the El Encanto department store in Havana, desultory explosions, and arson. The Cuban government also had been warned by senior KGB agents Osvaldo Sánchez Cabrera and "Aragon", who died violently before and after the invasion, respectively. The general Cuban population was not well informed, except for CIA funded Radio Swan. As of May 1960, almost all means of public communication were in the government’s hands.

Parties involved

Hispano-Soviet advisors to Cuban government forces

Soviet-trained advisors were brought to Cuba from Eastern Bloc countries. These advisors had held high staff positions in the Soviet Armies during World War II and having resided in the Soviet Union for long periods are thus known as "Hispano-Soviets"; the most senior of these were the Spanish Communists veterans of the Spanish Civil War Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, Enrique Lister and Cuba born (1892) Alberto Bayo. Ciutat de Miguel (Masonic name: Algazel; Russian name: Pavel Pavlovich Stepanov; Cuban alias: Ángel Martínez Riosola, commonly referred to as Angelito) is said to have arrived the same day as the La Coubre explosion; he was wounded in the foot during the War Against the Bandits. Date of wound is not given in references cited.

The role of other Soviet Agents at the time is not well known, although they were there and well established in Cuba at the time of the Bay of Pigs Invasion and can be presumed that in that emergency to have been actively involved in the Cuban government's defence. Some of these agents acquired far greater fame later. For instance, two KGB colonels, Vadim Kochergin and Victor Simanov were first sighted in Cuba about September 1959.

Cuban government order of battle

The Cuban government order of battle is unclear and subject to dispute. Fidel Castro is given credit for directing strategy by Cuban government sources. At least nominally, Juan Almeida was replaced by Sergio del Valle Jimenez, head of the Cuban Armed Forces in 1961. Antonio Enrique Lusson Batlle, a Raul Castro loyalist, is also placed there

Orlando Rodriguez Puerta, previous commander of Fidel Castro's personal guard, was charged with direction of Cuban government forces in Matanzas Province directly north of combat area. El Gallego Fernández José Ramón Fernández is often said to have held a senior command. Hispano-Soviets Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, Enrique Lister, and Alberto Bayo were advisors/and or commanders to intelligence and militia forces. Ciutat de Miguel under the name Angel Martínez Riosola was a significant leader/advisor for Cuban forces coming from Central Provinces. Victor Emilo Dreke Cruz, although nominally in charge of Central Province forces is generally considered to have played subordinate role to Ciutat de Miguel. Victor Emilo Dreke Cruz describes his part in the action as first fighting with parachutists and then being wounded in an ambush The documentary "Brothers in Arms" covers the life of one South African, a Robert Herboldt who had a role as quartermaster. While his presence at the site of action is generally conceded, the exact role of Arnaldo Ochoa, later to be commander of Cuban forces in Angola, is obscure.

Suppression of internal resistance

No quarter was given during the suppression of the resistance in the Escambray mountains, where former rebels from the War Against Batista took different sides. Ramiro Valdes Menendez was Minister of the Interior in 1961.

"Potential enemies of the Revolution were neutralized, arrested, or shot while resisting arrest. Because of the lack of prison space (apparently Batista had not built enough jails), suspected counter-revolutionaries were unceremoniously rounded up and corralled in any facility available, be it sports stadium, school or schoolyard, etc., to prevent the people from aiding the expected invading force.

By the time the invasion began, Cuban government authorities had already executed some who were suspected of colluding with the American campaign, however, the CIA seemed blissfully unaware of this repressions effects on the planned operation (notably two former "Comandantes" Humberto Sorí Marin and William Alexander Morgan). Others executed included Alberto Tapia Ruano, a Catholic youth leader. Several hundred thousand people were imprisoned before, during and after the invasion.

On April 3, 1961, a bomb attack on militia barracks in Bayamo killed four militia and wounded eight more; on April 6, the Hershey Sugar factory in Matanzas was destroyed by sabotage; on April 18, Directorio guerrilla Marcelino Magaňaz died in action in Sierra Maestra.

On April 14, 1961, the guerrillas of Agapito Rivera fought Cuban government forces near Las Cruces, Montembo, Las Villas, where several government forces were killed and others wounded. On April 16, Merardo Leon, Jose Leon, and 14 others staged armed rising at Las Delicias Estate in Las Villas, only four survived Leonel Martinez and 12 others took to the country side (ibid). On April 17, 1961, Osvaldo Ramírez (then chief of the rural resistance to Castro) was captured in Aromas de Velázquez and immediately executed.

