is a philosophical
concept of the capacity of an agent to act in a world. The agency is considered as belonging to that agent, even if that agent represents a fictitious character, or some other non-existent entity. The capacity to act does not at first imply a specific moral dimension to the ability to make the choice to act, therefore moral agency
is a distinct concept.
Human agency is the capacity for human beings to make choices and to impose those choices on the world. It is normally contrasted to natural forces
, which are causes involving only unthinking deterministic
processes. In this respect, agency is subtly distinct from the concept of free will
, the philosophical doctrine
that our choices are not the product of causal chains, but are significantly free or undetermined
. Human agency entails the uncontroversial, weaker claim that humans do in fact make decisions and enact them on the world. How
humans come to make decisions, by free choice or other processes, is another issue.
The capacity of a human to act as an agent is personal to that human, though considerations of the outcomes flowing from particular acts of human agency for us and others can then be thought to invest a moral component into a given situation wherein an agent has acted, and thus to involve moral agency. If a situation is the consequence of human decision making, persons may be under a duty to apply value judgments to the consequences of their decisions, and held to be responsible for those decisions. Human agency entitles the observer to ask should this have occurred? in a way that would be nonsensical in circumstances lacking human decisions-makers, for example, the impact of Shoemaker-Levy into Jupiter.
In certain philosophical traditions (particularly those established by Hegel
), human agency is a collective, historical dynamic, rather than a function arising out of individual behavior. Hegel's Geist
and Marx's universal class
expressions of this idea of humans treated as social beings, organized to act in concert.
Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 1-26.