Prelude to invasion

Air attacks on airfields (15 April)

Operation Puma, the code name given to the offensive counter air attack stage of the campaign against the Cuban government FAR (Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria), called for 48 hours of air strikes across the island to effectively eliminate the FAR, to ensure that Brigade 2506 aircraft would achieve air superiority over the island prior to the landing of ground forces at Playa Giron.

Initially the CIA planned a surprise air attack using B-26Bs (of the self-styled Fuerza Aérea de Liberacion) against the aircraft and bases of the FAR. This took place in the early morning of 15 April 1961 with three flights of B-26B Invader light bomber aircraft displaying false markings of the FAR bombed and strafed the Cuban airfields of San Antonio de Los Baños, Antonio Maceo International Airport at Santiago de Cuba, and the airfield at Ciudad Libertad (formerly named Campo Columbia). The attack left Cuban forces with "two B-26s, two Sea Furies, and two T-33As at San Antonio de los Baños Airbase, and only one Sea Fury at the Antonio Maceo Airport" while two of the attacking B-26 bombers were damaged. However, the surviving FAR aircraft, though few, were of good quality and, with a mix of fighter/bombers and ground attack aircraft, still a well-balanced force to use in defense against an amphibious invasion. By contrast, the CIA-provided aircraft of a single type lacked the flexibility necessary to achieve air superiority.

Deception flight (15 April)

Of the Brigade 2506 aircraft that were prepared on the morning of 15 April 1961, one was tasked with establishing the CIA cover story for the invasion. The Douglas B-26B Invader used for this mission carried false FAR markings and serial number 933, and was piloted by Mario Zuniga. Prior to departure, the engine cowling from one of the aircraft's two engines was removed by maintenance personnel, fired upon, then re-installed to give the appearance that the aircraft had taken ground fire at some point during its flight. Zuniga departed from the CIA-run base at Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua on a solo, low-flying mission that took him over Pinar del Río, the westernmost province of Cuba, and then north-east toward Key West, Florida. Once across the island, Zuniga climbed steeply away from the waves of the Florida Straits to an altitude where he would be detected by US radar installations to the north of Cuba. At altitude and a safe distance north of the island, Zuniga feathered the engine with the pre-installed bullet holes in the engine cowling, radioed a mayday call and requested immediate permission to land at Miami International airport.

Mario Zuniga, masquerading as "Juan Garcia", publicly claimed that three colleagues had also defected from the FAR. That may have been part of the deception plan to allow offensive Brigade 2506 aircraft to divert safely to US airfields in the event of battle damage or other emergencies. Indeed, B-26 call-sign Puma Three (crew Fernandez-Mon and Perez) ditched fatally in the sea 30 miles north of Cuba, but its companion aircraft reached Boca Chica Naval Air Station at Key West, about an hour before Zuniga landed at Miami. The surviving un-named crew of two were reported as being granted political asylum on 16 April, as was Mario Zuniga, and that they were then onboard a bus bound for Miami. It seems unlikely that the aircraft or its crew could have returned to Puerto Cabezas in time for the 17 April operations, during which B-26s call-sign Puma One (crew Crespo and Perez-Lorenzo) and Puma Two (crew Piedra and Fernandez) were shot down.

Reaction (15 April)

By the time of Mario Zuniga's announcement to the world mid-morning on 15 April 1961, the B-26 bombers of Brigade 2506, after their attacks, were dispersed around the Caribbean, seeking diversions to friendly airfields or flying a three and a half hour return leg to their base in Nicaragua to re-arm and refuel. Those flight crews that arrived back at Puerza Cabezas ("Happy Valley") were met with a cable from Washington ordering the indefinite stand-down of all further combat operations over Cuba on that day.

Adlai Stevenson, the US ambassador to the United Nations, had been embarrassed by revelations that the first wave of air strikes had been carried out by US planes despite his repeated denials to the UN on 15 April that this was so. He contacted McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security who, unaware of the critical importance to the mission of the second wave, canceled the air strike despite Kennedy's earlier approval for it. Although the Cuban government had prior knowledge of the invasion, the Cuban air force (FAR) aircraft were vulnerable on the ground and probably could have been wiped out, if the second and third waves of attack had been launched as originally planned.

The second wave of air strikes, designed to wipe out any remainder of the FAR, was canceled. President Kennedy wanted the operation to look as if the Cuban exiles could have planned it, so that his administration could claim "plausible deniability" and avoid responsibility for the invasion as a US operation. This was the same reason for which the landing site had been moved from Trinidad, which was close to the Escambray Mountains, an anti-communist rebel stronghold, where the anti-government forces would have been able to reach sanctuary in case of failure. Moreover, Trinidad not only had great port facilities for landing the invasion force, armaments and supplies, but more importantly, was a counter-revolutionary fervent of activity, where a rising of the population could have been possible. President Kennedy, despite the CIA's objections, moved the landing site to the Bay of Pigs area. CIA Chief of Operations, Richard Bissell, had chosen the Trinidad site for the above reasons, but the President, upholding plausible deniability, insisted it be moved. The cancellation of the air strikes, the change of the landing site, and ultimately, the lack of US air cover and support during the invasion, sealed the fate of the mission.

At the end of 15 April, the leadership of the air forces of the Cuban government was in disarray. The former driver for Raul Castro, "Maro" Guerra Bermejo, was replaced on the second day of action by Castro's Minister of Communication Raúl Curbelo Morales.

Phoney war (16 April)

Following the air strikes on airfields on 15 April, the FAR managed to prepare for armed action at least four T-33s, four Sea Furies and five or six B-26s. All three types were armed with machine guns for air-to-air combat and for strafing of ships and ground forces. CIA planners had reportedly failed to discover that the US-supplied T-33 jets had long been armed with M-3 machine guns. The Sea Furies and B-26s were also armed with rockets, for attacks against ships and tanks. Some sorties were flown by the FAR on 16 April, but no contact was made with opposing ships or aircraft.

Invasion

Invasion day (17 April)

On April 17, four 2,400-ton chartered transports (named the Houston, Río Escondido, Caribe, and Atlántico) transported 1,511 Cuban exiles to the Bay of Pigs on the southern coast of Cuba. They were accompanied by two CIA-owned infantry landing craft (LCI's), called the Blagar and Barbara J, containing supplies, ordnance, and equipment. The group was also known as the Cuban Expeditionary Force. The small contingent hoped to find support from the local population, intending to cross the island to Havana. The CIA assumed the invasion would spark a popular uprising against the Cuban government of Fidel Castro. However, the Escambray rebels had been contained by Cuban militia directed by Francisco Ciutat de Miguel.

In the beginning, the Cuban militia on the beach surrendered, and the invaders moved to control the causeways across the Zapata swamps. There the fighting became intense, and Cuban militia and army casualties were high, both as a result of firepower from the Brigade 2506 and the B-26 Invader attack aircraft.

After landing, it soon became evident that the Brigade 2506 ground forces were not going to receive effective support at the site of the invasion and were likely to lose. Reports from both sides describe tank battles involving heavy USSR equipment. After the initial success, the CIA/Brigade 2506 forces suffered considerable reverses. When the invasion started on 17 April 1961, the remaining FAR Hawker Sea Furies were able to engage the Brigade 2506 forces on the beaches within 15 minutes. When the FAR B-26s arrived to take over bombing the beaches, the Sea Furies changed targets to the amphibious support ships, damaging the flagship Marsopa and sinking the Houston, which was the main supply ship, for the loss of one aircraft. By mid-morning, rockets fired from Sea Furies had also sunk the Rio Escondido, and the two remaining freighters Caribe and Atlántico then retreated south to international waters.

About two hours after the initial landings, 177 paratroops from the parachute battalion of Brigade 2506 were dropped in the area of Horquita, inland from Playa Larga, from five C-46 and one C-54 transport aircraft, in an action code-named Operation Falcon.

Kennedy decided against giving the faltering invasion US air support because of his opposition to overt intervention. Kennedy had also canceled sorties of attacks on Cuban airfields planned for 16 April and dawn on 17 April.

Naval action during the Bay of Pigs extended beyond the attacks on the invaders' supply vessels. The Cuban government lost at least two vessels, the P.C. Baire,and the B.J. Driscoll with extensive but apparently not specifically reported loss of life. The Brigade 2506 command ship Blagar successfully fought off attacking aircraft.

On the night of 17/18 April, a planned air strike on airfields by B-26s of Brigade 2506 from Puerto Cabezas reportedly failed due to incompetence and bad weather.

Invasion day plus one (aka D+1) 18 April

On 18 April, in the only air attack mission from Puerto Cabezas that day, six B-26s attacked Cuban militia and army units, including columns of vehicles moving toward Playa Larga, using bombs, napalm and rockets, causing heavy casualties. The group of B-26s was code-named Lobo Flight, led by an American CIA contract pilot, and included Mario Zuniga, the "defector" pilot. It is reported that one of the attacks by Lobo Flight caused at least nine hundred casualties to the Cuban government forces. In these attacks, Cuban ground forces suffered an estimated 1,800 casualties when a mixture of Cuban army troops, militia, and civilians were caught on an open causeway riding in civilian buses towards the battle scene in which several buses were hit by napalm.. A photo of a burned bus, presumably one of those used to transport Cuban militia, can be seen on page 154 of Wyden (1979).

About Cuban casualties, Carlos Franqui wrote:

Invasion day plus two (D+2) 19 April

The final air attack mission (code-named Mad Dog Flight) comprised five B-26s, four of which were manned by American CIA contract air crews and pilots from the Alabama Air Guard. Two of the B-26s were shot down with the loss of four Americans.

One of the C-46s delivered arms and equipment to the Giron airstrip occupied by Brigade 2506 ground forces. The C-46 also evacuated Matias Farias, the pilot of B-26 serial '935' (code-named Chico Two) that had been shot down and crash-landed at Giron on 17 April.

However, once their air support was absent and after expending all ammunition, the Brigade 2506 ground forces were forced back to the beaches. Admiral Dennison implemented directives to have unmarked United States Navy boats, protected by six unmarked F3H Demon fighters from USS Independence (CV-62), evacuate "quite a few people" from the beach. A United States destroyer fired on a Cuban shore battery during the evacuation.

Aftermath

Casualties

Aircrews killed in action between 15 April and 19 April totalled six from FAR (Cuban air force), ten Cuban exiles and four US citizens.

By the time fighting ended on April 21, 68 Brigade 2506 ground forces personnel were killed in action and the rest were captured. Cuba's losses during the Bay of Pigs Invasion are unknown, but most sources estimate them to be in the thousands. Triay mentions 4,000 casualties; Lynch states about 5,000. Other sources indicate over 2,200 casualties. Unofficial reports list that seven Cuban army infantry battalions suffered significant losses during the fighting. The Cuban government initially reported its army losses to be 87 dead and many more wounded during the three days of fighting the invaders. The number of those killed in action in Cuba's army during the battle eventually ran to 140, and then finally to 161. However, these figures are for Cuban army losses only, not including militia or armed civilian loyalists. Thus in the most accepted calculations, a total of around 2,000 (perhaps as many as 5,000, see above) Cuban militia fighting for the Republic of Cuba may have been killed, wounded or missing in action.

The total casualties for Brigade 2506 were 104 members killed in action, and a few hundred more were wounded. Also killed was one US paratrooper, who was attached to the Brigade 2506.

In 1979 the body of Alabama National Guard Captain Thomas Willard Ray, who was shot down flying a B-26, was returned to his family from Cuba. In the 1990s, the CIA admitted to his links to the agency and awarded him its highest award, the Intelligence Star.

Prisoners

The 1,209 captured Brigade 2506 members were quickly put on trial for treason. A few were executed, and the rest sentenced to thirty years in prison. After 20 months of negotiation with the United States, Cuba released the exiles in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine.

In May 1961, Fidel Castro proposed an exchange of the surviving members of the assault for 500 large tractors, presumably for agriculture. The trade rose to US$28 million. Negotiations were non-productive until after the Cuban missile crisis. On December 21, 1962, Castro and James B. Donovan, a US lawyer, signed an agreement to exchange the 1,113 prisoners for US$53 million in food and medicine; the money was raised by private donations. On December 29, 1962, Kennedy met with the returning brigade at Palm Beach, Florida.

On April 19, at least seven Cubans plus two US citizens (Angus K. McNair and Howard F. Anderson) were executed in Pinar del Rio province..

Between April and October 1961, hundreds of executions took place in response to the invasion. They took place at various prisons, particularly at the dreaded Fortaleza de la Cabana and El Morro Castle, 18th-century Spanish fortresses built to protect Havana Harbor. The Cuban government authorities had converted their dungeons into prisons, their walls into paredones de fusilamiento (firing squad walls). Infiltration team leaders Antonio Diaz Pou and Raimundo E. Lopez, as well as underground students Virgilio Campaneria, Alberto Tapia, and more than one hundred others died within these colonial prisons.

Political reaction

The failed invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy Administration and made Castro wary of future US intervention in Cuba. As a result of the failure, CIA director Allen Dulles, deputy CIA director Charles Cabell, and Deputy Director of Operations Richard Bissell were all forced to resign. All three were held responsible for the planning of the operation at the CIA. Responsibility of the Kennedy administration and the US State Department for modifications of the plans was not apparent until later.

In August 1961, during an economic conference of the Organization of American States in Punta del Este, Uruguay, Che Guevara sent a note to Kennedy through Richard N. Goodwin, a young secretary of the White House. It said: "Thanks for Playa Girón. Before the invasion, the revolution was weak. Now it's stronger than ever.

Later analysis

CIA report

The CIA wrote a detailed internal report that laid blame for the failure squarely on internal incompetence. Errors by the CIA and other American analysts contributed to the debacle:

The administration believed that the troops could retreat to the mountains to lead a guerrilla war if they lost in open battle. The mountains were too far to reach on foot, and the troops were deployed in swamp land, where they were easily surrounded.
They believed that the involvement of the US in the incident could be denied.
They believed that Cubans would be grateful to be liberated from Fidel Castro and would quickly join the battle. This support failed to materialize; many hundreds of thousands of others were arrested, and some executed, prior to the landings. (see also Priestland 2003; Lynch, 2000). The invasion by a foreign country appeared to have actually boosted the support of the Fidel Castro government.

The CIA's near certainty that the Cuban people would rise up and join them was based on the agency's extremely weak presence on the ground in Cuba. Cuban government's counter-intelligence, trained by Soviet Bloc specialists including Enrique Lister, had infiltrated most resistance groups. Because of this, almost all the information that came from exiles and defectors was "contaminated." CIA operative E. Howard Hunt had interviewed Cubans in Havana prior to the invasion; in a later interview with CNN, he said, "…all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro. Grayston Lynch among others, also points to Cuban government forces rounding up of hundreds of thousands of anti-Castro and potentially anti-Castro Cubans across the island prior to and during the invasion (e.g. Priestland, 2003), destroying any chances for a general uprising against the Castro regime. Thus the million voices that had cried "Cuba si, comunismo NO!" on November 28 1959, were gone or silent.

Many military leaders almost certainly expected the invasion to fail but thought that Kennedy would send in Marines to save the exiles. Kennedy, however, did not want a full scale war and abandoned the exiles.

Hindsight of invasion warnings

An April 29 2000 Washington Post article, "Soviets Knew Date of Cuba Attack", reported that the CIA had information indicating that the Soviet Union knew the invasion was going to take place and did not inform Kennedy. Radio Moscow broadcast an English-language newscast on April 13, 1961 predicting the invasion "in a plot hatched by the CIA" using paid "criminals" within a week. The invasion took place four days later.

According to the British Ambassador to the US, David Ormsby-Gore, British intelligence estimates, which had been made available to the CIA, indicated that the Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro and that there was no likelihood of mass defections or insurrections following the invasion. More recent analysis suggests that the sources such as those used in the Ormsby-Gore intelligence estimate were not aware of related material.

Invasion legacy in Cuba

The invasion is often criticized as making Castro even more popular, adding nationalistic sentiments to the support for his economic policies. Following the initial B-26 bombings, he declared the revolution "Marxist-Leninist". After the invasion, he pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union, partly for protection, which helped pave the way for the Cuban Missile Crisis a year and a half later. Castro was now increasingly wary of further US intervention and more susceptible to Soviet suggestions of placing nuclear weapons on Cuba to ensure its security. There are still yearly nationwide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la Defensa' (Defense Day) to prepare the population for an invasion.

Invasion legacy for Cuban exiles

Many who fought for the CIA in the Bay of Pigs remained loyal after the fiasco. Some Bay of Pigs veterans became officers in the US Army in Vietnam, including 6 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels, 9 majors, and 29 captains. By March 2007, about half of the Brigade had died.

Popular culture references

In his book "Downsize This!", Michael Moore has a chapter called "Those Keystone Cubans", discussing US-Cuban relations. He says that the Bay of Pigs Invasion "...resembles an old Keystone Cops movie," due to the mismanagement of the operation.

The plot of the novel "American Tabloid," by James Ellroy, surrounds the lives of various fictional characters responsible for plotting the invasion. In the book, President Kennedy is assassinated by the planners as a direct result of his failure to provide U.S. military aid, particularly air support, to the exiles.

Playa Girón today

Little remains of the original village, which in the 1960s was small and remote. It is still remote, with just a single road to the village and out again, but it has grown markedly since the invasion. Few people there today were residents at the time. The road from the north is marked by frequent memorials to the Cuban dead. There are billboards marking where invaders were rounded up and showing pictures of their being led away. Another at the entrance to the village quotes Castro's comment that the Bay of Pigs was the "first defeat of Yankee imperialism." A two-room museum, with aircraft and other military equipment outside, shows pictures, arms and maps of the attack and photos of the Cuban soldiers who died. Billboards and other material refer to "mercenaries".

Notes

References

Anderson, Jon L. 1998 Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. Grove/Atlantic ISBN 0-8021-3558-7
Andrade, John (1982). Latin-American Military Aviation. Midland Counties. ISBN 0904597318
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Faria, Miguel, A, Cuba in Revolution—Escape from a Lost Paradise (2002) Hacienda Publishing, pp. 93–102, notes# 16 and 24. ISBN 0-9641077-3-2.
Franqui, Carlos 1984 (foreword by G. Cabrera Infante and translated by Alfred MacAdam from Spanish 1981 version) Family portrait with Fidel. 1985 edition Random House First Vintage Books, New York. ISBN 0394726200 pp. 111–128
Hagedorn, Dan (1993). Central American and Caribbean Air Forces. Air-Britain. ISBN 0851302106
Hagedorn, Dan and Hellström, Leif (1994). Foreign Invaders - The Douglas Invader in foreign military and US clandestine service. UK: Midland Publishing Limited. ISBN 1857800133.
Hagedorn, Dan (2006). Latin American Air Wars & Aircraft. Hikoki. ISBN 1902109449
Hunt, E. Howard 1973 Give us this day. Arlington House, New Rochelle, N.Y. ISBN 978-0870002281
Johnson, Haynes 1964 The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506. W. W. Norton & Co Inc. New York. 1974 edition ISBN 0-393-04263-4
Lagas, Jacques 1964 Memorias de un capitán rebelde. Editorial del Pácifico. Santiago, Chile.
Lazo, Mario 1968, 1970 Dagger in the heart: American policy failures in Cuba. Twin Circle. New York. I968 edition Library of Congress number 6831632, 1970 edition, ASIN B0007DPNJS
Lynch, Grayston L. 2000 Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs. Potomac Books Dulles Virginia ISBN 1-57488-237-6
de Paz-Sánchez, Manuel 2001 Zona de Guerra, España y la revolución Cubana (1960–1962), Taller de Historia, Tenerife Gran Canaria ISBN 8479263644
Priestland, Jane (editor) 2003 British Archives on Cuba: Cuba under Castro 1959–1962. Archival Publications International Limited, 2003, London ISBN 1-903008-20-4
Ros, Enrique 1994 (1998) Giron la verdadera historia. Ediciones Universales (Colección Cuba y sus jueces) third edition Miami ISBN 0-89729-738-5
Jean Edward Smith, "Bay of Pigs: The Unanswered Questions," The Nation, (Apr. 13, 1964), p. 360–363.
Somoza-Debayle, Anastasio and Jack Cox 1980 Nicaragua Betrayed Western Islands Publishers, pp. 169–180 ISBN 088279235
Thomas, Hugh 1998 Cuba or The Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press, New York Updated Ed. ISBN 0-306-80827-7
Thompson, Scott (2002). Douglas A-26 and B-26 Invader. UK. Crowood Press ISBN 1861265014
Triay, Victor 2001 Andres Bay of Pigs. University Press of Florida, Gainesville ISBN 0-8130-2090-5
Vivés, Juan (Pseudonym, of a former veteran and Castro Intelligence Official; Translated to Spanish from 1981 Les Maîtres de Cuba. Opera Mundi, Paris by Zoraida Valcarcel) 1982 Los Amos de Cuba. EMCÉ Editores, Buenos Aires. ISBN 9500400758
Welch, David A and James G Blight (editors) 1998 Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland Oregon ISBN 0-7146-4883-3 ISBN 0-7146-4435-8
Wyden, Peter 1979 Bay of Pigs Simon. and Schuster New York ISBN 0-671-24006-40